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Very often, people have to make decisions where the available options are not certain. In such 
situations risk becomes an important factor that ought to be seriously considered. It is not 
difficult to find examples where the importance of handling risky situations properly can be 
crucial: from simple everyday consumption and savings plans to more complicated future 
investment plans about stocks, bonds and portfolio optimization. These decisions could be 
directly related to choices that could generate either gains or losses, or to situations where 
people have to decide among options where both gains and losses can be present. Furthermore, 
a number of factors directly related to the decision making can be manipulated and thus, risk 
preferences could be affected accordingly. The impact of higher stakes and the possibility of 
intertemporal choices during the decision process constitute two such factors. This dissertation 
studies the decision making process behind such choices in three different lab experiments which 
are outlined in Chapters 2, 3, 4. 
The analysis of the data collected from all the experiments is based on well-known decision 
theory models. Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) is the main model used in Chapter 2 for the analysis of risk preferences, which focuses on 
observations derived from gain-only questions. In Chapter 3, we complement EUT with 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the most 
comprehensive decision theory model that can account for sign-dependence in risk preferences. 
This is a necessary move since the experiment we describe in this Chapter includes questions for 
gains and losses, too. In Chapter 4, the scope of our experimental design is expanded further by 
including questions with mixed options, too. In that way, we can focus our analysis on the most 
crucial tenet of CPT, loss aversion. In Chapter 4, we also make use of the Dual Theory (DT) model, 
introduced by Yaari (1987); this is a much less used model compared to EUT and CPT, but it offers 
a different and especially simpler modelling perspective compared to CPT which can be useful to 
applied research in decision making.  
Apart from the above models, a second unifying link among all chapters is the implementation 
of treatments in all the experiments. The first treatment is the time delay treatment where 
choices are payable after a specific delay. The employment of such a treatment should not be a 
surprise since it has been found that time delay tends to direct risk preferences towards an 
increasingly risk tolerant behavior (Noussair and Wu, 2006).The second treatment is the 
magnitude treatment where the rewards of the options increase in value. Markowitz (1952) 
surmised that higher stakes could change risk preferences for both gains and losses through 
changes in utility curvature. The evidence support an increasingly risk averse behavior when 
people face choices with higher stakes, at least for gains (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992). 
Chapter 2 describes an experiment with a time delay treatment application, Chapter 3 contains 
an experiment where both time delay and magnitude treatments are applied and finally, in the 
experiment in Chapter 4 only a magnitude treatment is implemented. The implementation of 





and how the parameters of the decision theory models described above are affected. Ultimately, 
this will allow us to have a more complete understanding of the patterns of choice under risk. 
In the first experiment in Chapter 2, ƚŝƚůĞĚ “An experimental investigation of the interrelationship 
between risk and time ?, the research question follows the title and it is centred on the potential 
connection between intertemporal choice and risk attitudes. Recent literature points to such a 
connection, and most notably to a positive relationship between larger risk aversion and more 
pronounced levels of impatience (Burks et al., 2009). However, there is little research in the 
economics literature about the nature of this apparent relationship and especially on its 
robustness and how it can be affected when experimental treatments like time delay are 
implemented. This is the idea that motivated the lab experiment of this chapter. Our 
experimental design required the participants to match a range of rewards that were available 
at different points in time, that is, smaller rewards were on offer sooner and larger rewards were 
available after a time delay. Two different time delays were employed, two months and four 
months. Furthermore, for the risk decision making context, we use the same rewards as 
previously but now the sooner reward is a certain option while the larger reward is a risky one. 
In that way, we directly juxtapose the choices of the participants that were indicative of their 
time and risk preferences (For more details see the instructions in Appendixes A and B in Chapter 
2). On top of this matching experimental process, we also make use of the Eckel-Grossman (2008) 
experimental method, based on choice among different options. The Eckel-Grossman method is 
a simple and straightforward experimental design for the elicitation of risk preferences which 
also allows us to compare the robustness of the results of the matching process. This could be 
an important point because it is not unlikely the procedure invariance of the different 
experimental designs not to hold and subsequently, the extracted risk preferences of the two 
experimental designs to diverge (Tversky et al., 1988).  
The results of the experiment are consistent with the literature indicating an inverse relationship 
between risk and time parameters which is represented through a switch towards a more risk 
tolerant behavior although the change in the levels of patience is limited. On the other hand, the 
evidence supporting a more patient behavior is rather weak though. We have also found 
evidence that both risk and time parameters start to level off as time passes. The Eckel-Grossman 
method reaffirms more categorically the aforementioned findings by also points to unstable risk 
preferences and an increase in risk tolerance. We do not measure levels of patience with respect 
to the elicited risk preferences for the Eckel-Grossman method; thus, we are unable to confirm 
any relationship between risk and time conditional on the Eckel-Grossman method. Note that in 
our statistical analysis in this chapter we use both parametric and nonparametric techniques and 
the results we report remain largely unaffected. 
In the second experiment of Chapter 3, the research question is expanded since our experiment 
incorporates options that incur losses. Therefore, the focus is now on risk behavior for both gains 
and losses. According to CPT, the behavior in the gain domain should mirror the behavior in the 
loss domain, in the sense that the same options should lead to a risk averse behavior for gains 
leading to a concave utility segment, while risk seeking behavior prevails in the loss domain 
(convex utility). This is the reflection effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the investigation of 





curvature only, the role of nonlinear probability weighting for each domain is examined 
thoroughly. Two experimental treatments are implemented: the magnitude treatment (higher 
stakes) and a time delay treatment of four months. Our contribution to the literature is twofold: 
first, we investigate the impact of higher stakes on reflection effect, an issue on which the 
literature has not really focused despite evidence that higher stakes can challenge theories like 
CPT (Fehr-Duda et. al, 2010). Second, we also examine temporal risk preferences given the 
presence of probability weighting. To our knowledge, only Abdellaoui et al. (2011) have 
attempted a similar investigation but only for gains, whereas we expand the research to the loss 
domain, too. For the elicitation of risk preferences, we make use of the Holt and Laury (2002) 
experimental design for both gains and losses. In that way, we generate data that can be used 
for sign-dependent models and in addition, it can be used for the reflection effect hypothesis 
testing since the same rewards are employed in either domain. For the simultaneous estimation 
of the model parameters in either domain, we use the statistical technique of maximum 
likelihood. Through this technique we estimate the treatment effects for each parameter. 
Moreover, the calculation of standard errors allows us to perform a number of statistical tests 
for domain-specific parameters. 
The reflection effect hypothesis is confirmed for lower stakes, but when higher stakes are utilized 
it is statistically rejected, marginally though. Higher stakes also generate probability treatment 
effects in the loss domain leading to the emergence of risk attitudes that do not comply with 
reflection effect since a probabilistic risk averse behavior prevails for either domain. Note that 
this behavior is governed by the elevation parameter of the probability weighting function.The 
emergence of probability treatment effects points to a violation of separability: A separability 
condition between outcomes and decision weights means that changes in outcomes are 
reflected on utility only, whereas changes in probabilities should be reflected on probability 
weighting only. If changes across outcomes, like offering higher stakes, have also an impact on 
probability weighting then this condition is violated. We will refer the reader back to this 
definition throughout this thesis. Moreover, the utility fourfold pattern of Markowitz (1952) is 
generally satisfied when the sign-dependent EUT model is employed. Regarding the time delay 
impact, this is found only on probability weighting and only in the gain domain. The result is a 
more risk tolerant behavior, similar in nature to that of Chapter 2, but now this behavioral change 
is expressed probabilistically only. Furthermore, the absence of any effects in the loss domain, 
hints at an asymmetric temporal risk attitude between gains and losses, an attitude that 
resembles the sign effect in time discounting (Thaler, 1981). 
In Chapter 4, the concept of loss aversion constitutes the focal point of our research. Loss 
aversion, the idea that losses loom larger than equivalent magnitude gains, has found 
applications in various fields of economics beyond the laboratory. This chapter investigates the 
volatility of loss aversion for risky choices under higher stakes and has been partly motivated by 
the conjecture of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that loss aversion most likely increases with the 
stake size. A second motivation is that the literature, especially from other fields, has also shown 
that loss aversion can be unstable and context-dependent, but this has not been investigated for 
risky choices and by using an analytic econometric specification that allows the simultaneous 
estimation of all the model parameters of CPT. Even though the focus of our analysis is on loss 





as well; the treatment effects on the latter could be especially important since loss aversion 
manifests itself with respect to utility curvature in the loss domain, thus, disentangling these two 
parameters could be useful in comprehending the nature of loss aversion. To identify loss 
aversion in a CPT model, we have included mixed options, that is, options that include both 
negative and positive rewards. We include options in each domain with up to three rewards, a 
fact that is rather uncommon in the literature. The statistical technique of maximum likelihood 
is used in this chapter in order to estimate the model parameters as well as the corresponding 
treatment effects. Note that we also use of the DT model as well. This model has the advantage 
that it assumes linear utility and subsequently by employing it, we can fully disentangle loss 
aversion from utility curvature.  
The main result of the experiment of Chapter 4 is the sizeable increase in loss aversion which 
could double its value under higher stakes, a result that is robust to different treatment effects 
implementations on the CPT model parameters. Yet, for lower stakes loss neutrality prevails, 
since the loss aversion parameter always statistically equals one. Furthermore, we found 
differential domain effects on utility after controlling for any loss aversion change. These effects 
show little change in the utility for losses but much larger for gains, revealing thus the underlying 
mechanisms for CPT under higher stakes. Note also that probability treatment effects emerge 
only when we account for no treatment effects on loss aversion; this contradicts other papers 
which emphasize the role of probability weighting but without taking into account the presence 
of loss aversion (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010). This finding in particular should be viewed in 
conjunction with the analysis of Chapter 3. To conclude, a simple model like DT returns 
parameter estimates for loss aversion and probability weighting that are not qualitative different 
from those of CPT.  Ultimately, this signals that more parsimonious sign-dependent models than 
CPT are available and could be considered by researchers.  
In Chapter 5, we summarize the conclusions from the experiments outlined in the three previous 






















The objective of this study is to determine the interrelationship between the reported risk and 
time preferences of economic agents. We conduct a lab experiment where the participants 
match two different rewards available at different points in time. Then they match the same 
rewards but this time one reward is certain and the other is offered under risk. We test for the 
stability of the results by adopting as treatments varying time horizons of two and four months. 
We find a consistently negative relationship between risk and time parameters signalling a rising 
risk tolerant behavior but slight evidence of more patience. However, this relationship appears 
to be stabilized after four months. To test further the stability of risk preferences, we also use 
the Eckel-Grossman (2002, 2008) risk elicitation technique, and we vary the time horizon as 
previously. The main result is that there is a considerable increase in risk loving behavior for half 




















Virtually all economic decisions can be affected significantly by two different factors, risk and 
time. Therefore, they should be modeled in such a way so that to take into account the effect of 
both risk and time. For intertemporal choices, that is, the choice among different options taking 
place at different dates, the impact of time has generally been described by the exponential 
discounting model which can be dated back at least to Samuelson (1937). Likewise, for the 
modeling of risk, utility functional forms like the CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) have 
been employed in the context of decision theories like Expected Utility Theory (EUT) or more 
recently Prospect Theory (PT) to characterize the risk behavior of people.  
Measuring risk and time preferences separately tends to be easier but from an analytical and 
holistic point of view is not always satisfactory since risk and time parameters cannot always be 
separated from each other e.g. the Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) model. In recent years 
ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂŶĚƋƵĂŶƚŝĨǇĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ƌŝƐŬand 
time preferences in the laboratory and in the field (Coller and Williams, 1999; Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002; Dave et al., 2010; Takeuchi, 2011) as well as some that 
focus on simultaneously estimating risk and time preferences (Andersen et al., 2008; Ida and 
Goto, 2009; Tanaka et al., 2010). Although recent research suggests that risk and time could be 
somehow related (Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin et al., 2013) it is far from 
clear what lies at the root of this relationship and how it could be affected by manipulating the 
context of decision making.  
Anderhub et al. (2001) was one of the first attempts in the economic literature to examine 
experimentally how risk and time interact. In a lab experiment, participants were asked to offer 
a maximum price on buying a risky prospect given an initial endowment and then a minimum 
price on selling it. The incentives were real and were to be paid by deferred cheques at three 
different points in time: the present, in four weeks and in eight weeks. They report that greater 
risk aversion is related to lower levels of patience. Noussair and Wu (2006) also examined the 
intertemporal decision making. They adopt a Holt and Laury (2002) (hereafter HL) design and 
focus on testing the stability of risk preferences when the rewards are materialized in the present 
or in future dates. Noussair and Wu (2006) find that risk preferences tend not to be stable and 
in particular that risk aversion is falling as lotteries with rewards paid in the distant future are 
chosen. Anderson and Stafford (2009) also find that risk behavior is generally not stable across 
time, albeit they ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ŚŽǁ ĞǆĂĐƚůǇ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂůƚĞƌĞĚ. Like Anderhub et al. (2001), in their 
experiment participant ?Ɛimpatience levels are positively related to the levels of risk aversion. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) also report that participants can alter their preferences and become 
more risk tolerant for delayed lotteries and this conclusion holds even after accounting for non-
linear probability weighting. But the literature also offers contradictory results on the risk and 
time relationship. Van Praag and Booij (2003) using data from a large survey also find that risk 
and time preferences can be context- and model-dependent but this time greater risk aversion 
is associated with more patience. Cohen et al. (2011) find no correlation between risk and time 





Sagristano et al. (2002) offer a potential explanation regarding temporal instability via the 
exploitation the Construal Level Theory (CLT) which is based on the concept of psychological 
distance and more precisely, one of the four dimensions of psychological distance, the temporal 
distance (Liberman et al., 2007).  According to CLT, events which are not present are considered 
to be in distance from us and thus, they cannot be experienced directly. Consequently, situations 
which are related to a more distant future could be assigned more extreme values relative to 
situations of the present, that is, preferences could change because they are considered to be 
time-dependent (Trope and Liberman, 2000; Liberman et al., 2002). Sagristano et al. (2002) show 
that gambles at different points in time is possible to be perceived differently since people tend 
to prefer high probability gambles in the near future and lower probability gambles in the more 
distant future. In this manner, the probabilities of gambles could well be discounted just like 
monetary rewards leading to changes of risk preferences across time. Another important insight 
from the psychology literature is that despite the many notional similarities between delay and 
probability (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991), still they should not be viewed as the same decision 
making processes but rather as cognitively analogous processes that ought to be examined under 
similar experimental and methodological procedures (see Green and Myerson (2004) for a 
survey). However, this insight does not address the interactions between risk and time but it 
treats risk and time as separate dimensions.  
In a seminal paper, Keren and Roelofsma (1995) investigated experimentally the effect of risk 
and time on each other. They conducted an experiment where the rewards were offered at 
different points in time and simultaneously the probability of realization of the rewards varies. 
dŚĞǇƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĐĂŶďĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇďŽƚŚƌŝƐŬĂŶĚƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŵŽƌĞ risk 
averse agents discount more steeply compared to less risk averse agents. In addition, the effect 
of the risk factor on time preferences, through the manipulation of the probabilities of 
realization, seems to be larger than vice versa. Although the scope of Keren and Roelofsma 
(1995) is quite broad, their findings imply a tradeoff between time and risk. These results mean 
that people may equate risk and time, at least partially, and thus, but also offer empirical support 
for qualitative differences between risk and time beyond the single process idea. The analysis in 
Keren and Roelofsma (1995) is partly based on the idea that certainty effect of PT can be 
expanded to include time delay: then, a time delay could change the certainty perception of a 
reward into a probabilistic one since it may be viewed as adding risk to a non-risky reward, 
potentially due to risks associated with having to wait for future rewards. As a result, preference 
reversals may follow. A well-known example of certainty effect is the Allais paradox (Weber and 
Chapman, 2005). 
The assumption that risk and time can be viewed in a similar fashion, has paved the way for a 
handful of theoretical models on the relationship between risk and time. Two papers are of 
particular interest: Baucells and Heukamp (2012) propose the Probability and Time Trade-off 
model (PTT) based on this assumption that risk and time could play the role of quantifiers of 
psychological distance. The PTT model can combine the probability perception as expressed 
through a probability weighting function with falling discount rates in the form of hyperbolic-
type discount functions and explain preference reversals in the light of time delay (see Baucells 
and Heukamp (2010) for an application). Furthermore, Halevy (2008) exploits the concept of 





discounting factor and on a hazard rate (the probability of consumption up until a specific point 
in time). Thus, a relationship between time discounting and the probability of survival can be 
established.  
This chapter contributes to the relatively small literature that exploits real incentives for the 
investigation of the interactions between risk and time preferences (Anderhub, 2001; Noussair 
and Wu, 2006; Anderson and Stafford, 2009; Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 
2011). More precisely, we perform an experiment where we delay the availability for both the 
risky and the intertemporal choices. We use decision questions on time discounting and on 
probability assessment for time and risk preference respectively. Regarding the probabilities 
scale, we do not focus solely at its end points but we try to span the whole range of it. This is an 
advantage compared to Anderson and Stafford (2009) and Baucells and Heukamp (2010) which 
in combination with the analogous variation in rewards offers a more balanced experimental 
approach. This is an important point since Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) have shown that 
tolerance for delay can be affected by the composition (skewness) of the gambles. The risk and 
time parameters are extracted thrice, at the present and by delaying them by two months and 
four months, much larger than the delays, up to eight weeks, offered by Anderhub et al. (2001) 
and Anderson and Stafford (2009) albeit smaller than of Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Baucells and 
Heukamp (2010) which can be up to one year. The monetary incentives we employ for both types 
of questions are always the same, a fact that allows us to contrast directly the risk and time 
parameters and to track effectively the nature of their relationship. Note that Anderhub et al. 
(2001) use a similar trick but they do not examine the stability of the risk and time preferences. 
The experimental results indicate that there is indeed an interaction between risk and time 
leading to an increasingly risk tolerant behavior. Regarding time preferences, we can only find a 
small tendency for a more patient behavior for the first two months. In addition, we find some 
evidence of stabilization for both risk and time preferences. This means that both risk and time 
indicators display less variability as the time horizon becomes lengthier. This is a finding which 
to our knowledge has not been reported earlier in the economics literature. We also utilize 
another experimental approach, the popular Eckel-Grossman (hereafter EG) (2002, 2008) 
method where risk parameters are derived based on interval estimates of the CRRA utility 
function. In this manner, we can better determine how risk behavior is affected by two different 
risk elicitation techniques. The experimental results again indicate, more emphatically, that time 
delay affects risk behavior since ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌŝƐŬĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĨŽůůŽǁƐĂĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐƉĂƚƚĞƌŶǁŚĞŶ
decisions are paid in future dates.   
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we discuss the methodology behind the 
experiment, in Section 2.3 we present the experimental design and in Section 2.4 we present the 
results. In Section 2.5 we draw some final conclusions.  
 
2.2 Methodology        
In this section we describe the methodological approach behind the decision questions of the 





ܸ ൌ ܣ כ ܶሺݐሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where ܸis the subjective value of the delayed reward after delay ݐ, ܣ the value of the same 
reward undiscounted (the objective value) and ܶሺݐሻ the discount indicator. Assume an individual 
who is indifferent between two different options timed at different points in time, that is, ሺݔଵǡ ݐଵሻ ?ሺݔଶǡ ݐଶሻ where ݔଵ ൏ ݔଶ and  ݐଵ ൏ ݐଶ. dŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
subjective value of the future reward has to be adjusted properly. This adjustment implies a 
devaluation which is due to the presence of the discount indicatorܶሺݐሻ.Then, the subjective 
value of ݔଶis equal toݔଶ כ ܶሺݐሻ. Thus, being indifferent between the two rewards means that ݔଵ ൌ ݔଶ כ ܶሺݐሻ ֜ ܶሺݐሻ ൌ ݔଵ ݔଶ ? ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Therefore, the discount indicator can described by the ratio of the two rewards. Essentially we 
adopt a nonparametric approach in modeling the discount indicators without assuming any 
particular functional form for them. Thus, we call it a discount indicator since we are not 
interested in revealing its precise form and henceforth, for convenience, we drop the 
argumentݐand we use the simple notationܶ. 
To test the stability of both the risk and time preferences, one can vary the timing of the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛdecision making, called henceforth time horizon. This can be done by moving forward 
the time horizon from the present to the future, and more specifically in two ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĂŶĚfour 
ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ƚŝŵĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ďǇĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŚŽƌŝǌŽŶǁĞĂƌe able to check 
how firm the iŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛpreferences are and comment on their variations across time. To 
discern among the time horizons, we introduce an index notation where each time horizon is 
indexed with a number from 1 to 3. Based on this notation, we define ଵܶ to be the discount 
indicator when the time horizon is the present,  ଶܶ and ܶ ଷ to be the discount indicators for a time 
horizon of two months and four months respectively (see Fig. 2.1 below). 
 
 
                                                    ȟ ଵܶǡଶ                                  ȟ ଶܶǡଷ 
   
                           ݐ ൌ  ?                                     ݐ ൌ  ?                                  ݐ ൌ  ?      
                                                    ȟܮଵǡଶ                                   ȟܮଶǡଷ 
   
                           ݐ ൌ  ?                                     ݐ ൌ  ?                                   ݐ ൌ  ?      
Note: The indices t=0, t=2 and t=4, correspond to the present, two and four months respectively. 
Fig. 2.1 The time reference frame for discount indicators and loss functions 
 
Next we ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĂŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƌŝƐŬďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ. Assume that an individual who 





is offered after playing a lottery i.e. ሺݔଵǡ  ?ሻ ?ሺݔଶǡ ݌ሻ where ݔଵǡ ݔଶሺݔଵ ൏ ݔଶሻ are the certain and 
risky rewards respectively and ݌the lowest acceptable winning odds for the lottery. In this 
gamble-related method we contrast a gamble with a certain outcome which plays the role of the 
certainty equivalent of the gamble. Assuming a behavior consistent with EUT, the expected value 
of the risky reward should equal the certain reward, that is, ݔଵ ൌ ݌ כ ݔଶ ֜ ݌ ൌ ݔଵ ݔଶ ? ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
dŚŝƐ ŝŵƉůŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĂƚŝŽ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ƌĞǁĂƌĚƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ƌĞǀĞĂů ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƐƚŝĐ
assessment of the risky reward. In that way we can elicit a probability assessments for a gamble 
at various levels of rewards.  
 
To characterize better ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞ Ă ůŽƐƐ ĨƵŶĐƚion defined by the 
equation   ܮ ൌ ܥܧ െ ሺ݌ כ ݎሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where ܥܧ the certain reward and ݎ the risky reward of the lottery. This loss function is also 
indexed with respect to the time horizons i.e. ܮ௧ǡ ݐ ൌ1, 2, 3. The sign of the loss function 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌŝƐŬďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?/Ĩܮ ൏  ?the individual can be described as risk 
averse since the certainty equivalent is smaller than the expected value of the lottery. If on the 
other hand, ܮ ൐  ? the individual can be classified as risk lover since she is willing to take greater 
risks in the lottery compared to the value of the certainty equivalent and if ܮ ൌ  ?the individual 
is risk neutral. 
We are also interested in the change of both the discount indicators and the loss function across 
time periods. Therefore, we employ the following transformations ȟ ௧ܶǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ௧ܶାଵ െ ௧ܶ  and ȟܮ௧ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ܮ௧ାଵ െ ܮ௧. Subsequently, we generate the variables ȟ ଵܶǡଶ ൌ ଶܶ െ ଵܶ, ȟ ଶܶǡଷ ൌ ଷܶ െ ଶܶ 
for the discount indicators and ȟܮଵǡଶ ൌ ܮଶ െ ܮଵ, ȟܮଶǡଷ ൌ ܮଷ െ ܮଶ  for the loss functions. These 
variables represent the change of ௧ܶǡ ܮ௧across the two time intervals i.e. from present to two 
months and from two months to four months as defined by the three different time horizons 
earlier. To enhance further our analysis, we introduce the concept of time reference frame. 
Imagine that time is represented by a time line, like the real numbers line, where all the three 
time horizons are ordered. A time reference frame corresponds to the relative position of ȟ ௧ܶǡ௧ାଵ 
and ȟܮ௧ǡ௧ାଵ  on this time line1. For example, ȟ ଵܶǡଶ  ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĚƚǁŽŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?
time horizon while ȟ ଶܶǡଷ ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚǁŽĂŶĚĨŽƵƌŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ƚŝŵĞŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶ
if their relative position on the time line is different, since ȟ ଶܶǡଷ ŚĂƐďĞĞŶ “ƉƵƐŚĞĚ ?ĞǀĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
into the future by starting two months later, their equal delay difference of two months makes ȟ ଵܶǡଶ and ȟ ଶܶǡଷ directly comparable (see also Fig. 2.1).  Evidently, the time reference frame 
concept holds for both ȟܮଵǡଶ and ȟܮଶǡଷ.  
                                                          
1This concept draws an analogy with analytic geometry where vectors are considered equivalent as long as they 
have the same length even if they are not located at the same points in a vector space. Thus, in our case   ? ଵܶǡଶǡ  ? ଶܶǡଷ 
can be considered equivalent and compared directly since they span the same time period, two months, despite 





Regarding time preferences, we define three different types based on the sign of ȟ ௧ܶǡ௧ାଵ. If ȟ ௧ܶǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ௧ܶାଵ െ ௧ܶ ൏  ?, then the individual is becoming more impatient (or less patient) 
between periods ݐ and ݐ ൅  ? since she chooses not to delay further the payment; we call such a 
behavior time-increasing impatience. If ȟ ௧ܶǡ௧ାଵ ൌ  ?the level of impatience does not change 
(time-constant impatience) and if ȟ ௧ܶǡ௧ାଵ ൐  ?individuals are becoming less impatient (or more 
patient) by opting for a more distant payment (time-decreasing impatience). Similarly, if ȟܮ௧ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ܮ௧ାଵ െ ܮ௧ ൐  ?, the loss function increases and hence, the individual can sustain larger 
losses which means that she  becomes more risk loving; we call such a behavior time-decreasing 
risk aversion. If ȟܮ௧ǡ௧ାଵ ൏  ?the loss function decreases (time-increasing risk aversion) and the 
individual becomes more risk averse. Finally, if ȟܮ௧ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ  ? ƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌŝƐŬƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĚŽŶ ?ƚ
change (time-constant risk aversion). 
 
2.3 The experiment 
Eighty-four students of the University of Kent participated in the experiment. All participants had 
been notified in advance that a £5 show-up fee would be awarded to each one of them at the 
end of the experiment irrespective of their answers. They were also informed that they had the 
opportunity to win up to £50 depending on their answers. The experiment lasted about one hour. 
The experiment consisted of five parts. The first two parts contained ten questions each and the 
next two of twenty questions each. The final part contained three questions. In total, all 
participants had to answer sixty-three questions. Separate instruction and answer sheets were 
available for the questions of each part of the experiment.  
2.3.1 Time discounting and probability assessment 
In part1, participants had to match two different rewards available at different points in time. 
The smaller reward was available immediately whereas the larger reward was available after 
some delay. They were asked to specify the longest acceptable delay for receiving the late and 
larger reward according to their preferences so that at the end to be indifferent between the 
two rewards. More precisely, each respondent had to answer ten questions of the following 
form2:  
For me, getting £ݔ today is just as good as getting £ݕ in ݇,  
where ݇ is the longest acceptable time delay the respondent considers appropriate for this 
intertemporal choice so that to be indifferent between ݔ and ݕ.Time delay ݇was to be selected 
from a list with seven available choices ranging from one week to four months. The values of ݔǡ ݕ 
ranged from £10-£50 and were sequentially incremented by £10 and it is always ݕ ൐ ݔ. 
                                                          
2The experimental design we have adopted for the first four parts follows closely that of Takeuchi (2011) with some 
modifications. First, we offer specific time delays options e.g. one month, two months, since this is a paper-and-
pencil experiment. Moreover, a different probability scale with fewer options is available and a varying time horizon 
treatment has been implemented for checking the stability of the elicited risk and time preferences. Finally, we offer 





In part 2, the questions were on risk preferences and subjective probability assessment. The 
participants had to match a certain reward with a risky one, the latter being available after 
playing a lottery. More precisely, they were asked to specify the lowest acceptable odds for 
winning the lottery according to their likings, so that at the end to be indifferent between the 
certain reward and the risky reward. The questions were of the form: 
For me, getting £ݔ for certain is just as good as getting £ݕ with chance ݉%,  
where ݉ is the lowest acceptable odds level that the respondent considers most appropriate for 
winning a lottery. The odds level was to be selected from a range of 10%-90% odds levels 
arranged in a line. The values of ݔǡ ݕ are defined as before.  
We employ two treatments, both of which aim at testing if and how time discounting and risk 
preferences are affected by the introduction of an additional time delay. This additional time 
delay results in the change of time horizon and in the shift of the time reference frame. We have 
chosen two different values for this additional time delay, two months and four months.  This is 
a useful feature because it is far from easy to collect data from the same participants at different 
points in time to examine the long-ƚĞƌŵ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?preferences3.The decision 
questions for part 3 with a time horizon of two and four months were of the form: 
Imagine yourself ݐ months from now. Then, 
For me, getting £ݔ, is just as good as getting £ݕ in ݇, 
where the time delay ݇ and the rewards ݔ and ݕare define as previously.Obviously, ݐ takes two 
different values here: two months and four months. Likewise, the decision questions on the 
winning odds for part 4 were of the form:  
Imagine yourself t months from now. Then, 
For me, getting £ݔ for certain is just as good as getting £ݕ with chance ݉% 
where ݔǡ ݕǡ ݉ǡ ݐ are defined as before4.In Table 2.1 that follows, we offer a succinct summary of 
the experimental methods and the treatments that were applied in the experiment. To put it 
briefly, two risk elicitation methods are used (the aforementioned probability assessment and 
the EG method that follows) and the time discounting method. For every method the same 
treatments are applied.  
 
 
                                                          
3A similar technique called FED (Front End Delay) has become popular in economics after being introduced by Coller 
and Williams (1999). By using FED, that is, offering money after a specific time delay, one can mitigate the immediacy 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽƉƌĞĨĞƌŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƌĞǁĂƌĚƐŽǀĞƌŵŽƌĞĚŝƐƚĂŶƚŽƵƚĐŽŵes), an effect considered to be 
the main reason behaving hyperbolic-type discounting (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Myerson and Green, 1995). 
In that way, one estimates lower discount rates which are better interpretable for policy purposes. 
4Note that care has been taken to avoid order effects by randomizing the distribution of the risk and time related 
questions. We do not observe significant order effects either for discount indicators or for loss functions, apart from 
the p-value of the t-test for the discount indicator ଵܶ which is 0.011. However, when we use the sign test, because 







Table 2.1 Description of the experiment 
























2.3.2 The Eckel-Grossman method 
Lastly, a version of the Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) (EG) method is adopted. This simple and 
easy to implement method allows us to estimate the risk parameters of a participant after 
assuming that her utility is of CRRA functional form. More importantly, it offers us an alternative 
way to estimate risk preferences based on objective probability estimates this time in contrast 
to the subjective probability-based techniques. In this method, each participant is presented with 
six different gambles and is asked to choose only one of them. Each gamble is comprised of two 
rewards of different magnitude, one smaller and one larger. Both rewards are equally likely to 
be realized, 50% winning chance for each. Note that the gambles are presented in such an order 
so that the expected value and the variance of the gambles to increase as the participants move 
from the first to the final gamble5 (see Table 2.2 ? ?dŚĞŶ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ǁĞ
can deduce the range of the values the CRRA coefficient can assume. The EG method has also 
been employed with the same varying time horizons of two and four months as the other four 
parts. In that way, we can cast an alternative look on the stability of the risk parameters even 
though under the EG method we are not able to track any possible tradeoff between risk and 
time since the time dimension is not investigated in this part.  
 










Gamble 1 14 14 14 0 3.46൏ ݎ 
Gamble 2 12 18 15 3 1.16൏ ݎ ൏3.46 
Gamble 3 10 22 16 6 0.71൏ ݎ ൏1.16 
Gamble 4 8 26 17 9 0.5൏ ݎ ൏0.71 
Gamble 5 6 30 18 12 0൏ ݎ ൏0.5 
Gamble 6 1 35 18 17 ݎ ൏0 
                                                          
5Notice that the first gamble has zero variance (zero variability in rewards) implying a sure reward of £14. Moreover, 
gambles 5 and 6 have the same expected value but gamble 6 is riskier since it has larger variance. As the difference 
of rewards increases, the variance also increases and the gambles become more risky. The participants were not 






2.3.3 Payment procedure 
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1964) mechanism was utilized so that the responses to 
be as truthful as possible6.At the end of each session, one participant and then one decision 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞƌĂŶĚŽŵůǇƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ?/ĨƚŚĂƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŽŶƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
time delay answer to that question was compared to a random number representing the range 
of the time delays, measured in days, from 7 to 120. If the random number was larger or equal 
to the ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛ answer, then she would receive the sooner reward. Otherwise, she would 
receive the larger reward after the delay she has opted for. In contrast, if the chosen question 
was on probability assessment ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ƌĂŶĚŽŵ
number ranging from 10 to 90. If the random number was smaller than her answer then she 
would receive immediately the certain reward, otherwise she would play the lottery and her 
odds of winning the lottery were equal to that random number. Subsequently, a new random 
number ranging between 0 and 100 would be generated; if the sum of the two random numbers 
was equal or larger to 100, then the participant would receive the larger reward. Otherwise, she 
would receive 25% of the certain reward. Finally, if the chosen question was on the EG method, 
then a random number from 0 to 100 was generated; if that number was smaller than 50, the 
participant would receive the lower reward of her chosen gamble, otherwise she would receive 
the higher reward. The payment process was exactly the same when the treatments were 
introduced. The only difference now is that the payment is deferred by a period equal to the time 
horizon. (The instructions of the experiment and a sample of the questions are in the 
Appendices). 
For those questions where the payment had to be deferred, it is important the participant to be 
fully convinced that she would receive the money for certain, otherwise she may not select her 
truly preferred option. This is a critical point which could have an impact on time-related 
questions especially and should be confronted effectively. Therefore, in order the incentive 
scheme to be as reliable as possible, we offer the future rewards in the form of guaranteed post-
dated cheque (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). In that way we eliminate whatever kind of risk can 
be associated with the credibility of a future payment. In that way, we are able to remove 
potentially nuisance factors that exist in real world and could jeopardize the quality of our data. 
In essence, we isolate the effect of the time delay treatments only on the discounting of 
preferences. This is an advantage of the lab experiments compared to real world settings where 
such control is very difficult.    
In our study we have followed the paradigm of experimental economics and we have opted for 
real incentives to be awarded to participants. In a sense, we adopt the popular in experimental 
economics concept of saliency advocated by Smith (1982) which implies that the incentives 
                                                          
6The BDM mechanism is obviously the first option since it has been used widely as a preference elicitation 
mechanism in economic experiments. Other options like the quadratic and linear scoring rules do exist and have 
been used before in economic experiments (e.g. Andersen et al.(2014)) but we believe that BDM is the simplest and 
most easily understood option for our experiment. Note also that BDM implicitly assumes that agents are EUT 






should be real so that to directly impact the actions taken by the participants7.This was done 
with the hope that our results would carry a greater degree of validity and credibility. 
Nonetheless, in psychology and other social sciences, the use of hypothetical incentives is not 
uncommon at all; the differences actually between different types of incentives may not be 
particularly significant (e.g. Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Camerer, 1995). Interestingly, one can find 
cases where some economists have defended hypothetical payment procedures. Loewenstein 
and Thaler (1989) for example stress that hypothetical incentives allow for larger stakes and 
larger delays to be used in the experimental process. This is indeed a valid argument which could 
possibly affect the experimental results because it does not offer us full control over two crucial 
factors, the magnitude of the incentives and the length of the time horizon8.  
 
2.4 Results 
In Section 2.4.1 we present the results of time discounting and probability assessment initially 
and then in Section 2.4.2 the results of the EG method. To enrich the conclusions, the statistical 
analysis is both parametric and nonparametric. At first, we examine the risk and time parameters 
relationship and then its implications, the increasing risk tolerance and the apparent stabilization 
for the risk and time parameters. Note that henceforth we will use the terms loss function and 
risk interchangeably, and likewise the same holds for the words discount indicator and time. 
2.4.1 The T-L analysis   
At first, we examine the relationship between the discount indicator and the loss function. Table 
2.3 gives the results of three different methods used in examining this relationship: the classic 
Pearson correlation coefficient, the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation coefficient and 
the OLS estimator. The Stata 15 software package has been used for the econometric and 
statistical analysis in this chapter. For the two correlation coefficients the results are negative, 
quite close in value and statistically significant at 1% although they are relatively weak since none 
of them is above 0.224 in absolute value9. This signals an inverse relationship between discount 
indicator and loss function hinting at a more risk tolerant behavior accompanied by decreasing 
patience. This conclusion is also confirmed after using an OLS estimator where the risk and time 
relationship remains negative and statistically significant. It is also unaffected if we use gender 
and age as explanatory variables10. Another point that we can easily see in Table 2.3, where the 
correlations between ܶ and ܮ and the estimates from a regression of ܶ on ܮ are presented, is 
that the value for both coefficients and the OLS estimator declines, in absolute value, after two 
months. Beyond this time period it seems that a stabilization process starts with little-changing 
values between two and four months. It is likely that this is an indication that the negative 
relationship between risk and time is initially falling and then reaches a plateau when decision 
                                                          
7The other major preconditions for a valid microeconomic experiment according to Smith (1982) (i.e. nonsatiation 
and monotonicity of the utility function) can safely assumed to be satisfied given that we offer monetary rewards 
of significant amount for students. 
8See also Bardsley et al. (2010), Chapter 6, for a further discussion about the necessity of real incentives and the 
differences regarding incentives between economics and psychology.  
9Another non-ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚƌŝĐĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?<ĞŶĚĂůů ?ƐƚĂƵĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƌĞƚƵƌŶƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƋƵĂůŝƚĂtive results. 





making is made further in the future. We suspect that this could be due to a declining variation 
for both the risk and time indicators as time horizon shifts. We present below in Fig. 2.2 three 
different estimators that have been plotted together for all the time horizons: OLS, a locally 
weighted regression (Cleveland, 1979) and the local polynomial estimator. The negative 
association of ܶ ௧ െ ܮ௧ is graphically verified by all plots. However, to offer a precise interpretation 
for this relationship in terms of risk and time preferences we have to analyze separately the loss 
functions and the discount indicators. 
 
Table 2.3 Correlation coefficients and OLS estimator between ܶ and ܮ11 
 Pearson correlation 
coefficient 
Spearman coefficient OLS regression 
ଵܶ െ ܮଵ ߩ ൌ -0.222*** ߩ ൌ -0.224*** -0.789*** ଶܶ െ ܮଶ ߩ ൌ -0.186*** ߩ ൌ -0.165*** -0.579*** ଷܶ െ ܮଷ ߩ ൌ -0.186*** ߩ ൌ -0.173*** -0.594*** ܰ 84 84 84 ܶ 10 10 10 
Statistical significance:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Fig. 2.2 Loss function and discount indicator plots per time horizon 
 
                                                          
11The number of participants in the experiment were ܰ ൌ84 and the number of tasks per treatment were ܶ ൌ10. 
Note that 12 questions were unanswered and were dropped from the data. So, instead of 840 observations, 828 








We turn our attention to the loss functions now. Table 2.4 reports the loss functions results for 
all the time horizons. Risk aversion is the dominant behavior in every horizon followed by risk 
loving behavior and then risk neutrality. However, since the probability scale of the experiment 
includes a limited range of winning odds options, we do not really concentrate on the pure 
categorization of risk preferences but rather, on the direction and the magnitude of the loss 
function change.  One can discern a specific albeit weak pattern in our data: there is a small 
tendency towards an increasing risk loving behavior, around 2.3 percentage points after two 
months. This change is attributable almost exclusively to a constantly falling risk neutrality. 
Notice that risk aversion does not participate in this tradeoff since it fluctuates very little. When 
the time horizon shifts to four months, this tendency towards a more risk loving behavior is 
practically unaffected. So, the shift of the time horizon by an additional two months does not 
impact risk attitudes, a fact ƚŚĂƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƐŬƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂĨƚĞƌĂĨŽƵƌŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?
time period. In addition, there is practically no change regarding the risk behavior classification 












Number of questions and corresponding percentage rates in parentheses 
 
For the statistical testing of the loss functionsܮଵǡ ܮଶǡ ܮଷ we use both parametric and non-
parametric tests.  As we can see in Table2.5, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test clearly shows that 
loss functions do change when the time horizon varies. The p-values of 0.051 and 0.045 show 
that in general the distribution of the loss functions ܮଶǡ ܮଷ  should not be considered the same 
as that of 1L . On the other hand, the p-value of 0.841 for the distributional hypothesis ܮଶ ൌܮଷshows that after two months the loss functions distributions can be safely considered as 
indistinguishable. We can also see here that the p-values for the parametric t-test are close to 
those of the signed-rank test and qualitatively do not alter our conclusions. Actually the t-tests 
show that it is even easier to distinguish between ܮଵǡ ܮଶ where (݌ ൌ0.021). All in all, these tests 
suggest that the differences between the loss functions are eliminated when the time horizon 
moves beyond two months. This constitutes a statistical confirmation of the stabilization process 
but from the angle of the risk dimension only12. 
We now turn our attention on how the risk and time attitudes of the participants vary over the 
time reference frames. Therefore, we make use of the already specified variables ȟ ଵܶǡଶǡ ȟ ଶܶǡଷ and ȟଵǡଶǡ ȟଶǡଷ13. For the time discount indicators (see Table 2.6), the change in time reference 
frame generates a tradeoff between time-decreasing impatience and time-constant impatience, 
that is, around 13% rise in constant levels of impatience and simultaneously an equivalent 
decline in rising patience. This noteworthy tradeoff is conditional on a virtually unaffected time-
increasing impatience behavior (29.6% vs. 29.95%). The obvious conclusion here is that there is  
 
Table 2.5 Tests for the loss functions 
 Wilcoxon signed-rank test T-test  ܮଵ ൌ ܮଶ ݌ ൌ0.051 ݌ ൌ0.021 ܮଵ ൌ ܮଷ ݌ ൌ0.045 ݌ ൌ0.062 ܮଶ ൌ ܮଷ ݌ ൌ0.841 ݌ ൌ0.777 
 
                                                          
12The statistical analysis of the discount indicators ଵܶǡ ଶܶǡ ଷܶdoes not produce any meaningful results. Note though 
that the amount of zeros between ଶܶǡ ଷܶ is much larger than of the other two pairs implying a kind of stabilization 
for the time dimension as well. 
13We have avoided using the variable ȟ ଵܶǡଷ and  ?ܮଵǡଷ because the time interval between the two periods is four 
months and not two months. 





a trend towards stabilization of the discounting process which seems to be intensified in the time 
reference frame between two and four months14. Yet, for the first two months our data shows a 
slight prevalence of a more patient behavior compared to a less one (32.48 vs. 29.6%, see Table 
2.6). But then, this increase in patience is associated with a rising risk loving behavior for the 
same time interval (Table 2.4). So, for the first two months we can detect a slight co-movement 
of more patience and more risk tolerance. In any case, t-test cannot statistically confirm any 
switch in preferences between the two time reference frames (the bootstrap t-test with 2000 
replications returns confidence intervals for the mean [-1.8, 3.9]), an indication that the 
stabilization process for the time indicator amplifies after the first two months.  
 






impatience ȟ ଵܶǡଶ 269 (32.48%) 245 (29.6%) 314 (37.92%) ȟ ଶܶǡଷ 159 (19.2%) 248 (29.95%) 421 (50.85%) 
Number of questions and corresponding percentage rates in parentheses 
 
Regarding the loss function now (Table 2.7), we observe that time-increasing risk aversion is 
falling, around 5.7 percentage points, and there is also a very small decline in decreasing risk 
aversion by 1.2 percentage points.  In turn, these changes are reflected in a rise of around 6.8 
percentage points of a time-constant risk aversion behavior due to the time reference frame 
change. Hence, this implies a tradeoff mostly between the falling level of a rising risk averse 
behavior and increasing risk neutrality across time intervals, in the same spirit as the tradeoff 
between risk loving and risk neutrality earlier (see Table 2.4). Although this trend seems to be 
relatively weak since the variation of the loss functions is not that large, a one-sided t-test returns ݌ ൌ0.048 favoring the alternative hypothesis  ?ܮଶǡଷ ൐  ?ܮଵǡଶ which means that moving the time 
reference frame forward can still lead to a more risk tolerant behavior.  
 
Table 2.7 Change in risk behavior based on time reference frame 





aversion ȟܮଵǡଶ 214 (25.84%) 253 (30.55%) 361 (43.6%) ȟܮଶǡଷ 204 (24.63%) 206 (24.88%) 418 (50.48%) 
Number of questions and corresponding percentage rates in parentheses 
 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐůŽŽŬĂƚ&ŝŐ ?2.3 which depicts the box plots for ȟ ଵܶǡଶǡ ȟ ଶܶǡଷǡ ȟܮଵǡଶǡ ȟܮଶǡଷ. As you can 
see the variation for all these variables declines steadily across time irrespective of the time 
                                                          
14We shun talking about concepts like hyperbolic discounting or exponential discounting. The methodologies we 
have employed for determining the nature of discounting based on Takeuchi (2011) and Anderhub et al. (2001), fail 





reference frame and an increasing numbers of severe outliers are observed (Table 2.8). We have 
tested for the equality of variances for the pairs ȟ ଵܶǡଶǡ ȟ ଶܶǡଷ and ȟܮଵǡଶǡ ȟܮଶǡଷƵƐŝŶŐ>ĞǀĞŶĞ ?ƐƌŽďƵƐƚ
test statistic. The p-values this test returns are 0.000 and 0.01 for the first and the second pair 
respectively confirming that we can confidently reject the null hypothesis of equal variances for 
both pairs, ȟ ଵܶǡଶǡ ȟ ଶܶǡଷ and  ȟܮଵǡଶǡ ȟܮଶǡଷ. This decline in variation, which is much more evident for 
the time than the risk indicators, may prompt one to assume that for these variables, as time 
horizon increases, they will all start converging towards zero and past a specific time horizon, 
one should expect that they will be zero. This would imply that we may reach a point where both ௧ܶǡ ܮ௧ would reach a specific value, a kind of steady-state value so that ௧ܶ ൌ ܶ and  ܮ௧ ൌ ܮ. Thus, 
a stabilization of preferences could follow. This may be due to an increasing difficulty to 
distinguish between different rewards for probabilistic or intertemporal choices. But in any case, 
we want to avoid rushing into hasty conclusions since we were unable to make use of multiple 
and lengthier time horizons. 
To summarize the above analysis, we keep the following basic conclusions: an inverse 
relationship between risk and time parameters (i.e. rising risk tolerance and more patience) is 
established for all time horizons but it is relatively small, a result close to Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
who found ߩ ൌ-0.23. Importantly, this relationship weakens and then apparently becomes 
stable after four months. This inverse relationship is translated to a more risk tolerant behavior 
or equivalently a falling risk averse behavior with the passage of time, a position that the 
literature broadly supports (Noussair and Wu, 2006; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Savadori and 
Mittone, 2015). We find some weak evidence of an apparently more patient behavior but only 
for the first two months. This blurred picture we get is part of the mixed results that appear in 
the literature on the interaction between risk and time (van Praag and Booij, 2003; Cohen et al., 
2011). Note here that contrary to the evidence for a more patient behavior, the change in 
attitude towards an increasing risk loving behavior can be viewed more clearly. Perhaps an 
explanation for this result is that the impact of time delay is not particularly severe as Keren and 
Roelofsma (1995) have already shown. Finally, we report some evidence for a stabilization 
process for both risk and time. We are unaware of a similar finding in the literature, but it is likely 
that CLT can offer some insight here: Liberman et al. (2002) mention that future events tend to 
be more extreme in value and at the same time to exhibit less variability. By incorporating time 
delay into a risky choice, participants not only become more risk lovers, a more extreme 
behavior, but also their risk behavior becomes less variable after some time. Thus, this last 









Table 2.8 Standard deviations and severe outliers, low and high bounds15 
 ȟ ଵܶǡଶ ȟ ଶܶǡଷ ȟܮଵǡଶ ȟܮଶǡଷ 













Fig. 2.3 Box plots for ȟܶǡ ȟܮ 
 
 
2.4.2 The Eckel-Grossman method results 
The last part of the experiment is the EG (2002, 2008) technique. This technique allows us to 
contrast the results on risk preferences elicited under experimental designs of different nature. 
EG is an experimental technique where participants can choose the gamble they prefer whereas 
in the previous parts we have implemented a matching procedure where the participants would 
match their subjective estimates of winning odds with a certain reward. Thus, by using the EG 
technique, we implicitly contrast two different experimental procedures regarding risk 
preferences. A potential advantage of EG is its simplicity since there is only one probability (50%) 
for all gambles which is more intuitive to the participants. Of course, given the simple design of 
EG, we focus only on the change of the risk aversion coefficients across time and not on the 
relationship between risk and time indicators16. 
Following the previous notation, we index the gambles which the participants choose and 
correspond to the three different time horizons, the present, two months and four months as ܩଵǡ ܩଶ and ܩଷrespectively. In every horizon, and for the whole sample of observations, risk 
aversion is the dominant behavior (Table 2.9). Notice that for ܩଷ, the risk loving behavior 
                                                          
15Severe outliers are defined to be the observations outside the range, that is, ܳሺ ? ?ሻ െ  ?ܫܳ ,ܴ ܳሺ ? ?ሻ ൅ ?ܫܴܳǡwhere ܳሺ ? ?ሻǡ ܳሺ ? ?ሻǡ ܫܴܳ the 25th percentile, the 75th percentile and the interquartile range respectively. 
These expressions constitute the low and high bounds of the severe outliers.  
16tĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ ? ? ?ŶŽƚ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚƌĞĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĨƵůůǇĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ





increases evidently compared to a constant risk loving behavior for ܩଵ and ܩଶ. Nonetheless, 
because in EG method only the last gamble corresponds to a risk loving behavior, this perspective 
is probably insufficienƚƚŽƐŚŽǁĂĐůĞĂƌƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ17. Therefore, we 
focus on the stability of risk preferences across time instead.  
 
Table 2.9 Risk behavior classification for each time horizon for the EG method 
Participants 
classification 
ܩଵ ܩଶ ܩଷ 
Risk-loving 9 (11.11%) 9 (11.11%) 15 (18.51%) 
Risk-averse 72 (88.88%) 72 (88.88%) 66 (81.48%) 
Number of participants and corresponding percentage rates in parentheses 
 
In Table 2.10, we report three different categories of time changing risk behavior for all the pairs 
of gambles: time-decreasing risk aversion (the CRRA coefficient decreases), time-increasing risk 
aversion (the CRRA coefficient increases) and time constant risk aversion behavior where 
participants report no change in their risk preferences. Regarding the comparison 
betweenܩଵƬܩଶ, 33.33% of the participants report a falling risk aversion coefficient, 22.22% 
report an increasing risk aversion coefficient and 44.44% a constant risk aversion coefficient. 
That is, more than half of the participants change their risk preferences after a change of two 
months in the time horizon. Subsequently, 60% of these participants who do change their risk 
preferences prefer to adopt a more risk loving behavior. 
 
Table 2.10 Risk behavior change for the EG method 





aversion ܩଵƬܩଶ 27 (33.33%) 18 (22.22%) 36 (44.44%) ܩଵƬܩଷ 40 (49.38%) 16 (19.8%) 25 (30.8%) ܩଶƬܩଷ 32 (39.5%) 11 (13.5%) 38 (46.9%) 
Number of participants and corresponding percentage rates in parentheses 
 
For the pair ܩଵƬܩଷ, the change in time horizon for two additional months (four months in total 
now) has resulted in an additional fall in risk aversion where now half of the participants report 
lower risk aversion coefficients, that is, about 16% of the participants adopt a more risk tolerant 
behavior. This change can be attributed mostly to a decline in time-constant risk aversion 
behavior, around 13.6 percentage points even though we can also detect a small fall in time-
increasing risk aversion, around 2.4 percentage points. Now notice the results for the pair ܩଶƬܩଷ. 
The time interval for this pair is exactly the same (two months) as for the pair ܩଵƬܩଶbut the time 
                                                          
17Remember also that in the EG method there is no way we can actually measure risk neutrality since the CRRA 





reference frame is different since it has been moved forward by two months for ܩଶƬܩଷ. For the 
latter pair of gambles we report a rise in time-decreasing risk aversion compared to ܩଵƬܩଶ(5 
participants, 6.2%) and a fall in time-increasing risk aversion (8.7% of the participants). Finally, 
there is little fluctuation on the number of participants whose risk behavior remains unaffected, 
where just two more participants opt for the same gambles. So, even for equally spaced time 
intervals, a change in the time reference frame is capable of changing the reported risk behavior 
and more precisely to change it pointing to a more risk tolerant behavior. Furthermore, the time 
reference frame shift seems to slow the change of risk preferences, that is, the change in risk 
preferences between the gambles ܩଵƬܩଶis relatively close to that of the gambles  ܩଶƬܩଷ. This 
could serve as a signal that risk behavior becomes more stable and is probably related to the 
minimal change in time-constant risk behavior.  
All in all, through the comparison of the different pairs of gambles, we can clearly see two 
patterns: a constantly falling time-increasing risk aversion coupled with a rising time-decreasing 
risk aversion. These facts seem to be in the same direction as the results from the first 
experimental design but now the numbers reveal a much larger risk aversion decline. Moreover, 
there is always a significant percentage of participants, up to 46.9%, who choose not to change 
their risk preferences despite the variations in time horizons. This fact is in accord with the results 
reported earlier, where also a large proportion of participants, up to 50% ĚŽŶ ?ƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞŝƌƌŝƐŬ
preferences at all (see Table 2.7). On the whole, there is clear evidence of a declining risk aversion 
when the time horizon or the time reference frame is altered. Note that although there are no 
discount indicators to contrast with the risk coefficients derived from EG so that to  confirm a 
statistical relationship, still a relationship between risk and time is revealed since the impact of 
timedelay leads to a decline in risk aversion, exactly as is reported previously in Section 2.4.1.   
Note that in the above analysis about the EG method we have assumed that choosing the same 
gamble in each treatment implies constant risk preferences. This is a simplification since we only 
have an interval estimate of the risk aversion coefficient, not its precise value. In other words, 
choosing the same gamble may still imply a shift in risk attitudes, but this shift is not adequate 
to lead to a different choice of gamble. An interval regression approach where an upper and a 
lower bound estimate for each gamble are available could offer a different perspective. 
However, it may be problematic that the upper and lower bounds for Gambles 1 and 6 
respectively are not available (due to the nature of the EG design) and there is also variation in 
the length of the intervals of the risk coefficient. Nonetheless, we have implemented this method 
by using treatment dummies as explanatory variables, denoting the change in time horizon and 
time reference frame. Although the sign of the dummy variables is always negative, indicating a 
switch towards a more risk tolerant behaviour in accord with the aforementioned results, it is 
statistically insignificant; thus, this approach cannot confirm a meaningful switch in risk attitudes.   
So, qualitatively there is an agreement between the results of the two different experimental 
methods. But the evidence is mixed for the preferences stabilization. It is difficult to talk about 
any stabilization process here since the EG method is not as dense, especially regarding the 
probability scale, as the matching-type questions of the previous parts. Given the differences in 
the experimental designs, it is likely that different lengths of time delay could have been required 
so that the EG method to exhibit that stabilization process. There is no guarantee however that 





We can also have a look at the EG results from a purely statistical perspective. For each gamble 
the participant chooses, we derive the average based on the interval bounds of the risk aversion 
coefficients described in Table 2.2. For Gambles 1 and 6 where the risk coefficients lie in half-
closed intervals, we use as risk estimates the numbers 3.46 and -0.5 respectively18. These 
numbers serve as indices for the six different risk levels observed in the EG design. We have used 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ <ŽƌŶďƌŽƚ ?Ɛ ƌĂŶŬ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚĞƐƚ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
distributions between the three gambles19. The results, p-values, presented in Table 2.11 
indicate that there is a statistical difference between the pairs ܩଵƬܩଷ and ܩଶƬܩଷ. This means 
that the statistical difference is detected only after we move the time horizon by four months. 
This is in accord with the results reported earlier (Table 2.10) where the trend towards a more 
risk tolerant behavior becomes clearer after four months. Still, these tests fail to capture any 
statistical shift in risk preferences after two months. Note however that these tests compare the 
distributions of the gambles but they do not offer any indication on the direction of the change.  
 
Table 2.11 Nonparametric tests (p-values) for the EG method 
Pairs of gambles Wilcoxon sign rank test Kornbrot test  
 
 
ܩଵƬܩଶ 0.291 0.148 ܩଵƬܩଷ 0.0029 0.0012 ܩଶƬܩଷ 0.0024 0.0011 
 
For this reason, we use the sign test to compare the medians of the pairs of gambles. We denote 
the median of each gamble ܩଵǡ ܩଶǡ ܩଷ as ܯீభ ǡ ܯீమ ǡ ܯீయ  respectively. In Table 2.12 we report the 
results of these tests (the null hypothesis always states that the medians of each pair are equal). 
As we can see, the medians of the gambles realized earlier in time are larger than the medians 
of the gambles realized later in time for the same pair of gambles as previously, ܩଵƬܩଷ and ܩଶƬܩଷ. This implies that earlier realized gambles correspond to a higher degree of risk aversion 
compared to later gambles. This conclusion offers the statistical confirmation of the tendency 
towards risk preferences instability which tends to be in favor of a more risk tolerant behavior20. 
Finally, a graphical representation of this tendency is presented in Fig. 2.4 where the histograms 
for all the EG gambles are depicted. One can see that the probability mass of the gambles starts 
to move leftwards as time passes, indicative of a lower risk aversion coefficient. But this shift is 
more evident the longer the time horizon, a fact seen when one compares the pair of gambles ܩଵƬܩଷ. 
                                                          
18The number 3.46 is the lower bound for the CRRA coefficient of Gamble 1. For Gamble 6, we use the number -0.5 
which is slightly smaller than its upper bound which equals zero.   
19 <ŽƌŶďƌŽƚ ?ƐƌĂŶŬĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚĞƐƚ is a version of the Wilcoxon-signed rank test for ordinal data. Given the indexation 
of the risk coefficients, the Kornbrot test should be the preferred option, although the results of the other two tests 
are not different. 
20 Note that this conclusion is not affected if we had used the conventional t-test and we were to compare means 
and not medians. Given the ordering nature of the data, we believe that a non-parametric approach is more suitable 
here. Moreover, the Jonckheere-Terpstra test also reveals a decreasing trend in the medians of these gambles with 






Table 2.12 The sign test on the equality of the medians 
Alternative hypotheses Sign test ܪଵǣ ܯீభ ൐ ܯீమ 0.116 ܪଵǣ ܯீభ ൐ ܯீయ 0.0009 ܪଵǣ ܯீమ ൐ ܯீయ 0.001 
 
 





In this chapter, we conducted an experiment using real incentives to verify the relationship 
between risk and time and how this relationship evolves when the time dimension is altered. 
The first important observation is that we detect an inverse relationship between the risk 
parameter as defined by the loss function and the discount indicator, but this association is small 
to establish any firm conclusion about the nature of their connection, that is, that more risk 
tolerance is associated with more patience.  We also find evidence of a more risk tolerant 
behavior regarding risk preferences and at the same time of a slightly more patient behavior 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĚƚǁŽŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ƚŝŵĞ ?KǀĞƌĂůů ?ǁĞĨĂŝůƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂŶǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
between risk attitudes and time patience in the same way as some papers in the literature have 





limited available options the participants had to indicate their willingness to wait. On the other 
hand, the switch in risk preferences towards risk tolerance is more tangible. This could imply that 
the immediacy effect has comparatively a smaller impact than the certainty effect conditional on 
the same time delay, so a parallelism of them may not always be fully functional (Keren and 
Roelofsma, 1995; Weber and Chapman, 2005).  From a theoretical point of view, the PTT model 
of Baucells and Heukamp (2012) seems to be quite generic and flexible enough to accommodate 
our findings on time and risk parameters and the subsequent increasing risk tolerance over the 
time horizons. However, PTT assumes a linear tradeoff between risk and time indicators, an 
assumption which can be quite restrictive for our experiment.  
We have complemented our experiment with the EG method which returns much stronger 
evidence on the rise of risk tolerant behavior. We believe that the main reason for that is the 
higher degree of experimental control this method offers. In the EG method, a specific interval 
estimate of the risk parameter is achieved whereas in the probability assessment decision 
questions, the loss function is estimated based on the lower bound of winning odds for each 
gamble. In that way, it is more likely that the EG method will come up with more intensely varied 
risk parameters across time. On the other hand, perhaps it is due to this feature that the EG 
method fails to offer any signs which would imply a stabilization of the risk preferences similar 
to that of the probability assessment decision questions. The EG results are consistent with the 
already reported literature (Keren and Roelofsma 1995; Anderhub et al., 2001; Noussair and Wu, 
2006; Anderson and Stafford, 2009). Noussair and Wu (2006) in particular report that 38.6% of 
the participants exhibit an increasing risk loving behavior when the payment of the gambles is 
delayed. Their result is close to our findings regarding the time-decreasing risk aversion behavior 
(33.33%, 49.38% and 39.5%). Note however, that they have used a HL design compared to the 
EG of our experiment and the time delay is up to three months. 
One additional interesting result, which to our knowledge has received no attention in the 
economics literature, is the noticeable tendency towards an equilibrium position for both the 
risk and the time parameters. This can be seen through the declining relationship between risk 
and time parameters as well as the declining variability of the discount indicators and the loss 
functions via the time reference frame. CLT can explain this behavioral pattern since it allows 
initially for a changing behavior, as expressed through risk tolerance, which subsequently 
becomes a more stable and abstract behavioral feature (Liberman and Trope, 1998; Liberman et 
al., 2002). Still however, we cannot rush to any strong conclusions given that we have utilized 
only two time horizons in our experiment. Most importantly, it is really difficult to postulate a 
quantitative relationship between the risk and time parameters which would allow a solid 
comparison of time and risk factors to take place (see Yi et al. (2006) for an application how 
probabilities can be transformed into delays). Note also that this equilibrium convergence may 
represent learning process, in the sense that participants could adjust their answers conditional 
on the answers in the previous time horizons (Erev and Roth, 1998). Since risk and time are 
seemingly closely intertwined, viewing them as a joint learning process may be an idea that 
merits further experimental research. In any case, a simple statistical relationship between risk 
and time indicators may be not enough to firmly validate the existence of this tradeoff. A more 






Real-world applications of our results can be found in the field of finance where van Binsbergen 
et al. (2012) show that the price of risk in the short term is larger than the price of risk in the long 
term. In other words, risk aversion as described from the price of risk is inversely related with 
time and thus, it declines across time. There are also some attempts to explicitly model these 
results, for example, Eisenbach and Schmalz (2016) who offer an application in the insurance 
markets by using a time-dependent risk aversion model and Guo (2015) who proposes models 
which incorporate the risk and time connection we have found. Moreover, some authors have 
been able to find evidence supporting our last observation of declining variability. They have 
shown that it is possible to predict stock returns in the long run, a fact that also implies that the 
variability of stocks decreases with the time horizon (Siegel, 1998; Barberis, 2000; Campbell and 
Viceira, 2005). Obviously, this is an ongoing and a relatively recent literature and further research 
is needed to see how robust this relationship between risk and time really is. Nonetheless, it 
indicates a very interesting area where the questions we have set and tried to answer in this 
chapter could find wide applicability.  
Although our experiment has taken place in the controlled environment of the laboratory where 
multiple dimensions of real world are not present and this does enhances the quality of our data, 
there are some limitations the experimental design is imposing on our results. For example, we 
could have used multiple time delays as well as lengthier time delays where one would be able 
to get a better view of the robustness of the results. This would be especially useful in tracking 
more effectively the apparent stabilization process of the risk aversion and discount indicator 
parameters. The aforementioned constraints prevented us from achieving a broader view 
regarding the interrelationship between risk and time. Additional treatments and the inclusion 
of more experimental factors e.g. the magnitude of the incentives, might have been helpful in 
the confirmation of hypotheses like the magnitude effect or the detection of other interesting 
patterns. The above constitute some issues that future experimental studies could tackle to 















Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
Welcome! You are going to participate in an economic experiment. Please put in silent mode or 
turn off your mobile phones. All your decisions will be anonymous and the data generated will 
be treated confidentially. 
Procedure: This experiment has 5 parts.  
In part 1, you will be asked to report the longest acceptable delay you consider appropriate so 
that to equally prefer two different monetary rewards, one smaller reward occurring now and 
another larger one occurring in the future. In part 2, you will be asked to report the lowest 
acceptable odd you consider appropriate so that to equally prefer two different rewards, one 
certain and one uncertain. 
In parts 3 and 4 you will be asked to report longest acceptable delays and lowest acceptable odds 
for similar questions as in parts 1 and 2, but this time the decision questions are set and paid in 
future dates (e.g. in 2 months from now). For parts 3 and 4 this process will take place twice for 
two different future dates. Finally, in Part 5 you will be asked to choose between 6 different 
gambles which are payable in future dates. 
For each part, you will be given an instructions sheet explaining the decision questions and the 
payment procedure. Attached you will find the decision questions. Lastly, you will complete a 
questionnaire on some socio-demographic questions.  
The Payoffs: The payments will take place at the end of the experiment. Each one of you will 
receive a participation fee of £5.In addition, one participant will have the opportunity to win up 
to £50. All participants have an equal chance of winning. The payment process will be as follows: 
 One participant will be randomly selected by picking a number out of a hat. Then, a random 
number will be drawn from 1 to 63 corresponding to the 63 decision questions of the experiment. 
The decision question with numbering equal to the random number will be chosen for the 
payment process. 
Some questions could result in receiving late rewards offered after a specific time delay. These 
late rewards will be awarded in the form of a post-dated cheque. Note that this is a fully 
funded experiment and the future payment will be guaranteed by Prof. Iain Fraser. 
 
Simple examples of the payment procedures for each part of the experiment are provided with 
the instruction sheets which you will be given shortly.   
Given the experimental procedures we follow, it can be shown you can get the maximum 
amount of money by being truthful during the reporting procedure. Over-reporting or under-
reporting in any part of the experiment can make you worse-off. It is in your self-interest to 
truthfully answer all the decision questions. 
Remember: There are no correct or wrong answers. Just give the answers you consider that most 







For me, getting £10
 
today is just as good as getting £30
 
in _ 
1 week       2 weeks       3 weeks       1 month       2 months       3 months       4 months              
 
For me, getting £20 for certain is just as good as winning £30 with chance _% 
                    10% chance                                              50% chance               90% chance 


























Appendix B: The EG method 
Below you can see 6 different gambles. Each gamble has two potential outcomes, one lower and 
one higher. Both outcomes are offered with the same probability level (50%). That is, they are 
both equally likely to occur. You can choose one and only one of these6 different gambles. 
To indicate your choice, tick the box next to your preferred gamble. 
             Payoffs                 Chances                    Your choice 
                                                                     Choose only one gamble 
Gamble 1 £14 50%  
£14 50% 
 
Gamble 2 £12 50%  
£18 50% 
 
Gamble 3 £10 50%  
£22 50% 
 
Gamble 4 £8 50%  
£26 50% 
 
Gamble 5 £6 50%  
£30 50% 
 
Gamble 6 £1 50%  
£35 50% 
 
The payment procedure: Assume that you have selected the Gamble 4, where you have 50% 
chances of winning £26 and 50% chances of winning £8. Then a random number between 0-100 
will be drawn. If the random number is above 50, you will be paid the high payoff, £26 at the end 







An experimental investigation of risk behavior for gains and losses: The effect of 




We investigate in a lab experiment the nature of risk preferences in the gain and loss domain. A 
simple experimental design is utilized with the same choices both in the gain and loss domain. 
We use Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to account not only 
for utility curvature but also for probability weighting and we examine the effect of higher stakes 
as well as the effect of delayed lotteries. Higher stakes weaken the reflection effect hypothesis 
and their impact is evident at both the utility and the probability parameters indicating the 
importance of the latter in the modelling process. Evidence for a clear asymmetry in probabilistic 
behavior between gains and losses under higher stakes is presented. Under time delay, only 
probability weighting for gains is affected, resulting in greater risk tolerance. This is indicative of 
























Risk affects all aspects of our life and many economic decisions are intertwined with risk. These 
risky economic decisions could result in generating profits (gains) or incurring debts (losses). 
Examples include the trading of stocks and bonds, the management of a business, the investment 
plans of a company, the purchase of insurance contract etc. Such decision making could be 
affected by a number of contextual factors with varying impulse. Two crucial factors are the size 
of the monetary payoffs and the time factor when one faces intertemporal choices, choices that 
are made available in future dates.  
The most popular of decision theory models, Expected Utility Theory (EUT), does not explicitly 
discern between the domains of gains and losses. Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) attempted 
to address this deficiency of EUT by introducing a utility function reflecting changes in wealth 
from a reference point so that to accommodate both gains and losses, a sign-dependent EUT. In 
that way they were adopting reference dependence, implying that preferences are shaped based 
on changes of wealth and not on the final value of the outcomes at stake. This is one of the tenets 
of Prospect Theory (PT) introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (hereafter K&T (1979)), 
later expanded to Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (hereafter 
T&K (1992)) to account for violations of stochastic dominance in probability weighting.  
To describe risk behavior in either domain, CPT stipulates a phenomenon called the reflection 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŐĂŝŶĚŽŵĂŝŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞǀĞƌƐĞd in the 
loss domain as long as the same prospects are used for risk elicitation. This effect implies a very 
similar pattern of behavior in both domains, concave utility (risk aversion) for gains and convex 
utility (risk seeking) for losses. The reflection effect follows directly from the invariance 
assumption of choice theory which states that preferences should not change when the same 
options are framed as gains or losses. Significant differences in the behavior in the two domains 
point out to violations of a normative decision making process as described by CPT and 
subsequently imply the existence of framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Birnbaum, 
2006). In general, the literature offers empirical support for the reflection effect (Fishburn and 
Kochenberger, 1979; Budescu and Weiss, 1987; T&K, 1992) although other authors report 
conflicting evidence (Cohen et al. 1987; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980). One reason for these 
conflicting findings is that there are references in the literature about concave or linear utilities 
for losses (Fennema and van Assen, 1999; Abdellaoui et al., 2007). To account for all these, 
Wakker et al. (2007) introduced the partial reflection effect hypothesis where the utility 
curvature for losses can be slightly convex and close to being a dichotomous line21. This new 
version of reflection effect allows for some differentiation in the parameters of the utility 
curvatures but it is not clear if it allows for statistical equality of these parameters.  
The discussion about reflection effect is limited to the shape and the degree of curvature of the 
utility function for gains and losses, yet is not limited by the type of model e.g. Fishburn and 
                                                          
21 Partial reflection effect is also related with the evolution of reflection effect itself. K&T (1979, p. 268) state:  “ ?
the preference between negative prospects is the mirror image of the preference between positive prospects. Thus, 
the reflection of prospects around 0 reverses the preference order ? ?ƵƚƚŚĞǇĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶůĂƚĞƌ
ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞǇƐƚĂƚĞ  ?d ?< ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? P  “ ?ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ŝŵƉůǇƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ





Kochenberger (1979) have tested reflection effect in a EUT reference dependent model. But 
another element of CPT, the nonlinear probability weighting, can also describe risk preferences 
in each domain and therefore it should be taken into account. The fourfold pattern that produces 
an inverse S-shaped weighting function where people overweight small probabilities and 
underweight high probabilities is well-known (Starmer, 2000). Another example is the principle 
of diminishing sensitivity, in a probabilistic context, which implies that changes near the end of 
the probability scale can be ignored or over-weighted and thus, they can affect probability 
weighing more acutely than changes close to the middle of scale (K&T, 1979). Hence, behavior 
could be equally affected by both probability and outcome size and thus, utility alone could be 
unlikely to explain accurately peopleƐ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽr. Therefore, CPT can complement EUT by 
eliminating the confounding between utility and probability weighting and allowing the 
researcher to obtain a broader picture on risk preferences. Across the two domains, the 
probability weighting function used by T&K (1992) allows for limited distinction between gains 
and losses but still produces similar inverse S-shape functions. Prelec (1998) also assumed 
equivalence across domains for the curvature of his own probability weighting function but he 
allowed room for differentiation for the other parameters. Albeit empirical evidence in the 
literature tends to support the inverse S-shape pattern in either domain (Etchart-Vincent and 
l ?,ĂƌŝĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?, these patterns may not necessarily be identical (Abdellaoui, 2000). A sizeable 
deviation between the probability parameters in each domain could also be indicative of the 
existence of framing effects for probability weighting, too. 
A factor that could impact risk attitude is the change of the outcome values used during the 
elicitation process. Markowitz (1952), incorporated first this insight into his proposed utility 
function and provided a link between the stakes size and the domain. His utility function was 
initially convex and then concave for small and larger gains respectively, but on the other hand 
it was concave and then convex for small and larger losses respectively. But CPT remains silent 
about the higher stakes impact on the utility curvature and the reflection effect. Since then, a 
number of studies have examined the higher stakes impact either in the lab (Holt and Laury, 
2002; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010; Drichoutis and Lusk, 2016) or in the field (Binswanger, 1980; Sillers, 
1980). The general conclusion that follows from these papers is that higher stakes change risk 
attitudes towards an increasingly risk averse behavior, for gains at least (Harrison et al. (2007) 
report an exception). Nonetheless, there is little research on the impact of higher stakes in the 
loss domain and the results are not always clear. Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) reported larger 
variations for risk preferences for gains and almost no difference between medium and high 
stakes for losses and likewise Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) found little change in preferences in the 
loss domain utility parameters when higher stakes are utilized whereas Vieider (2012) reported 
differences mostly for utility parameters and only for larger stakes probability weighting may be 
affected. To our knowledge, Laury and Holt (2008) is the only paper that examines reflection 
effect under higher stakes; they found that reflection effect can be affected negatively from 
higher stakes but their analysis is of descriptive nature and lacks any solid statistical confirmation. 
By using higher stakes we also have the opportunity to check how the shapes of utility and 
probability weighting functions are going to be affected. It is normally expected that a 
separability with respect to outcomes and probabilities should hold, that is, changes in outcomes 





probability adjustments (we refer the reader back to the separability definition given in p. 3). 
However, this claim could be invalid due to possible interactions between utility and probability 
and thus, higher stakes could impact the probability weighting functions parameters as well. This 
has been confirmed by Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) for both gains and losses and Bouchouicha and 
Vieider (2017) for gains-only models.  Finally, the investigation of the impact of higher stakes 
makes sense in the light of the EUT criticism by Rabin (2000) who claimed that a utility curvature 
change is upper and lower bounded and is conditional on the wealth level. So, one should be 
careful into drawing safe conclusions over different ranges of outcome values by using only EUT 
because the concavity could be minimal and the utility could be close to being linear. 
Another factor that could affect risk preferences is time delay. Originating with Thaler (1981), 
many studies have found evidence of a sign effect, that is, there is a different mechanism 
between gain and loss discounting, and in particular that gains are discounted more heavily than 
losses when they are both offered with a time delay (Benzion et al., 1989; Frederick et al., 2002; 
but see Shelley (1994) for the opposite result). In addition, it has been documented in the 
literature that the discounting of future prospects, in the gain domain, leads to an increasingly 
risk tolerant behavior ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƐǁŝƚĐŚ ĨƌŽŵsafe to riskier prospects 
(Noussair and Wu, 2006; Savadori and Mittone, 2015). To our knowledge, it seems that only 
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) have investigated the impact of delayed lotteries on risk preferences, by 
attempting to discriminate between utility and probability weighting. They found a more risk-
loving behavior for delayed lotteries displayed primarily on probability weighting function than 
on utility curvature. Apart from the importance of probability, this finding also indicates a 
potential trade-off relationship between risk preferences and time delay, a fact supported by an 
affect-based reasoning (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2001) which states 
that future choices are related to weaker emotional reactions and thus, they are susceptible to 
change. We are unaware of any investigation of these findings in the context of sign-dependent 
models like CPT.  
Time delay does not affect directly either of the two components of a lottery, the outcomes and 
the probabilities. This is important because it makes time less tangible than monetary outcomes 
and it may imply that the mechanisms behind time delay may be more demanding cognitively 
and of different nature qualitatively than these behind monetary outcomes. These distinct 
properties between the dimensions of time and money have been highlighted before in the 
literature and could impact mental accounting and could result in different investment decisions 
(Leclerc et al., 1995; Soster et al., 2010). For example, including time delay in decision making 
changes the environment where the decisions are made and this affects the decision process by 
resulting in a less narrow framing than when higher stakes are used, in the sense that the choice 
of lotteries and the time delay impact could be considered separately and not simultaneously 
(Kahneman, 2003; see also Öncüler and Onay (2009)).Note that in the papers cited previously, 
time preferences are not elicited and discount rates are not derived. This is a path we follow in 
the upcoming analysis given the difficulties in implementing it in the loss domain.  
In this chapter, we attempt to examine further the nature of risk attitudes in the gain and loss 
domain. Our experiment incorporates the following contributions to the relevant literature of 





(HL) (2002) experimental design in the loss domain so that sign-dependent models can be 
implemented straightforwardly. Despite the popularity of the HL design, we are aware of only a 
handful of papers who have embedded losses in the HL design (Laury and Holt, 2008; Gazda et 
al., 2011; Brink and Rankin, 2013; Schipper, 2014). Second, we make use of the maximum 
likelihood technique in order to examine statistically treatment effects in either domain, a 
technique not employed up until now for sign-dependent models with the HL design. Third, our 
chapter is one of the few in the economic literature that uses a sign-dependent version of EUT 
along with the CPT model. The sign-dependent EUT model has been far less used in the literature 
than CPT, in fact, we are aware of only a few applications of it (Gaudecker et al., 2011; Bocquèho 
et al., 2014; Andersson et al., 2016; Bouchouicha and Vieider, 2017); even then however, the 
research questions put forward do not always focus on both domains or examine the impact of 
treatments. Fourth, we use two treatments for both gains and losses, the magnitude treatment 
and the time delay treatment. In the magnitude treatment all outcomes increase by a factor of 
four and in the time delay treatment all outcomes are available after four months. Although the 
usage of higher stakes in economic experiments is not uncommon, the usage of time delay is not 
so. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) is apparently the only attempt so far examining delayed lotteries 
conditional on probability weighting but their analysis is confined to gains only without 
comparing different sign-dependent models. 
The main results of our experiment are summarized as follows: Although for low stakes the 
reflection effect holds, under higher stakes it weakens and it can be marginally rejected. 
Separability issues in the loss domain arise where the higher stakes impact is absorbed by the 
probability weighting function, yielding a dissimilarity between gains and losses featured beyond 
the utility curvature and which is incompatible with a probabilistic interpretation of the reflection 
effect hypothesis. Furthermore, the probabilistic behavior in either domain is driven exclusively 
by the elevation parameter indicating risk aversion for both gains and losses. Note that 
DĂƌŬŽǁŝƚǌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?utility-based fourfold pattern is also largely confirmed when probability 
weighting is assumed to be linear under EUT. As for time delay, its impact is detected on 
probability weighting for gains and not on utility curvature. We detect no effect in the loss 
domain. Subsequently, a probabilistically more risk tolerant behavior for gains emerges together 
with an asymmetric risk attitude between gains and losses with respect to time delay. Although 
we do not elicit time preferences in this chapter, this asymmetric risk attitude is reminiscent of 
ƚŚĞƐŝŐŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŝŶƚĞƌƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐŚŽůĚƐĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐƵŶĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ
by the impact of time delay. 
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 we present the experimental design and in 
Section 3.3 we discuss the econometric approach. In Section 3.4 we present the results and in 
Section 3.5thefinal conclusions. 
 
3.2 The Experiment 
This section discusses the experimental design as well as the procedures behind the experiment. 





3.2.1 The experimental design 
Eighty students, from the University of Kent (at Canterbury campus) participated in the 
experiment. The students were either undergraduate or postgraduate and were members from 
various Departments of the University. In total, six experimental sessions took place and each 
student participated in only one session which lasted around 50 minutes.  All participants had 
been notified beforehand that a £5 show-up fee would be awarded to each one of them at the 
end of the experiment. In addition, the participants were explicitly informed that they would be 
given the opportunity to win additional money, up to £46.2 depending on their answers. The 
participants were initially given analytical instructions which included examples and a detailed 
description of the payment process; then separate answer sheets were distributed for the 
questions of the experiment. 
For the elicitation of risk preferences we have used the Multiple Price List (MPL) format first 
proposed by Holt and Laury (HL) (2002). HL is a very popular experimental design which has been 
applied extensively in laboratory as well as field experiments (Andersen et al., 2006; Coble and 
Lusk, 2010; Dave et al., 2010). In the HL experimental design, the participants face ten separate 
decision questions each of which is comprised of two options, Lottery A and Lottery B (see Table 
3.1). Each one of these two lotteries consists of two different outcomes, one larger and one 
smaller which remain constant throughout the ten decision questions and are offered at varying 
probabilities. In particular, the two pairs of outcomes for Lottery A and Lottery B are £6, £4.8 and 
£11.55, £0.3 respectively. For both lotteries, as we move down the HL design, the probabilities 
for each outcome always change by the same amount, 0.1.  For the larger outcomes (£6, £11.55) 
of each lottery, the probability of winning increases constantly by 0.1 and subsequently for the 
smaller outcomes (£4.8, £0.3) the probability of winning declines continuously by 0.1. 
 
Table 3.1  Choices in the experiment 
    Lottery A (Safe option)        Lottery B (Risky option) Difference       
(£) 
Range of CRRA 
parameter 
1/10 of £6  &  9/10 of £4.8 
2/10 of £6  &  8/10 of £4.8 
3/10 of £6  &  7/10 of £4.8 
4/10 of £6  &  6/10 of £4.8 
5/10 of £6  &  5/10 of £4.8 
6/10 of £6  &  4/10 of £4.8 
7/10 of £6  &  3/10 of £4.8 
8/10 of £6  &  2/10 of £4.8 
9/10 of £6  &  1/10 of £4.8 
10/10 of £6  &0/10 of £4.8 
1/10 of £11.55  &   9/10 of £0.3 
2/10 of £11.55  &   8/10 of £0.3 
3/10 of £11.55  &   7/10 of £0.3 
4/10 of £11.55  &   6/10 of £0.3 
5/10 of £11.55  &   5/10 of £0.3 
6/10 of £11.55  &   4/10 of £0.3 
7/10 of £11.55  &   3/10 of £0.3 
8/10 of £11.55  &  2/10 of £0.3 
9/10 of £11.55  &  1/10 of £0.3 






















first four decision questions (see Table 3.1 for details), the difference in the expected payments 
is positive and favours Lottery A whereas in the last six decision questions the difference in the 





column of Table 3.1 is the difference in the expected values between Lottery A and Lottery B. 
Typically, participants start by choosing Lottery A in the first decision question and then at some 
point they switch to Lottery B. The decision question at which this switch takes place indicates 
ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĂůǁŚĞƌĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝƐŬƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐůŝĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞůĂƐƚĐŽůƵŵŶŽĨdĂďůĞ 3.1) when a 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function is utilized22. This means that if one 
switches in one of the first four questions she is considered to be risk-seeking while if one 
switches in one of the last five decision questions she is classified as risk-averse. Lastly, a switch 
at the fifth decision question points to a risk-neutral participant.  
The same HL design was also used for the decision questions in the loss domain. Of course all 
outcomes now are losses and subsequently they are represented by negative numbers, but still 
they are same numbers in absolute value as previously (-£6, -£4.8 for Lottery A and -£11.55, -
£0.3 for Lottery B). There is also one subtle difference in the HL design between the two domains: 
Lotteries A and B are reversed and thus, participants now start from Lottery B and at some point 
switch to Lottery A ?dŚŝƐŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞ “ŵŝƌƌŽƌŝŵĂŐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐĂŝŶƐĂŶĚ
losses as predicted from CPT (Laury and Holt, 2008). In the same spirit, the classification of risk 
preferences also changes to manifest the gains-losses mirror image. So, a switch in the first four 
decision questions reveals risk aversion and a switch in one of the last five decision questions 
reveals a risk loving behavior.   
3.2.2 The treatments 
As mentioned earlier, we employ a treatment factor which has three levels: the baseline 
treatment which offers the lower stakes(£4.8, £6 for Lottery A and £0.3, £11.55 for Lottery B) as 
described in Table 3.1, the magnitude treatment which offers higher stakes and in particular four 
times higher than those of the baseline treatment (£19.2, £24 for Lottery A and £1.2, £46.2 for 
Lottery B)23 and the time delay treatment which offers the lower stakes of the baseline treatment 
but payable after a time delay of four months. The same decision questions were presented to 
the participants in the loss domain for each one of the treatments. In essence, we performed a 
2x3within subject experiment where the same HL experimental design was used in two domains 
(gains and losses) with three treatments (baseline, magnitude and time delay) in each domain. A 
summary of the experimental methods and the treatments used can be found in Table 3.2.  
A concern with within-subject experimental designs is the potential existence of order effects i.e. 
Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐ ŝŶ ŽŶĞquestion could be affected by her answers in the previous 
question. This is an issue that appears when an experimenter elicits multiple observations per 
treatment from the same subject and has been documented previously in the literature of 
experimental economics (Harrison et al., 2005; Lusk and Shogren, 2007). To account for this 
phenomenon, we do not adopt the monotonic switching approach and instead we opt to re-
                                                          
22 The last column refers to the lower and upper bounds of the coefficient of a CRRA utility function when a 
participant switches in a particular decision question. Such values could be useful if one wanted to determine risk 
behavior based only on the switching point between the lotteries. In the upcoming analysis, we will not use them 
because all the questions, in every domain and in every treatment, have been randomised. Note that no information 
about the last two columns of Table 3.1 was presented to the participants.  
23 The hourly wage rate in UK for 2016 was £5.55 for the ages 18-20 and 6.95 for the ages 21-24. Given that over 
90% of the participants belong to either one of these two age groups, the offer of £46.2 implies that participants 





arrange and present in a random order all the questions in every treatment and for both 
domains. Thus, we control satisfactorily for the presence of order effects (Charness et al., 2012). 
During the experiment we have presented the questions to subjects with a fixed order with 
respect to each treatment and each domain, that is, first the questions for the baseline, then for 
the magnitude and at the end for the time delay treatment. Likewise, within each treatment we 
first presented the questions for gains and afterwards the questions for losses. We have adopted 
this approach in order the whole process to be less cognitively demanding for the participants. 
Mixing questions of various treatments could have been cognitively challenging for the 
participants and this could have an impact on the quality of our data. We are not aware of any 
attempt in the literature to test for order effects with respect to treatments and domains.    
 
Table 3.2 Description of the treatments in the experiment 
                                             HL experimental design 
Treatments Gain domain Loss domain 
Baseline 3 3 
Magnitude: (x4) stakes 3 3 
Time delay: 4 months 3 3 
 
Due to budget constraints, we were forced to pay a subset of the participants, at least 10%, in 
each session24. For the questions in the loss domain, the payment took place from a fixed 
endowment conditional on a loss domain decision question chosen for payment. This fixed 
endowment was equal to the largest possible loss they could incur, that is, for the baseline and 
the time delay treatment the fixed endowment was £11.55 and for the magnitude treatment the 
fixed endowment was £46.225. At the end of each session one question was randomly selected 
as the binding question for payment. Then, the participants were paid according to their answer 
to that question (See the Appendix A of this chapter which includes the experimental instructions 
and sample questions). In total, 80 participants participated in three treatments and in two 
domains. Since each participant answered 10 questions 80*6*10=4800 observations extracted, 
where 6 is the product of the domains (2) and the treatments (3). However there was one missing 
value due to one unanswered question, so in total, 4799 observation were used in the 
experiment.  
                                                          
24 There is no evidence that paying a subset of the participants affects negatively the effectiveness of the random 
lottery incentive in the context of simple MPLs. Charness et al. (2016) review a number of studies on different 
payment procedures in economic experiments and they conclude that paying a subset of the participants (Harrison 
et al., 2007; Brokesova et al., 2015; see also Beaud and Willinger (2015) who examine the impact of significant 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨůŽƐƐĞƐ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶƉĂǇŝŶŐŽŶůǇŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
behavior and motivation. Charness et al. (2016) report that some concerns may be raised regarding experiments in 
a dynamic choice context but this is irrelevant in our case.  
25 Offering an initial endowment is practically the default option in economic experiments containing potential losses 
(Harrison and Rutström, 2009; Vieider et al., 2015; Baillon and Bleichrodt, 2015), otherwise, participants may lose 
real money. Yet, Etchart-sŝŶĐĞŶƚĂŶĚů ?,ĂƌŝĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĞůŽƐƐĚŽŵĂŝŶ





Inevitably when the time delay treatment was applicable the payments had to be awarded after 
the time delay of four months. At that point, we had to assure the participants that they would 
not be deceived and they would receive their money, otherwise they may not reveal their true 
preferences. For that reason, a guaranteed post-dated cheque was given to the students if a 
question under the time delay treatment was binding for payment at the end of the experiment. 
This is a technique that has been used before in the elicitation of time preferences or of delayed 
risk preferences (Coble and Lusk, 2010; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). Although this type of 
payment eliminates the possibility of deception, it may still result in the elicitation of distorted 
preferences since the payment remains secured, though delayed. In other words, the guaranteed 
post-dated cheque could inadvertently result in insufficient variation of risk preferences in both 
the gain and loss domain and subsequently the time delay treatment may be less effective than 
we would like it to be. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
This section first describes how the basic model specifications, EUT and CPT have been 
constructed. Then we describe the econometric modelling of both models. We consider EUT 
assign-dependent in the same fashion and around the same reference point as CPT. 
3.3.1 The model specifications 
To be able to introduce a reference-dependent EUT, we need a function which would account 
for different curvature parameters for each domain. Such a function under the terminology of 
CPT is called value function which is in essence a utility function based on the deviations from a 
reference point. Henceforth, for simplicity we will use the simpler term utility instead of value 
function to describe these deviations. The dominant functional form in the literature is the piece-
wise power function with different specifications for gains and losses which returns the usual S-
shaped graph reported by K&T (1979), that is, ݑሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ݔఈ ݂݅ݔ ൒  ?െሺെݔሻఉ݂݅ݔ ൏  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
The exponents ߙǡ ߚሺߙ ൐  ?ǡ ߚ ൐  ?ሻrepresent the utility curvature parameters for the gain and 
loss domain respectively.Then the utility for choosing one of the two lotteries comprised of two 
outcomes,ݔଵand ݔଶ is  ܸ ൌ ݌ଵݑሺݔଵሻ ൅ ݌ଶݑሺݔଶሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
where ݌ଵǡ ݌ଶ and ݑሺݔଵሻǡ ݑሺݔଶሻare the probabilities and the values of the two outcomes of each 
lottery.  
Now, we define the other model we use, the CPT model. CPT satisfies not only sign-dependence 
but also eliminates potential confounding effects by allowing us to control separately for utility 
curvature and non-linear probability weighting. Under CPT, the utility for choosing one of the 





whereݓሺ݌ଵሻǡ ݓሺ݌ଶሻ and ݑሺݔଵሻǡ ݑሺݔଶሻare the decision weights and the values respectively that 
a participant assigns to each lottery. To model the non-linear probability weighting, we use the 
probability weighting function introduced by Prelec (1998)   ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ିఋሺି௟௡௣ሻം ǡ  ? ൑ ݌ ൑  ?ǡ ߛ ൐  ?ǡ ߜ ൐  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
The parameter ߛdescribes the curvature of the probability weighting function: small values of  ߛሺߛ ൏  ?ሻ indicate an inverse S-shape graph and larger values of ߛሺߛ ൐  ?ሻindicate an S-shaped 
probability weighting function graph. The other parameter, ߜ, can be viewed as an indicator of 
the elevation of the weighting function; small values of ߜlead to a more elevated curve and thus, 
higher weights on probability. In the special case where ߛ ൌ ߜ ൌ  ?, the Prelec probability 
weighting function collapses to linear probability since it becomes ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݌and then EUT and 
CPT are indistinguishable. Since in our econometric analysis we discriminate between gains and 
losses regarding the probability weighting function, its parameters can assume different values 
that separately describe risk behavior in the gain domain ሺߛାǡ ߜାሻ and in the loss domain ሺߛିǡ ߜିሻ: ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ൝ݓାሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ିఋశሺି௟௡௣ሻംశ ǡ ݔ ൒  ?ݓିሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ିఋషሺି௟௡௣ሻംష ǡ ݔ ൏  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
In CPT the outcomes are ranked in each domain where it is ȁݔଵȁ ൏ ȁݔଶȁ so that the decision 
weights to sum up to 1, that is:  ݓሺ݌ଶሻ ൌ ݁ିఋሺି௟௡௣మሻം ݓሺ݌ଵሻ ൌ ݓሺ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶሻ െ ݓሺ݌ଶሻ ൌ  ? െ ݓሺ݌ଶሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Essentially, the process of ranking is the same for both domains with the difference that 
outcomes are ranked from best to worst for gains and from worse to best for losses in order the 
 “ŵŝƌƌŽƌŝŵĂŐĞ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉŽŝŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐĂŝŶƐĂŶĚůŽƐƐĞƐƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
utility function for CPT we use the same functional form specification as for EUT, the power 
function. In that way, equation ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ is analogous to equation ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ apart from probability 
weighting and rank-dependence.  
As it is evident from the above, in this chapter we use the CPT of T&K (1992) and not the original 
version of prospect theory of K&T (1979). The major difference is that CPT, by exploiting the Rank 
Dependent Utility of Quiggin (1982),  requires not just the weighting of the probabilities but also 
the ranking of the outcomes, so that the elicited preferences to be both sign-dependent and 
rank-dependent. This is necessary in order for violations of stochastic dominance with respect to 
probability weighting to be avoided. As mentioned ĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ?ŝŶŽƵƌĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĚĞƐŝŐŶǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ
have mixed gambles, we only have gambles in either the gain or the loss domain only. Without 
mixed gambles, the loss aversion parameter ߣlacks any interpretation in the context of decision 
theory models like ours and therefore we ignore it by assuming a loss neutral behavior i.e. ߣ ൌ ?. 






To model econometrically the choices of the participants, we adopt the random utility approach 
as in Andersen et al. (2008) and Coble and Lusk (2010). Then, we assume that the utility ௜ܷ௝ǡ௄ of 
a participant ݆ for a decision question݅ and after opting for either Lottery A or Lottery B indexed 
by ܭ ൌ ܣǡ ܤ   is  ௜ܷ௝ǡ௄ ൌ ௜ܸ௝ǡ௄ ൅ ߝ௜௝ǡ௄ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where  ߝ௜௝ǡ௄ is a stochastic specification for the error term. Note here that ߝ௜௝ǡ௄, also carries an 
experimental interpretation in the sense that it accounts for the all the kind of errors  people are 
making in the decision making process due to negligence, fatigue etc. The utility of an individual 
for choosing either Lottery A or Lottery B in a decision question is  
௜ܸǡ௄ ൌ ݓ൫݌ଵǡ௜ǡ௄൯ݑ൫ݔଵǡ௜ǡ௄൯ ൅ ݓ൫݌ଶǡ௜ǡ௄൯ݑ൫ݔଶǡ௜ǡ௄൯ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Then the probability of choosing Lottery A over Lottery B implies that  ௜ܷ௝ǡ஺ ൐ ௜ܷ௝ǡ஻ ֜ ሺ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஺ െ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஻ሻ ൅ ሺߝ௜௝ǡ஺ െ ߝ௜௝ǡ஻ሻ ൐  ? 
ĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐĞƋƵĂůƚŽ ሺܣሻ ൌ Ȱ ൬ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஺ െ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஻ߪ ൰ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Note that is assumed that the error terms ߝ௜௝ǡ஺ and ߝ௜௝ǡ஻  are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed according to the cumulative distribution function Ȱሺ ?ሻ which corresponds 
to the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation ߪ26. Thus, we maximize the 
following likelihood function in a probit model specification:  
 ஘  ൌ ෍ ෍ሾݕ௜௝ሺሺሺܣሻሻ ȁɅሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ݕ௜௝ሻሺሺ ? െሺܣሻሻ ȁߠሻሿ௃௝ୀଵூ௜ୀଵ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ 
where ݕ௜௝ ൌ1 if Lottery A is chosen as most preferable and ݕ௜௝ ൌ0 if Lottery B is the preferred 
choice27 and ߠ is the vector of parameters to be estimated.  
The question now is how to estimate the vector ߠ  that includes the treatment effects due to 
higher stakes and time delay. To address this issue we adopt the approach by Fehr-Duda et al. 
(2010) where each model parameter is constructed as a linear function of the higher stakes and 
of the time delay. For example, for the treatment effect on the parameter ߛି we have ߛି ൌߛ଴ି ൅ ߛ௧ି כ ݐݎ݁ܽݐwhere ݐݎ݁ܽݐ  is a dummy variable representing either the higher stakes or the 
time delay and ߛ଴ି is the parameter that represents the baseline treatment. If there is indeed a 
treatment effect onߛି, then we should expect the treatment coefficient ߛ௧ି to be statistically 
significant. The sign of the treatment coefficient denotes the direction of the treatment effect. 
                                                          
26 To be more precise, the standard deviation of the difference in the error terms is  ? ?ߪ, since the difference of 
two normally distributed variables, ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪଶሻǡ follows also a normal distribution with variance equal to  ?ߪଶ. 
27 The econometric modelling is exactly the same for EUT. The only difference is that for EUT the decision weights 





The same rationale applies for the other model parameters, too. So, under EUT and CPT we 
estimate the following respective vectors:   ߠ ൌ ሺߙ଴ǡ ߙ௧ǡ ߚ଴ǡ ߚ௧ǡ ߪሻᇱ ߠ ൌ ሺߙ଴ǡ ߙ௧ǡ ߚ଴ǡ ߚ௧ǡ ߛ଴ି ǡ ߛ௧ି ǡ ߛ଴ାǡ ߛ௧ାǡ ߜ଴ି ǡ ߜ௧ି ǡ ߜ଴ାǡ ߜ௧ାǡ ߪሻᇱ 
For all models we account for potential correlation among the responses reported from the same 
participant by using clustered standard errors in the maximum likelihood estimation. This is a 
plausible concern because the observations within each cluster could be correlated with each 
other since all of them have been generated by the same participant. In that way we avoid any 
potential efficiency questions that may arise for the variance-covariance matrix of the maximum 
likelihood estimator. The Stata 15 software package has been used for programming the 
maximum likelihood and the simulation of the graphs. In Appendix B of this chapter, a sample 
code for the sign-dependent EUT model has been included. 
After having identified the different types of models, the question of selecting the best model 
comes next. For this selection the Likelihood Ratio test will be used. The test statistic is given by 
the formula ܮܴ ൌ െ ? כ ሺ݈݊ሺܮଵሻ െ ሺܮଶሻሻ where ܮଵǡ ܮଶ are the likelihoods of the two models, 
EUT and CPT respectively. The test statistic follows a ȱଶ distribution under the null hypothesis 
which favours the simpler model, the EUT. This test allows for selection between two different 
nested models as the decision theoretical models of our experiment, since EUT can be derived 
from CPT if we restrict the probability parameters ߛǡ ߜ  of the latter to be equal to one.     
Our structural modelling approach assumes that risk preferences for all participants can be 
described by either EUT or CPT, in other words, we imply a homogeneity of preferences for all 
participants. Obviously this can be a quite restrictive assumption since not all participants need 
to behave in a similar way. Thus, heterogeneity in risk attitudes could be present. That 
heterogeneity could be present in our data in three different ways: first, it could be observed 
heterogeneity, in the sense that utility and probability parameters could depend on demographic 
characteristics of each individual (see Harrison and Rutström (2009) for an application). 
Unfortunately, we have collected little demographic data and our sample is a quite 
homogeneous student population in order to offer any valuable information. Second, 
heterogeneity could be present in the form of unobserved heterogeneity, that is, some 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌŝƐŬƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŵĂǇďĞďĞƚƚĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇhdǁŚŝůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞƐƚĂWdŵŽĚĞůŵĂǇ
be more suitable. Then, an econometric approach based on finite mixture models could be 
plausible (see Conte et al. (2011) for an application). But our data is not rich enough (the same 
pair of gambles is used for all choices in the HL design) to allow for the estimation of such 
computationally intensive models. A third level of heterogeneity could be present at the 
individual level, that is, each model parameter could be dependent on each participant, so a 
between-subject variation could emerge. In section 3.4.1 below, we have attempted to sketch 
graphically how the switching point varies per treatment and per domain. This variability is not 
included in our econometric model since in this case a large number of parameters would have 






Since we use exactly the same lotteries for both the gain and the loss domain, and in addition 
we fully cover the largest possible losses that the participants could possibly incur, implicitly we 
assume that the reference point is zero. Thus, the starting point from which participants tend to 
define their wealth for both gains and losses is zero and so the changes in wealth are analogous 
for either domain. This has been assumed for the simplicity of the econometric analysis but also 
because it is implied by K&T (1979). However, it is possible that reference point may not 
necessarily be fixed, but rather to be considered as a function of the recent beliefs the participant 
may hold or more generally of the expectations people may harbour (Abeler et al., 2011; Kƅszegi 
and Rabin, 2006; Kƅszegi and Rabin, 2007) or even to be dependent on previous experiences or 
even not to be unique (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999). This is a difficult point and is not 
examined further in this chapter.  
 
3.4 Results 
In this section we present the main results of the econometric analysis. At first we discuss and 
we represent graphically the choices of the participants across domains for all treatments. Then, 
we comment on the estimated parameters of EUT and CPT under the magnitude and time delay 
treatments. Note that we will henceforth use the phrases higher stakes and magnitude 
treatment interchangeably.  
3.4.1 Description of the choices 
Fig. 3.1 offers a first look at the choices of the participants. They depict the percentage of 
participants choosing the safe option per domain. We consider as safe option the gambles of 
Lottery A since they exhibit lower variability compared to the corresponding gambles of Lottery 
B. Since the same gambles are used for both gains and losses (only the sign of the gambles 
changes), the switching point indicating risk neutrality, and after assuming EUT preferences and 
a CRRA utility functional form, was always the same, the fifth gamble28.  
/ŶƚŚĞŐĂŝŶĚŽŵĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐin the baseline and time delay treatments are 
close enough, signalling that the effect of the time delay treatment may be relatively small. On 
ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĐůĞĂƌůǇƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
since its line is always above the lines of the other two treatments (e.g. for the magnitude 
treatment, participants practically start switching from question 5 and onwards whereas for the 
baseline and time delay treatments already almost 20% of the participants have switched up 
until question 4). This could mean that higher stakes result in switching later and thus, a higher 
degree of risk aversion is to be expected.  
In the loss domain on the other hand, the picture is much more imprecise and we cannot clearly 
distinguish any effect of the magnitude and the time delay treatment. It seems however that the 
magnitude treatment still has a small effect given that its corresponding line is slightly above the 
lines of the other two treatments. Another observation is that the pattern of choices is very 
                                                          
28 Recall the reversal here for the loss domain: in the gain domain, participants switch from Lottery A to Lottery B, 
whereas in the loss domain participants switch from Lottery B to Lottery A. This reversal is necessary in order to 





similar irrespective of the treatment. Note also that the majority of participants switch in the last 
five questions, an indication of risk loving behavior as the reflection effect stipulates. Finally, note 
the smooth downward sloping lines of both graphs reflecting a consistent pattern of choice. It is 
also worth mentioning that we get this clear pattern without imposing monotonic switching or 
having to remove any individual from our data due to possible fears of violating monotonicity i.e. 
switching back and forth more than once. 
 
Fig. 3.1 Switching patterns per domain 
 
 
However, the above do not tell us anything about individual behavior. It worth exploring how 
each participant behaves in the absence of monotonic switching. Table 3.3 below shows this 
behavior per domain and per treatment. As we can see the majority of the participants switch 
only once i.e. they behave as if monotonic switching had been imposed 411 out of 480 times 
(85%). In addition, in 7 cases there is no switch at all. But for the rest, their preferences could be 
imprecise since they switch more than once. The number of multiple switches can take different 
values ranging from 2 to 7. Note that we also document an even number of multiple switches (2 
or 4), albeit very small, just 13 (2.7%). Generally, this happens because participants choose the 
same lottery in their first and last questions or because they start their choices in a reverse order 
than expected, that is, choosing the right lottery (Lottery B) for gains and the left lottery (Lottery 
A) for losses. All in all, multiple switching does exist (around 15% of the cases). These findings 
confirm the validity of our approach not to impose monotonic switching and to include an error 
term in the econometric analysis so that to account for variability in choice.  
Another issue in describing individual choices is the variability of the switching point. Note that 
the Figures 3.1 represent an aggregate picture and cannot fully reveal the exact switching point 
of each individual. In Fig. 3.2a and 3.2b below we present in the form of histograms the variation 
in switching points per domain and per treatment. Such a variation could hint at a degree of 
individual heterogeneity in risk attitudes, a fact that our structural modelling approach based on 
EUT and CPT cannot capture since in essence it generates mean estimates. Note that in the case 
of multiple switches and in order to make the comparisons meaningful, we define a single 






Table 3.3 Multiple switches per domain and treatment 
 Gain domain Loss domain Total switches 
Number of 
switches 
Baseline Magnitude Time 
delay 
Baseline Magnitude Time 
delay 
 
0 - - 1 3 2 1 7 
1 63 69 70 66 69 74 411 
2 1 1 2 - 1 1 6 
3 12 9 5 8 6 3 43 
4 2 1 1 2 - 1 7 
5 1 - 1 1 2 - 5 
7 1 - - - - - 1 
 80 80 80 80 80 80 480 
 
For gains first, in the baseline treatment we can see that switching at questions 7 and 6 are the 
two dominant options, then followed by questions 4 and 5; in total, switching at these four 
questions represent 80% of the participants. In the magnitude treatment, the switching point 
starts moving to the right and the questions 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the dominant switching points. This 
reveals that the magnitude treatment seems to be strong enough to induce change in risk 
attitudes and it is an indication of higher levels of risk aversion. It also shows that very few 
switches happen in the first four questions. As for time delay, questions 5, 6 and 7 represent 
around 69% of the switching points. This is quite close to the baseline treatment (where 
questions 5, 6 and 7 represent 65% of the switching points) revealing a potentially limited 
influence of the time delay treatment.   
 
Fig. 3.2a Switching points variation in the gain domain 
 
 
Moving to the loss domain now, for the baseline treatment first, switching at questions 4 and 5 
accounts for slightly more than half of the participants (55%) followed by questions 6 and 3. In 
total all the participants have switched by question 8. For the magnitude treatment, we have a 
similar picture where a switch at questions 4 and 5 represents exactly half of the participants 
(50%), followed by a switch at questions 3 and 6. Again, there are very few switches at the two 
first and two last questions. For the time delay treatment, the overall picture is again similar with 





switches are accompanied by very few switches in the two first and two last questions. Note that 
these findings for the loss domain are generally in accord with the aggregate pattern of choices 
in Fig. 3.1 where there is limited choice differentiation across the three treatments.   
 
Fig. 3.2b Switching points variation in the loss domain 
 
 
3.4.2 EUT under higher stakes  
We start the investigation for magnitude treatment effects by focusing first on the EUT model 
(see Table 3.4 below).For either domain, the treatment effect is statistically significant and 
negative in value, -0.309 and -0.385 for gains and losses respectively, signalling steeper utility 
curvatures and leading to a more risk averse behavior for gains and a more risk seeking behavior 
for losses. The reflection effect hypothesis for the baseline treatment is firmly rejected since for 
the equality ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴, the p-value is ݌ ൌ0.000, indicating an asymmetry between gains and 
losses. We can also detect a small differential domain effect i.e. ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ௧ (݌ ൌ0.048) which 
means that the treatment effect is considered to be slightly larger statistically for losses than for 
gains. To test for the reflection effect under higher stakes, one has to add up the baseline 
coefficients and the treatment effects, that is, we test ߙ଴ ൅ ߚ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧. For this test it is݌ ൌ0.0003, thus, the reflection effect hypothesis is rejected under higher stakes, too. Furthermore, 
the utility curvature for gains for the baseline treatment can be considered linear since  ߙ଴ ൌ ?ǡ ݌ ൌ0.848, but for losses it is concave since ߚ଴ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.000. However, under the impact of 
higher stakes, utility for gains becomes concave (ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௧ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.000) whereas for losses it 
becomes convex (ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.0001). Hence, higher stakes can reverse risk attitudes in 
both domains. Note that these changes in risk attitudes are in accord with the changes in 
preferences proposed by Markowitz (1952) where for larger outcomes people become more risk 
averse for gains and more risk seeking for losses from an initial risk aversion position; however, 
the convex segment (risk seeking) for gains for the baseline ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ DĂƌŬŽǁŝƚǌ ?Ɛ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ






Table 3.4 Model parameters for the magnitude treatment29 






















ߛ଴ି  1.363*** 
(0.302) 
ߜ଴ି  1.031*** 




ߛ௧ି  0.103 
(0.372) 
ߜ௧ି  -0.454*** 




    ܰ 80 80      ܶ 60 60      ݈݋݃ܮ -1206.49 -1009.41      
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
3.4.3 Utility in CPT and the reflection effect under higher stakes 
Now, we move to the other decision theory model, the CPT. Starting with the utility curvature, 
we observe treatment effects which are statistically significant, quite large and negative in value, 
-0.421 and -0.379 for the gain and loss domains respectively. The reflection effect hypothesis for 
the baseline treatment, ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴, is not rejected now since Wald test returns ݌ ൌ0.66. 
Furthermore, there is no differential domain effect since the equality, ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ௧ is comfortably 
satisfied (݌ ൌ0.568). This absence of differential domain effect leads to the weakening of 
reflection effect under higher stakes, which now can be marginally rejected given that for ߙ଴ ൅ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧, it is ݌ ൌ0.046. Thus, CPT offers a very different picture on reflection effect (see 
Fig. 3.3a), which initially holds for the baseline treatment but when higher stakes kick in, it is 
possible this effect to be reversed. There is also another way to view this reversal of the reflection 
effect: statistically, both utility curvatures for the baseline treatment are linear since it isߙ଴ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.357 and ߚ଴ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.11. But after taking into account the treatment effects, the linear 
utility assumption collapses for the magnitude treatment (ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௧ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.000 and ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.000).  
Although under higher stakes we have ended up with steeper utility curvature for either domain 
(Fig. 3.3a), we have avoided labelling this behavioral change as rising risk aversion for gains and 
rising risk seeking for losses because the presence of probability weighting under CPT invalidates 
                                                          
29 Recall that the number of observation in our data should have been equal to ܰ כ ܶ ൌ4800 (the number of 
participants times the number of questions for both domains and for all treatments), but instead it is 4799 since 





the direct relationship between utility curvature and risk aversion put forward under EUT 
(Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994). Note also that we have ended up with linear utility in the 
baseline treatment, a finding that can be attributed to the relatively small amounts on offer 
(Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). It is also a confirmation of the partial reflection effect, at least for 
the loss domain (Wakker et al., 2007). 
 
Fig. 3.3a  Value function graph for CPT (Magnitude treatment) 
 
 
3.4.4 Probability weighting in CPT under higher stakes 
We start the investigation of the probability factor by focusing first on the curvature parameter, ߛ. That curvature can be considered linear in the baseline treatment for either domain (ߛ଴ି ൌ ?ǡ ݌ ൌ0.229 and ߛ଴ା ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.221). This linearity in curvature is present even when higher 
stakes are employed since it is ߛ଴ି ൅ ߛ௧ି ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.086 and ߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௧ା ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.149. This is not 
surprising since both treatment effects,  ߛ௧ାǡ ߛ௧ି ,  are close in value and statistically insignificant, 
so that to be ߛ௧ା ൌ ߛ௧ି , ݌ ൌ0.94. Thus, all the curvatures of the probability weighting functions 
can be thought as practically linear. In addition, a non-linear test (based on the delta method)to 
detect any probability curvature divergence between gains and losses under the magnitude 
treatment, shows that for the equalityሺߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௧ାሻ ሺߛ଴ି ൅ ߛ௧ି ሻ ൌ  ? ? , it is݌ ൌ0.736, so we can be 
comfortable that the probability curvature linearity remains unaffected. Ultimately, this reveals 
the limited role of probability curvature in the HL design with varying stakes.  
Regarding the other probability parameter, the elevation parameter ߜǡ it can only be considered 
linear in the baseline treatment for losses (ߜ଴ି ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.782), but this linearity collapses under 
higher stakes, where the treatment effect ߜ௧ି  is almost half the value of ߜ଴ି  and statistically 
significant (ߜ଴ି ൅ ߜ௧ି ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.000). This strong treatment effect shrinks the value of ߜ and 
leads to a more elevated probability graph (see right panel of Fig. 3.2b). For the gain domain on 
the other hand, the treatment effect ߜ௧ାis negligible and does not affect the already large value 
of ߜ଴ା which reveals probabilistic pessimism and a graph below the dichotomous line (see left 
panel of Fig. 3.2b).  Note finally, that ߜ is the factor that drives a wedge between the two domains 





The above findings imply that for both domains, ߜ departs considerably from linearity contrary 
to the tendency exhibited by ߛ, and it is this parameter that governs the formation of the 
probability shapes. 
The next step is to determine if there is any meaningful impact of higher stakes on probability 
weighting. The existence of two probability parameters complicates things and makes necessary 
the treatment effects on both parameters to be taken into account. Therefore, we use a t-test 
with 2000 bootstrap replications, which is performed upon the difference between the baseline 
and the magnitude treatment for the two probability weighting curves in each domain (see Fehr-
Duda et al. (2010)). The null hypothesis of the t-test states that that difference is considered 
statistically to be zero, and thus, no probability treatment effects are present and subsequently 
no separability exists30(the definition of separability is given in p. 3). For gains, the test returns a 
bootstrap test statistic ݖ ൌ -1.29 along with 95% confidence intervals that contain zero i.e. [-
0.047, 0.0096]; this illustrates that no probability treatment effects (i.e. separability) exist in this 
domain. For losses, a different picture emerges: the test statistic equals ݖ ൌ -8.48, a sufficiently 
small value so that the 95% confidence intervals not to contain zero i.e. [-0.149, -0.093], signalling 
that a statistically significant difference in probability weighting exists in the presence of higher 
stakes. We stress that the existence of separability in this domain should be attributed almost 
exclusively to the treatment effect on the elevation and not on the curvature parameter due to 
the linearity of the latter as shown earlier. 
 
Fig. 3.3b   Probability weighting graphs per domain (Magnitude treatment) 
 
 
We look now at how probability forms risk attitudes. The probability-driven behavior for gains, 
always indicates risk aversion since the large values of the elevation parameter ߜ for either 
treatment (ߜ଴ା and ߜ଴ା ൅ ߜ௧ା), yield a pessimistic attitude leading to a convex probability 
weighting function. This means that risk aversion is prevalent with respect to probability. This is 
important because it complements the linear utility of the baseline treatment revealing that it is 
                                                          
30This is a simple t-test of unpaired data. Note that we explicitly control for unequal variances of the samples derived 





probability weighting that drives risk attitudes in the baseline treatment31. It could also follow 
from the HL design which has been shown to provide better estimates of probability weighting 
than estimates of utility curvature (Drichoutis and Lusk, 2016). But in the magnitude treatment, 
the whole impact of higher stakes is absorbed in the utility curvature only, as the absence of 
separability shows. On the other hand, the probability graph for losses goes from being linear 
(ߛ଴ି ൌ  ?ǡ ߜ଴ି ൌ1, returns ݌ ൌ0.4706) in the baseline treatment to a concave graph under higher 
stakes which also illustrates probabilistic risk aversion32. One could claim that this contradicts 
the reflection effect hypothesis in principle, but the reflection effect says nothing about equality 
of the probability parameters, either. Moreover, it seems likely that the existence of separability 
for losses diverts some of the higher stakes impact away from utility, contributing to the 
weakening of the reflection effect hypothesis. To summarize, we observe different reactions of 
probability parameters in each domain under higher stakes which exposes more potential 
asymmetries between gains and losses, beyond the weakening of the reflection effect. This 
probabilistic asymmetry seems to contradict most of the literature (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010; 
Vieider, 2012), albeit the research question and the methodological approaches are not the same 
as ours. However, Abdellaoui (2000) does find that reflection effect is not conveyed to probability 
weighting but under a two-step experimental design while Pachur and Kellen (2013) find such a 
probabilistic asymmetry but conditional on the presence of loss aversion. From another point of 
view, it is in accord with findings about how the human brain responds to the framing of 
outcomes (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Gonzalez et al., 2005) and the interpretation of losses 
as a threat that could lead to probabilistic risk aversion (Lejarraga et al., 2012). 
At this point we comment further on the prominence of the elevation parameter ߜin probability 
weighting. We suspect that the primary explanation for this result lies with the psychological 
interpretation attributed to the two probability parameters: ߛ refers to how people discriminate 
among different probabilities whereas ߜ refers to how probability is over/under-weighted (see 
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) for a discussion). Because the participants are literate students, they 
can easily understand the small, and constant, probability variations (of 0.1), and this in turn can 
lead to near-linear curvature (ߛ ൎ  ?). Thus, it is the elevation parameter ߜ that in essence defines 
probabilistic behavior through over/under-weighting of probabilities. Note that despite the 
rather scarce empirical studies on losses, the critical role of elevation in probability weighting 
has been mentioned before (Abdellaoui, 2000) and it has also been directly related to the 
presence of larger outcomes (Etchart-Vincent, 2004).The importance of elevation is also 
probably related to the HL design itself, since it varies probabilities but keeps the monetary 
outcomes unchanged (Drichoutis and Lusk, 2016). Hence, the employment of a two-parameter 
Prelec weighting function, which clearly separates curvature from elevation, could paint a better, 
more complete picture for probability weighting. Ultimately, this is a finding that highlights the 
complicated nature of probability weighting and could bring into question the employment of a 
single parameter weighting function which is typically the default option for the HL design. 
                                                          
31 Recall that Fig. 3.1 clearly shows that in the gain domain and for the magnitude treatment, risk averse behavior is 
dominant since the majority of the participants switch after the fifth question.  






The well-known fourfold pattern of K&T (1992) that produces inverse S-shaped probability 
weighting functions is not confirmed by our data(this finding re-appears in the time delay 
treatment we will see later). Violations of the fourfold pattern have been reported before in the 
literature (Harbaugh et al., 2002) along with the existence of S-shape, concave or convex 
probability patterns (Balcombe and Fraser, 2015). It is likely that varying degrees of unobserved 
heterogeneity in each domain are the main culprits for this finding. In addition, and as explained 
earlier, such probability patterns may be a feature of a two-parameter Prelec weighting function 
for the HL design.  
As for the model selection process, we use the Likelihood Ratio test. This test shows that our 
data emphatically favours CPT over EUT since the test statistic is very large (394.16). The obvious 
reason for this is the presence of larger number of parameters in CPT that captures the 
probabilistic behavior of the participants as reflected in the HL design. Therefore, the richer 
conclusions drawn from CPT ought to be taken into account since it is the CPT model that 
describes best the data.  
3.4.5 EUT under time delay 
For time delay treatment and the EUT model first, there is very limited impact on utility since the 
coefficients are both very small and statistically insignificant (see Table 3.5). These utility 
treatment effects are very close in absolute value, equal to -0.01, and obviously there is no 
statistical difference between them given that the test ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ௧ returns p-value equal to 0.973. 
Hence, no differential domain effects exist for time delay. The reflection effect hypothesis of ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴ is firmly rejected (݌ ൌ0.000) indicating an uneven relation between the two domains. 
This unevenness is noticeable via tests for the linearity of the utility where ߙ଴ ൌ  ? returns ݌ ൌ0.000 while for ߚ଴ ൌ  ? it is ݌ ൌ0.264 i.e. utility is linear for losses only. Delaying the lotteries, 
also invalidates reflection effect given that the p-value for ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧ equals 0.0001. 
Hence, as with the magnitude treatment, we find no evidence of support for reflection effect 
under EUT.  The collapse of the reflection effect is also depicted to the values the utility 
parameters for each domain can assume: for gains, the utility curvature is always concave 
whereas for losses it is statistically a linear utility (ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௧ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.000 and ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.466). Note that these findings on utility curvature confirm the partial reflection effect 
hypothesis put forward by Wakker et al. (2007, p. 207), but statistically this is not translated to a 
confirmation of the curvature equality between gains and losses, as the reflection effect 











Table 3.5   Model parameters for the time delay treatment  






















ߛ଴ି  1.322*** 
(0.304) 
ߜ଴ି  0.989*** 




ߛ௧ି  0.165 
(0.393) 
ߜ௧ି  0.012 




    ܰ 80 80      ܶ 60 60      ݈݋݃ܮ -1093.77 -1046.05      
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
3.4.6 Utility in CPT and the reflection effect under time delay 
Turning our attention to CPT model now, where as we can see in Table 3.5, the utility treatment 
effects are both very small numbers and are also statistically insignificant at 1%, a finding that 
leads to the absence of any differential domain effect (ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ௧, ݌ ൌ0.658). Reflection effect 
again holds for the baseline treatment comfortably (ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴, ݌ ൌ0.594) and remains unaffected 
when the lotteries are delayed (ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧, ݌ ൌ0.208). Moreover, utility curvature is 
linear for either domain (ߙ଴ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.55 and ߚ଴ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.183) even after the implementation 
of the time delay treatment (ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௧ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.871 and ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௧ ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.383). Hence, a first 
conclusion is that after accounting for probability weighting, reflection effect becomes a solid 
feature of a CPT model with delayed lotteries (see Fig. 3.4a).  
Note that this comes contrary to our findings on higher stakes where reflection effect hypothesis 
weakens and can be rejected. The linear utility specification is also present under time delay, 
confirming again the partial reflection effect hypothesis in the loss domain (Wakker et al., 2007) 
as well as the almost linear utility over small values of outcomes (Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). 
We stress that the linearity of utility is not affected at all by the delayed lotteries, something 
which is in contrast to magnitude treatment, where the linearity of utility collapses when that 
treatment is applied. Our results here are in line with Abdellaoui et al. (2011) who find no impact 
of time delay on utility curvature irrespective of the length of the delay and with Abdellaoui and 
Kemel (2014) who report larger utility curvature for money than for time but under a quite 





dominated framework has also been reported by Leclerc et al. (1995), without utilizing however 
an explicit equation modeling approach as does this chapter. 
 
Fig. 3.4a Value function graph for CPT (Time delay treatment) 
 
 
3.4.7 Probability weighting in CPT under time delay 
The probability curvature parameter ߛ is statistically considered linear for the baseline treatment 
and for both gains and losses (ߛ଴ି ൌ  ?ǡ ݌ ൌ0.289 and ߛ଴ା ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.218), a result that is of 
course in line with what reported earlier in Section 3.4.4. The statistical insignificance of the 
probability curvature treatment effects (ߛ௧ି ǡ ߛ௧ା), turns out not to have any meaningful impact on 
the probability curvatures, since the statistical linearity of the latter is unchanged (ߛ଴ି ൅ ߛ௧ି ൌ ?,݌ ൌ0.123 and ߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௧ା ൌ  ?,݌ ൌ0.114). We also perform a non-linear test on the existence of 
a wedge that time delay might put between the two domains: for the test ሺߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௧ାሻ ሺߛ଴ି ൅ ߛ௧ି ሻ ൌ  ? ? ǡit is ݌ ൌ0.846. All in all, probability curvature remains statistically 
linear with no obvious differentiation between the two domains. Recall that this finding for the 
time delay treatment is in complete accord with that for the magnitude treatment. So, it follows 
naturally that probability curvature alone does not really affect probabilistic risk behavior in 
either domain and for either treatment.  
As for the elevation parameterߜ, its value for losses is linear for the baseline treatment (ߜ଴ି ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.912) and remains such when the time delay treatment kicks in (ߜ଴ି ൅ ߜ௧ି ൌ  ?, ݌ ൌ0.994). 
On the other hand for gains, the large value of ߜ଴ା indicates very clearly a pessimistic behavior, 
depicted through a convex probability weighting graph and which remains largely unaffected 
after time delay is implemented (see the left panel of Fig. 3.4b). Note also that there is limited 
differentiation between the two domains since for the non-linear test ሺߜ଴ା ൅ ߜ௧ାሻ ሺߜ଴ି ൅ ߜ௧ି ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? , we get ݌ ൌ0.103. We can infer from the above that it is the 
elevation parameter that seems to drive a slight wedge between gains and losses, but this wedge 
is definitely smaller compared to that of the magnitude treatment. In addition, the probabilistic 





To draw more accurate conclusions about the probability weighting impact, we have to test if 
the difference of the weighting curves representing the treatments is statistically significant or 
not. Using the same bootstrap t-test as in Section 3.4.4, we find that for the gain domain, the 
test statistic is ݖ ൌ-2.06, a sufficient value so that the 95% confidence intervals not to contain 
zero i.e. [-0.059, -0.0014], a result that confirms statistically the presence of probability 
treatment effects for gains. As for losses, the test statistic is ݖ ൌ-0.34, and the resulting 
confidence intervals [-0.0342, 0.024] indicate no probability treatment effects and no 
separability (the definition of separability is given in p. 3).  
 
Fig. 3.4b   Probability weighting graphs per domain (Time delay treatment) 
 
We now examine more closely the time delay impact on probability weighting. In the left panel 
of Fig. 3.4b depicting the gain domain, the probability weighting curve for time delay is initially 
indistinguishable from the curve of the baseline treatment, but after some point it starts lifting 
up faster. We suspect that behind this uplifting is the elevation parameter since its treatment 
effect is negative (ߜ௧ା ൌ -0.074), generating a more optimistic behavior, that is, the decision 
weights for time delay increase, and simultaneously the probability curvature remains linear for 
either treatments as we have shown earlier. Inevitably, this rise in optimism leads to a higher risk 
tolerance, with respect to probability only, for lotteries that are payable in the future33. In Fig. 
3.3c, the difference between the probability curves for the baseline and the time delay 
treatments ( ?ݓାሺ݌ሻ ൌ  ݓାሺ݌ሻ௧-ݓାሺ݌ሻ଴) have been plotted for the gain domain. Note that the 
time delay curve is above the baseline curve after a specific value of probability, around 0.29. 
This implies that it is the larger probabilities of the HL design that contribute to the rising risk 
tolerant behavior. This is a finding which is strikingly close to what Abdellaoui et al. (2011) state 
ĂďŽƵƚ “ĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵĨŽƌƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐůĂƌŐĞƌƚŚĂŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ? In terms of objective 
probability, represented by the dichotomous line, probabilities are over-weighted towards the 
end of the scale, after a value of around 0.76. 
 
                                                          
33 We emphasize that this finding is due to the comparison between the curves of the two treatments. We ignore 








Fig. 3.4c   Difference of probability weighting curves (Time delay treatment)  
 
 
Observing a rising risk tolerant behavior when lotteries are delayed is a finding that has been 
reported before in the relevant literature about the interaction between risk and time (Noussair 
and Wu, 2006; Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Savadori and Mittone, 2015). Yet, with the notable 
exception of Abdellaoui et al. (2011), we are unaware of any other work that has reported a 
similar result by explicitly accounting for the role of probability weighting. The question that 
arises here is how one can explain that shift in probability weighting. We believe that an affect-
based reasoning offers a solid explanatory framework: Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) proposed 
that affect-poor outcomes may give rise to a greater insensitivity to probabilities and ultimately 
in a more linear probabilistic perception (see also Loewenstein et al. (2001)). Given this rationale, 
we can claim that delayed lotteries could have resulted in a decline of the anticipated affective 
reactions and thus, to a more risk tolerant behavior. Although this is an appealing hypothesis, if 
we accept it, we struggle to find a reason why under time delay lotteries are becoming less vivid 
options. Perhaps an explanation could be the offering of guaranteed post-dated cheques for the 
payment of the delayed lotteries. It is not unlikely that securing future payments could have led 
to declining affect for future lotteries because the risk in future payments could have been 
decreased, or even eliminated. However, this is a standard practice in experiments on 
intertemporal choice (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012), which is also unavoidable if we want to 
refrain from using hypothetical rewards and satisfy salience in economic experiments (Smith, 
1982).   
As for probability weighting in the loss domain (see right panel, Fig. 3.4b), we stress that these 
curves are linear in the baseline treatment (ߛ଴ି ൌ  ?ǡ ߜ଴ି ൌ  ? returns ݌ ൌ0.567) as well as under 
time delay (ߛ଴ି ൅ ߛ௧ି ൌ  ?ǡ ߜ଴ି ൅ ߜ௧ି ൌ  ? returns ݌ ൌ0.282). Thus, time delay has no effect at all 





utility, reveals a complete insensitivity of risk preferences for losses when the lotteries are 
delayed. So, this result linked with the increasing risk tolerance in the gain domain, implies a 
clear asymmetry between gains and losses, which is represented only on probability weighting 
and not on utility where reflection effect is satisfied. Note that the affect-based reasoning should 
not be discarded as a hypothesis since Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) claim that their theory is 
transferable to losses, too. Nonetheless, the absence of probability treatment effects in the loss 
domain in our experiment cannot confirm this claim. Still, we are not knowledgeable of any 
attempt to confirm Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) in the context of sign-dependent models like 
CPT. But this affect-based reasoning is a warning against ignoring the role of probability 
weighting in the elicitation of time-related preferences, as quite often happens in the literature.  
Up to this point from our analysis on time delay treatment, two main conclusions follow: first, 
we can see a distinction between the dimensions of time and money, represented by the time 
delay and the magnitude treatment respectively, the latter having an impact not only on 
probability weighting but on utility, too, by invalidating the reflection effect hypothesis: this 
confirms the different paths of mental accounting between money and time that have been 
reported in the literature (Leclerc et al., 1995; Soman, 2001) and which are depicted in the lower 
degree of transferability (fungibility) of time compared to money and the difficulties in properly 
aggregating time periods and evaluating future decisions (Thaler, 1999). We caution though that 
we reach this conclusion by capturing the impact of time by both probability weighting and 
utility, but we have not included a time discount factor.  
Second, this probabilistic asymmetry between gains and losses under time delay is a novel 
finding, which to the best of our knowledge has not been reported before in the literature (recall 
that the analysis if Abdellaoui et al. (2011) is for gains only). An obvious interpretation is that the 
rising risk tolerance in the gain domain exists because of the discounting of future lotteries: then, 
discounting causes a lower present value for future lotteries and thus, participants switch their 
preferences towards a more risk tolerant behavior. But for losses, the discounting is apparently 
very small or practically zero due to the absence of probability treatment effects. This asymmetry 
in discounting hints at the sign effect, a classic finding in the study of intertemporal choice which 
states that gains are discounted more than losses (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; 
Estle et al., 2006). The existence of practically no discounting for losses may look surprising at 
first, but it is something that has been reported before (Hardisty et al., 2013) and it is probably 
related to the apparent aversive behavior shown for delayed lotteries and can lead to an 
insensitivity in delay discounting for losses (Myerson et al., 2017). In any case, in this chapter we 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚĞůŝĐŝƚƚŝŵĞƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƐŽǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌĂƚĞƐĨŽƌŐĂŝŶƐ and losses. 
Therefore, this discussion is inevitably confined to reporting an asymmetry in risk preferences 
between gains and losses for delayed lotteries, which is featured in probability weighting only, 
and not about an actual sign effect.  
Finally, regarding the selection of the preferred model, the Likelihood Ratio test again indicates 
a clear preference for CPT over EUT, since the test statistic is also large (95.44). Thus, again the 
statistical conclusions for time delay are similar to those from the magnitude treatment and 







In this chapter we have investigated experimentally risk behavior and how it is affected under 
two treatments: when higher stakes are offered (magnitude treatment) and when lotteries are 
offered after a delay (time delay treatment). We find that the reflection effect hypothesis of CPT 
is dependent on the magnitude of the stakes, since it is present for lower stakes due to the 
linearity of the utility in either domain, but it can be rejected when higher stakes are utilized, a 
result in accord with Laury and Holt (2008). This statistical adjustment is due to the strong 
treatment effects that cause the collapse of the linear utilities making curvatures concave and 
convex for gains and losses respectively. This hints at the utility-based fourfold pattern of 
Markowitz (1952), a precursor-model of CPT, which after using the EUT model and controlling 
for a linear probability perception, it can be largely confirmed (apart from the risk seeking 
condition for gains in the baseline treatment). 
The role of probability weighting turns out to be essential into revealing another level of 
asymmetry between gains and losses. Higher stakes have no impact on probability weighting 
function in the gain domain, where probability weighting remains convex marking a probabilistic 
risk averse behavior; but there is a clear statistically detectable impact for losses transforming 
the initially linear weighing function to a concave one which also marks a risk averse behavior. In 
other words, a kind of reflection effect is not confirmed for probabilities, thus the 
aforementioned utility-based gain-loss asymmetry under higher stakes is transferable to 
probabilistic behavior, too, a point that has not been emphasized by the literature (Abdellaoui, 
2000). We stress that the asymmetry between gains and losses for both the baseline and the 
magnitude treatment should be ascribed to the elevation parameters only since the curvature 
parameters are statistically linear in either domain. Elevation has not always been included in 
probability modelling and is definitely absent from empirical analyses based on the HL design 
(Drichoutis and Lusk, 2016). The inclusion of two probability parameters has as a side-effect the 
collapse of the fourfold pattern for the probability weighting function (T&K, 1992). Apart from 
being a design-related finding, it could hint at the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in our 
data which would require more elaborate econometric techniques to be tackled. However, the 
literature has shown that other than inverse-S shape probability patterns should not be ruled 
out (Balcombe and Fraser, 2015). Note finally, that the importance of probability weighting is 
also confirmed statistically through the Likelihood Ratio tests that overwhelmingly favour the 
CPT model over EUT.  
Contrary to higher stakes, time delay is found to have no impact on utility curvature. In fact, the 
treatment effects are so weak that the linearity of the utility parameters in either domain is 
satisfied and therefore reflection effect holds comfortably. It is probability weighting that comes 
forth as the carrier of the time delay impact on risk preferences. Two basic conclusions are 
drawn: in the gain domain, the behavior becomes more risk tolerant, a result that can be better 
explained by an affect-based reasoning (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001) where time delay can 
lead to less affective reactions for lotteries, and thus, change how people weight probabilities. 
This probabilistic change is consistent with the switch towards riskier options that have been 
reported in the literature (e.g. Noussair and Wu (2006)). But for losses, the impact on probability 





implies that gains are viewed as less attractive as time passes but this is not happening for losses, 
a fact that is very much reminiscent of the sign effect in delay discounting (Thaler, 1981; 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) even though in our experimental design we have not controlled 
for time discount rates.  
Of course, we acknowledge that there are some limitations derived from the experimental design 
itself as well as from the nature of the lab experiments. Firstly, the popular HL method (2002) 
uses two pairs of outcomes in each lottery for the utility parameters derivation and this number 
of outcomes may not be enough to capture all segments of the utility curvature, although by 
using higher stakes the number of outcomes increases and thus it partly mitigates this deficiency. 
Regarding the time delay treatment, the deferred cheques we have employed in order to secure 
the delayed payments could have as a side effect the under-reporting of risk preferences since 
the participants face no threat in receiving their money. Unfortunately, this is an almost 
unavoidable obstacle since if we fail to offer a secure future payment implicitly we deceive the 
participants and hence, we would have violated one of the tenets of the economic experimental 
protocol, the saliency principle, which requires the decisions of the participants to be directly 
related to their payoffs (see Plott (1979) and Smith (1982)). Consequently, some caution is 
necessary before drawing safe conclusions about the impact of time delay on risk preferences.  
Another limitation is the non-inclusion of mixed gambles in our experimental design. The 
inclusion of such gambles would have allowed the identification of loss aversion which 
complements the reference dependence structure of the gain-loss relationship. K&T (1979) 
hinted at a possible impact of higher stakes on the loss aversion parameter but it is difficult to 
have strong prior beliefs about the magnitude of change given the limited attention this question 
has received in the literature in the context of risky choices. Furthermore, research so far has not 
clearly identified the exact nature of loss aversion which could range from being an emotional 
reaction to a judgement mistake (Camerer, 2005). It would also be interesting to see how this 
affects utility and nonlinear probability weighting and the separability issues which might 
emerge. This is a question that merits further research.  
An interesting direction for future research would be to combine the magnitude and the time 
delay treatments in a single treatment where larger stakes would be offered in future dates. The 
adoption of such a treatment could be motivated by the clear indications on the existence of a 
magnitude effect in the discounting process as well, that is, larger stakes are less heavily 
discounted than lower stakes (see Frederick et al. (2002) for a survey). This treatment could be 
put in a wider framework and coupled with the elicitation of time preferences to lead to the 
investigation of discounted utility-type models beyond the Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) 
model which empirically has been found to exhibit a number of anomalies (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Coble and Lusk, 2010). In this way, one can also have a much more comprehensive look at the 
difference in discounting between gains and losses. 
Finally, it may be worthwhile to explore some other decision theory models e.g. Disappointment 
Aversion, Regret Theory and Weighted Expected Utility. These models could either stand on their 
own as candidate models beyond EUT and CPT for the interpretation of the data (see Hey and 
Orme (1994)). It may also be worthwhile to control for unobserved heterogeneity in our analysis 





model (Conte et al., 2011). This last type of models is relatively new in the economics literature 
although it has a long history in statistics (Newcomb, 1886). It would be interesting to estimate 
to estimate finite mixture models where the components are not just EUT, CPT or Rank 
Dependent Utility but other less known decision theory models like those mentioned previously. 
We are not aware of any such attempt in the literature. Affective measures of utility like 
Experienced Utility (EU) (Kahneman et al., 1997) are attractive and promising for future research 
albeit it is difficult to be used in an econometric analysis similar to the one outlined in this 
chapter. The above constitute some potentially fruitful lines for future research on risk behavior 





































Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
Welcome! You are going to participate in an economic experiment. Please put in silent mode or 
deactivate your mobile phones. Do not show your decision to or discuss your 
decision with anyone else. All your decisions will be anonymous and the data generated will be 
treated strictly confidentially.  
This is an experiment about the economics of decision making under uncertainty. The 
experiment is consisted 6 parts. In all parts you will answer questions on choices between 
different types of lotteries. For each part, you will be given an instructions sheet explaining the 
decision questions and the payment procedure. Attached you will find the decision questions.  
At the end of the experiment each one of you will receive £5 as a participation fee. In addition, 
two participants will be randomly chosen by picking a number out of a hat and will be given the 
opportunity to receive rewards up to £46.2, based on their answers in a randomly selected 
decision question. All rewards are in cash.  
It is possible that some questions could result in receiving late rewards offered after a specific 
time delay. In case you are entitled to a future reward, a payment certificate will be given to 
you so that to ensure that you will properly receive all the money. Be sure to bring that 
certificate in order to receive the money. Note that this is a fully funded experiment and the 
future payment will be guaranteed by Prof. Iain Fraser.  
For statistical needs, please answer all the questions. There are no correct or wrong answers. 
Which lotteries you prefer is a matter of personal taste. Please work in silence and make your 
choices by thinking carefully about all decision questions. 
 
Sample questions: 
You will face a series of choices between two different lotteries, Lottery Left and Lottery Right. 
Each lottery is comprised of two different rewards being offered at varying chances of winning. 
The lotteries are presented in the form of pie charts (see below).  The monetary rewards are 
presented as regions of the pie chart and the size of each region is proportional to the probability 
of the reward. Next to each region you will see labels which specify the exact reward and its 
associated probability. Both lotteries always contain the same rewards, £6 and £4.8 for Lottery 
left and £11.55 and £0.3 for Lottery Right. In the example below, Lottery Left consists of £6 at 
30% and £4.8 at 70% chance of winning and Lottery Right consists of £0.3 at 70% and £11.55 at 
30% chance of winning.  
You are asked to indicate which of the two lotteries, Left or Right, you prefer to buy. To indicate 








Lottery   Left                                                Lottery    Right 
0 
  
Left        Right 
 
 
Payment process:  
Assume that the above decision question has been randomly selected for payment at the end of 
the experiment and you have chosen Lottery Left.  
A ten-sided dice will be drawn. If the number turns out to be between 0-2 (0, 1, 2, that is 30%) 
you receive £6.If the number of the dice turns out to be between 3-9 (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 that is 




Appendix B: Sample code for EUT model 
 
capture program drop CPT_sep_prelec1_noi 
program define CPT_sep_prelec1_noi 
args lnf alpha beta gamma_plus gamma_minus noise 
 
tempvar prob1l prob2l prob1r prob2r m1 m2 m3 m4 y1left y2left y1right y2right euL euR euDiff  
tempvar dw_prob1l_ga  dw_prob1l_lo dw_prob2l_ga  dw_prob2l_lo  dw_prob1r_ga  dw_prob1r_lo  
tempvar dw_prob2r_ga   dw_prob2r_lo  




generate double `prob1l' = $ML_y2 
generate double `prob2l' = $ML_y3 
generate double `prob1r' = $ML_y4 
generate double `prob2r' = $ML_y5 
 
generate double `m1' = $ML_y6 













generate double `m3' = $ML_y8 
generate double `m4' = $ML_y9 
 
*Left lottery first 
*Gains 
 
generate double `dw_prob1l_ga'=.   
generate double `dw_prob2l_ga'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob2l_ga'= exp(-(-ln($ML_y3))^`gamma_plus')                 if `m2'>=0 
replace         `dw_prob2l_ga'= 0                                                                             if $ML_y3==0 & `m2'>=0 
replace         `dw_prob1l_ga'= 1- `dw_prob2l_ga'                                               if `m2'>=0 
*Losses 
generate double `dw_prob1l_lo'=.   
generate double `dw_prob2l_lo'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob1l_lo'= exp(-(-ln($ML_y2))^`gamma_minus')                  if `m1'<0 
replace         `dw_prob1l_lo'= 0                                                                                  if $ML_y2==0 & `m1'<0 
replace         `dw_prob2l_lo'= 1- `dw_prob1l_lo'                                                    if `m1'<0 
 
*Right lottery now 
*Gains 
generate double `dw_prob1r_ga'=.   
generate double `dw_prob2r_ga'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob2r_ga'= exp(-(-ln($ML_y5))^`gamma_plus')                 if `m4'>=0 
replace         `dw_prob2r_ga'= 0                                                                             if $ML_y5==0 & `m4'>=0 
replace         `dw_prob1r_ga'= 1- `dw_prob2r_ga'                                              if `m4'>=0 
 
*Losses 
generate double `dw_prob1r_lo'=.   
generate double `dw_prob2r_lo'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob1r_lo'= exp(-(-ln($ML_y4))^`gamma_minus')                  if `m3'<0 
replace         `dw_prob1r_lo'= 0                                                                                 if $ML_y4==0 & `m3'<0 




generate double `y1left' = . 
replace `y1left' = ( `m1')^(`alpha') if `m1'>=0 
replace `y1left' = -(-`m1')^(`beta') if `m1'<0 
 
generate double `y2left' = . 
replace `y2left' = ( `m2')^(`alpha') if `m2'>=0 
replace `y2left' = -(-`m2')^(`beta') if `m2'<0 
 
generate double `y1right' = . 
replace `y1right' = ( `m3')^(`alpha') if `m3'>=0 
replace `y1right' = -(-`m3')^(`beta') if `m3'<0 
 
generate double `y2right' = . 





replace `y2right' = -(-`m4')^(`beta') if `m4'<0 
 
*Generate the final decision weights 
 
generate double `dw_prob1l' =. 
generate double `dw_prob2l' =. 
generate double `dw_prob1r' =.  
generate double `dw_prob2r' =. 
 
replace  `dw_prob1l'=`dw_prob1l_ga'   if sign2==1 
replace  `dw_prob1l'=`dw_prob1l_lo'   if sign2==2 
 
replace  `dw_prob2l'=`dw_prob1l_ga'   if sign2==1 
replace  `dw_prob2l'=`dw_prob1l_lo'   if sign2==2 
 
replace  `dw_prob1r'=`dw_prob1r_ga'   if sign2==1 
replace  `dw_prob1r'=`dw_prob1r_lo'   if sign2==2 
 
replace  `dw_prob2r'=`dw_prob2r_ga'   if sign2==1 
replace  `dw_prob2r'=`dw_prob2r_lo'   if sign2==2 
 
*The utility of each lottery 
 
generate double `euL' = (`dw_prob1l'*`y1left')+(`dw_prob2l'*`y2left') 
generate double `euR' = (`dw_prob1r'*`y1right')+(`dw_prob2r'*`y2right') 
 
generate double `euDiff' = (`euR' - `euL')/`noise' 
 
replace `lnf' = ln(normal( `euDiff')) if $ML_y1==1 




ml model lf CPT_sep_prelec1_noi (alpha: option p1left p2left p1right p2right prize1 prize2 prize3 prize4= ) 





















In the controlled environment of the laboratory, we investigate experimentally the effect of 
stakes size on Cumulative Prospect Theory with a particular focus on loss aversion. We find that 
loss aversion increases substantially and could be doubled although the starting point for loss 
aversion implies loss neutral risk behavior. This spike of loss aversion is apparently unaffected by 
the stakes impact on probability weighting and utility curvature. Moreover, if we control 
explicitly for this spike in loss aversion, the parameters in the gain domain are affected more 
than the corresponding parameters in the loss domain. These results reveal the importance of 
loss aversion and its volatile nature and the Cumulative Prospect Theory mechanisms behind 





















Risky decision making is an integral part of everyday life. The examples are abundant and include 
decisions about investment, consumption and saving future plans, buying retirement annuities 
and household insurance. Such decisions could be options between gains or losses, or mixed 
combinations of them where both gains and losses are at stake. Prospect Theory (PT) by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (hereafter K&T (1979)), as well as its successor Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT) also introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (hereafter T&K (1992)) 
utilized such mixed outcomes to establish the concept of loss aversion, that losses loom larger 
than gains of equal magnitude. Loss aversion has been used to interpret phenomena like the 
endowment effect, the status quo bias, the sunk cost fallacy and has become one of the main 
tenets of behavioral economics and modern decision theory. But loss aversion could be affected 
by a number of factors and given the potentially large variability of outcomes, the effect of higher 
stakes is apparently one such major factor. The literature has generally shown that when the 
monetary outcomes at stake are higher, preferences may not necessarily remain the same. 
However, the literature has not really been expanded to include mixed outcomes, so the effect 
of higher stakes on loss aversion has not been fully scrutinised. This is the central question of this 
chapter and will be investigated through a lab experiment.  
CPT constituted an important departure from the dominant rational choice model of Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT). A crucial point was the introduction of a reference dependence feature, in 
the sense that outcomes can be treated separately as gains or losses depending on being above 
or below a reference point. This feature implies that derived utility depends on changes of wealth 
and not on final levels of wealth and it is this feature upon which PT and CPT were built. 
Furthermore, according to CPT changes in preferences are felt more intensely near the reference 
point i.e. the difference between £5 and £10 seems larger that the difference between £105 and 
£110 on either domain. This reflects the principle of diminishing sensitivity, which in turn is 
closely related to the psychophysics of quantity and leads to the usual S-shape of the value 
function, the function that evaluates risky outcomes in the CPT jargon. Reference dependence 
paves the way for loss aversion, the most important feature of CPT (Kahneman, 2003), the notion 
that the disutility of losses is larger than the utility of equally-sized gains, represented by a kink 
of the value function at the reference point denoting larger steepness for losses than for gains. 
Loss aversion quickly found numerous applications and has been utilized for the explanation of 
many research questions in many different areas of economics34. The well-known value of loss 
aversion equal to 2.25 as reported by T&K (1992) should not be considered a constant number 
panacea though. Beauchamp et al. (2012) have shown that the loss aversion value can be 
dependent on the experimental design and it could assume lower values which signal loss neutral 
behavior and likewise Plott and Zeiler (2005) stress the importance of framing effects for riskless 
                                                          
34 Some examples include the optimal pricing strategy decided by a firm (Spiegler, 2012; ,ĞŝĚŚƵĞƐĂŶĚ<ƅƐǌĞŐŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?
consumer and saving behavior (Bowman et al., 1999; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), a downward-sloping labour supply 
indicating a negative relation between effort elasticity and loss aversion (Camerer et al., 1997; Goette et al., 2004), 
the equity premium puzzle interpretation (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Haigh and List, 2005), market failure (Baharad 
and Kliger, 2013) and riskless choices  for consumption goods due to the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman 





choices. The economic literature has not really focused on this issue, but the relevant literature, 
especially the psychology literature, has examined more broadly the nature of loss aversion. 
Birnbaum and Bahra (2007), Ert and Erev (2013) and Walasek and Stewart (2015) all show 
through the use of experimental data that loss aversion is volatile and context-dependent. Of 
course, that variability of loss aversion could be due to differences in loss aversion definitions35, 
different elicitation techniques or differences in the subject pools of the participants. However, 
ŝƚĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇŝŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌWd ?/ƚŝƐ
likely that different reference point specifications would lead to different coding of the outcomes 
as gains or losses and hence to different loss aversion estimates36. 
The importance of higher stakes and its possible influence on risk preferences have a long history 
in decision theory. Markowitz (1952) accounted explicitly for stake-dependent preferences for 
both gains and losses, by observing that for small outcomes people were risk seeking for gains 
and risk averse for losses whereas for larger outcomes there was a reversal in preferences with 
people being risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses. His approach however included only 
utility parameters with changing convexity types within each domain and that was a feature 
difficult to track down empirically. Since then, higher stakes have been used in economic 
experiments in the field and in the lab in order to check the stability of risk preferences (e.g. 
Binswanger and Silliers 1983; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Harrison et al., 2007; Drichoutis 
and Lusk, 2016), focusing mostly on the gain domain, with the usual finding that risk aversion 
tends to increase when higher outcomes are on offer. But there are only a few studies that have 
examined the impact of higher stakes on losses (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990; Etchard-Vincent, 
2004; Laury and Holt, 2008; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010) and they also report the risk attitudes can 
also be affected albeit the overall picture for such effects is not as clear as for gains. K&T (1979) 
state that a positive relationship between loss aversion and stakes size should be expected for 
mixed gambles (K&T, 1979, p. 279) but they offer no further elaboration on this claim and they 
mention nothing about the stakes impact on the other parameters. The literature has not really 
addressed the impact of higher stakes on loss aversion through mixed gambles. Andersen et al. 
(2010) report that loss aversion can increase substantially when the endowment on offer 
increases, too. Vieider (2012), who uses rather moderate stake variations, Andrikogiannopoulou 
and Papakonstantinou (2017) who use betting industry data also report varying values of loss 
aversion but they do not estimate explicit treatment effects and they offer no statistical 
confirmation. On the other hand Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) find practically no loss aversion 
variation in a population sample but they use hypothetical payoffs and have a rather limited 
variation in outcome and probability range. 
Higher stakes could also allow us to investigate experimentally the impact on probability 
weighting. It is expected that changes in outcomes would be reflected in an equivalent way only 
                                                          
35 Two kinds of definitions of loss aversion exist in the literature, local and global definitions. The former, derived 
from values of gains and losses close to the reference point, has prevailed in the literature. Unfortunately, the local 
definition can be conceptually restrictive but it still permits the clear estimation of experimental treatments on 
model parameters as the higher stakes treatment of this chapter. Global definitions make impossible the separation 
of loss aversion from utility curvature, therefore are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
36Reference point has proven to be a difficult issue which was not fully addressed by K&T (1979) and T&K (1992) and 






on the utility and not in the probability parameters, which means a separability condition 
between probability weighting and outcome values, a fact T&K (1992) support empirically (see 
also Prelec (1998) for a similar argument). We also refer the reader back to the definition of 
separability given in p. 3. Although recent papers have shown that this assumption could be 
violated (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010; Bouchouicha and Vieider, 2017),to our knowledge it hasn ?t been 
investigated explicitly in the light of loss aversion. Then, the existence of separability could imply 
a relationship between probability weighting and loss aversion albeit there are no empirical 
applications to establish this, only papers from a theoretical perspective (Schmidt and Zank, 
2008; Zank, 2010). In any case, the employment of higher stakes has proven to be a major 
challenge to decision theories under risk like EUT and CPT as seminal papers like Rabin (2000) 
and Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) have shown respectively. This fact along with the apparent instability 
of loss aversion, is a major motive to investigate the behavior of loss aversion.  
To contribute on the literature on CPT and the nature of loss aversion, we conduct a lab 
experiment where we employ a treatment with much higher stakes by a factor of six. This allows 
us to examine how risk attitude is affected when stake dependence becomes in essence an 
additional factor of CPT. This is one of the very first attempts to investigate the impact of higher 
stakes on a CPT model with mixed gambles in the context of risky choices. We also employ the 
statistical technique of maximum likelihood for the estimation of the treatment effects on all 
model parameters. Although there are a few papers that have utilized this technique before, 
they are constrained to gains and losses. We are unaware of any paper that uses this technique 
with options in the mixed domain to estimate the impact of higher stakes on loss aversion. 
Moreover, to our knowledge, this is the only attempt along with Harrison and Swarthout (2016) 
that uses lotteries with more than two outcomes in all domains (gains, losses, mixed) for a CPT 
model. The estimation of probability treatment effects allows us to investigate the existence of 
separability after controlling explicitly for loss aversion, something that has not been attempted 
before in the literature. Finally, we employ the Dual Theory (DT) model to investigate the same 
issues as previously mentioned under CPT. This is a model rarely used in the literature (Vieider 
et al. (2015) and Harrison and Swarthout (2016) are two exceptions) and its main usefulness is 
that it allows for no confounding between utility and loss aversion since the former is assumed 
to be linear. 
The analysis of our experimental data shows clear treatment effects on loss aversion under 
various treatment scenarios for both the CPT and the DT models. The results indicate that under 
higher stakes the loss aversion parameter increases substantially to numbers beyond the usual 
2.25 indicating persistently high levels of loss averse behavior. Note though that the starting 
point for loss aversion when the low stakes are used reveals no evidence of loss averse behavior 
in our data. Furthermore, if we control for no treatment effects on loss aversion specifically, then 
the utility estimates for gains change considerably but for losses only slightly, signalling 
qualitatively different utility effects per domain. The fourfold pattern for the probability 
weighting functions as predicted by T&K (1992) is confirmed only for gains but not for losses. As 
for separability, generally it does not arise in our data except for models where we avoid 
controlling for treatment effects on the loss aversion parameter. Finally, the DT model offers 
similar results to the CPT model regarding the loss aversion and the probability parameter which 





The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2discusses the details of the experimental design, 
Section 4.3 discusses the decision theory models and the methodological approach. Section 4.4 
presents the results and Section 4.5draws some conclusions.  
 
4.2 The Experiment 
This section describes the experimental design, the novelties it incorporates, the treatment 
implementation and the procedures behind the experiment. 
4.2.1 The experiment set-up 
One hundred and nineteen students (119) from the University of Kent at Canterbury, 
participated in the experiment. The recruited students (both undergraduate and postgraduate) 
were primarily members of the School of Economics or the Business School and the rest (about 
1/3 of the participants) belonged to various academic departments. All data were collected in 
October 2017 during a series of experimental sessions lasted less than 1 hour and each student 
participated in just one session. Before the experimental sessions, all participants had been 
notified that each of them would receive a £5 participation fee irrespective of their answers and 
furthermore, they would have the chance to get additional money, up to £60. This would be 
determined by their answers in the questions during the experiment. Detailed instructions along 
with examples of the questions and explanations of the payment process were distributed to the 
participants at first. Afterwards, the paper sheets with the questions were distributed. Full 
anonymity was ensured throughout the experiment. 
When the experimental session was over, the payment took place in private by selecting a 
ďŝŶĚŝŶŐ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƌĂŶĚŽŵ ĂŶĚ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ
participants themselves determined the payment process by throwing a 12-sided and a 10-sided 
dices. 
4.2.2 The experimental design 
The experimental design consisted of a series of binary choices between two options, A and B. 
Option A consisted of three different outcomes being offered at different probability levels 
whereas Option B was always a sure thing37. The two options were presented as pie charts and 
the participants could choose one option, A or B. For gains, the outcomes of the options were 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨǀĂůƵĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ?ŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇ ? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
10) ? ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ĨŽƌ ůŽƐƐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ƌĂŶŐĞ ǁĂƐ  ?-10, -9.5, - ? ? ? ?  ?) and for the mixed domain 
options their range was (-10, -9.5, - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƐ 
outcomes assumed a range of values from 0 to 1 incremented by 0.05 i.e. (0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?. For the generation of the options we imposed interval constraints for the model 
parameters: the utility parameters based on a power function were between 0.1 and 1.5 for 
gains and between 0.1 and 2 for losses as well as for the probability weighting function 
                                                          
37 We decided not to alternate the sure thing between the options, A or B. This was done in order to reduce the 
cognitive difficulty for the participants and the time required answering the questions. Therefore Option A was 





parameters based on a Prelec weighting function; the loss aversion parameter could range 
between 0.5 and 5. Note that the relative wide range of these interval constraints aimed at 
uncovering the treatment effects due to higher stakes. The aforementioned process results in a 
riĐŚĞƌĂŶĚŵŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝďůĞĚĂƚĂƐĞƚƚŚĂƚĂůůŽǁƐŵŽƌĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
compared to other popular experimental designs e.g. Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison and 
Rutström (2009).  
This experimental design incorporates two major characteristics: first, we exclude pairs of 
options for which participants offer the same answers which implies certainty about their 
preferences and thus, we receive no additional information because the determinant of the 
information matrix is maximized for those options. This is a principle that has been exploited 
before in the development of optimal experimental designs (Moffatt, 2015). Second, we exclude 
the pairs of options which if considered in pairs, do not offer additional information than if 
considered alone. This ensures that no pair of options is redundant and subsequently that 
different pairs of options can accommodate different perspectives. Again, this is directly related 
with a basic principle in information theory according to which the entropy (information) of a 
variable declines when a second variable is observed, so if a pair of options offer no additional 
information it can be excluded (see Balcombe and Fraser (2017) for more details).  
We chose 99 questions from the simulation process to be used in the experiment. To 
accommodate this large number of questions, we divided them into three different blocks. More 
precisely, participants faced 12 questions in the gain domain as well as in the loss domain and 9 
questions in the mixed domain, altogether 33 observations from each participant. In the mixed 
domain especially, we were careful to have an approximately equal number of positive and 
negative outcomes in the right option to avoid any bias to be diffused in the loss aversion 
estimation. We decided the numbers for gains and losses to be the same in order not to 
jeopardize the reflection effect hypothesis as well as the utility curvature equality which is 
necessary for the loss aversion identification (see below). The questions in the mixed domain 
were slightly fewer due to time constraints and because we expected mixed options to have an 
impact primarily on loss aversion identification given the definition of which we adopt later. 
Table 4.1 contains the options used for gains in the first block. All the options for all domains are 
in Appendix A while the experimental instructions and an example of the questions can be found 
in Appendix B.  
We also employed a treatment, called magnitude treatment where all outcomes for each 
question and in every domain are scaled up by a factor of six. Therefore, apart from the first set 
of questions described earlier with outcomes up to £10 (the baseline treatment), we have 
another set of choices where the only change is the up-scaling of the outcomes up to £60. Thus, 
the total number of questions per participant was 66, the total number of questions to be used 
was 198 and this was translated to 7851 observations overall38. As a result, we have a within-
subject design with choices from participants across both treatments. The combination of these 
                                                          
38Note that each of the 119 subjects answered 66 questions. We had to drop three missing values, so instead of 





two different sets of choices allows us to estimate the impact of higher stakes i.e. the treatment 
effects on the model parameters39. 
 










Given the within-subject experimental design we use, there may be some disquiet over the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŽƌĚĞƌĞĨĨĞĐƚƐƐŝŶĐĞŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ
would be affected from what they have already learned from the previous questions. To control 
for this concern, we randomize the order of appearance of all questions in every domain and for 
both treatments (Charness et al., 2012). 
We have chosen to use real monetary incentives so that the salience principle of experimental 
economics holds (Smith, 1982). Given budget constraints, we decided to pay 20% of the 
participants in each experimental session. This approach is supported by the comprehensive 
survey of Charness et al. (2016) who report that paying a subsample of the participants, usually 
10% (Harrison et al., 2007; von Gaudecker et al., 2011; Beaud and Willinger, 2015) does not 
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?motivation and the validity of the random lottery incentive 
scheme. For the questions that included negative outcomes, a fixed endowment was used for 
each question which was given if such a question was chosen for payment at the end of the 
experiment. This fixed endowment equalled the largest possible loss that could be realised 
during the experiment and its value could vary between £0 and £60, so the participants would 
never lose money. This was a necessary step to be taken in order to avoid paying negative 
outcomes to any of the participants. Note that an endowment that covers losses is the standard 
procedure of dealing with negative outcomes in economic experiments e.g. Fehr-Duda et al. 
(2010) and Vieider et al. (2015)40. An issue that may arise because of this endowment is that it 
                                                          
39 The hourly wage rate in UK for 2017 was £5.60 for ages 18 to 20 and £7.05 for ages 21 to 24. Three quarters of 
the participants in the experiment are up to 24, so they could earn money 10.71 or 8.51 times higher than working 
elsewhere. 
40Actually, Etchart-Vincent and l ?,ĂƌŝĚŽŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨĨĞƌĂn experimental confirmation for this approach since they 
report no significant difference between payments for losses from an endowment or hypothetical losses.  
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
1.5 5 10 0.3 0.1 0.6 0 6.5 0 0 1 0 
2.5 3 9 0.1 0.55 0.35 0 4.5 0 0 1 0 
2.5 5 9.5 0.55 0.2 0.25 0 4 0 0 1 0 
0 7.5 10 0.45 0.05 0.5 0 4 0 0 1 0 
2 9.5 10 0.45 0.05 0.5 0 6 0 0 1 0 
1 0 9.5 0.55 0 0.45 0 3.5 0 0 1 0 
1.5 6 10 0.25 0.15 0.6 0 7 0 0 1 0 
0 4 9.5 0 0.6 0.4 0 6 0 0 1 0 
3 3.5 9 0.4 0.2 0.4 0 5.5 0 0 1 0 
0 1.5 8.5 0.05 0.35 0.6 0 5 0 0 1 0 
0 0.5 8.5 0.05 0.6 0.35 0 2 0 0 1 0 





may be integrated (asset integration) with the negative outcomes and participants may not 
necessarily understand the losses. Subsequently, this could affect the reference point 
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŵĂǇŶŽƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŽĨǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐ
in turn could lead to a biased estimation of loss aversion, potentially an underestimation of it. 
We believe this is not happening given the results we report later where loss aversion is 
emphatically present and there is a clear discrepancy between gains and losses in terms of 
probability weighting and utility curvature when the equality restriction is omitted.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
This section describes the formulation of the CPT and DT models and their subsequent 
employment in the econometric analysis. Both CPT and DT are treated as sign-dependent models 
and around the same reference point, considered to be zero. 
4.3.1 Model formulations 
To proceed with the CPT formulation, we need a specific functional form for the value function 
which would allow the estimation of the utility curvature parameters. This function, called value 
function in the jargon of CPT, shows clearly two desirable features of CPT, sign-dependence and 
reference-dependence. We make use of the most popular functional form in the literature, the 
piece-wise power function with different specifications for gains and losses: ݑሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ݔఈ ݂݅ݔ ൒  ?െߣሺെݔሻఉ݂݅ݔ ൏  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
The exponents ߙǡ ߚሺߙ ൐  ?ǡ ߚ ൐  ?ሻrepresent the utility curvature parameters for the gain and 
loss domain respectively and ߣሺߣ ൐  ?ሻis the loss aversion parameter where ߣ ൐  ? indicates loss 
aversion. Graphically, the most commonly found pattern is that of the S-shape where the utility 
shapes for gains and losses are convex and concave segments respectively whereas the loss 
aversion impact is depicted as a kink at the origin to show that losses matter more than 
equivalent gains.  
We also remain consistent with the literature and we impose the constraint ߙ ൌ ߚ in the 
estimation process of the model parameters. This constraint is almost unavoidable otherwise it 
is possible to end up with situations where for some ݔ in the domain of the value function to 
have uሺݔሻ ൐ െݑሺെݔሻwhich obviously contradicts the notioŶ ƚŚĂƚ  “ůŽƐƐĞƐ ůŽŽŵ ůĂƌŐĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ
ŐĂŝŶƐ ?  ?< ?d ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?41. Furthermore, if the constraint ߙ ൌ ߚ  was absent, the utility 
curvature in the loss domain would be confounded between ߚ and ߣ and would make it difficult 
to identify separately and reliably the treatment effects on each parameter42. That difficulty 
                                                          
41 Recall that that in order to have loss aversion, that is, steeper curvature for losses than for gains, for ݔǡ ݕ א Թାǡ ݔ ൐ݕ it should  ݑሺെݕሻ െ ݑሺെݔሻ ൐ ݑሺݔሻ െ ݑሺݕሻ  and if  ݕ ൌ  ? then the previous inequality becomes  ݑሺݔሻ ൏ ݑሺെݔሻ  
(see K&T, 1979; p. 279). 
42 Actually, if ߙ ് ߚ, then it is always ߙ ൏ ߚ and ߣ ا  ?and close to zero, an indication of loss seeking behavior which 
in general contradicts the literature. Obviously this is happening due to the confounding between loss aversion and 





stems from the implicit assumption that loss aversion has a local definition based on preferences 
close to the reference point. Essentially, we adopt the loss aversion definition of T&K (1992) 
where ߣ ൌ െݑሺെ ?ሻ ݑሺ ?ሻ ?  and after assuming that the value function ݑሺ ?ሻ is approximately linear 
around the reference point (at the closed interval ሾെ ?ǡ  ?ሿ) and differentiable at it, then loss 
aversion could result in the familiar kink at the reference point43. The nature of this definition is 
ĂŶŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƚƌĂĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨWdďƵƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚŝŶĚĞƌƵƐŝŶ
investigating the impact of higher stakes through the combination of different sets of choices of 
the two treatments. Note that this definition coupled with the constraint ߙ ൌ ߚ implies that the 
identification of loss aversion is based on the mixed outcomes (Wakker, 2010, p.259). 
As for the probability weighting function, we employ the probability weighting function 
introduced by Prelec (1998)   ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ିሺି௟௡௣ሻം  , ? ൏ ݌ ൏  ?ǡ ߛ ൐  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ  
where ݌is the probability argument and the parameter ߛrepresents the curvature, the slope of 
the probability weighting function. Whenߛ ൏  ?, the probability graph is the characteristic 
inverse S-shaped graph (T&K, 1992) whereas when ߛ ൐  ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂn S-shaped graph. Obviously when ߛ ൌ  ?, it is ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݌, so the probability graph is a straight line. In our analysis, we estimate the 
probability weighting function conditional on the sign of the outcomes, so we can write it as 
follows: ݓሺ݌ሻ ൌ ൝ݓାሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ିሺି௟௡௣ሻംశ ݂݅ݔ ൒  ?ݓିሺ݌ሻ ൌ ݁ିሺି௟௡௣ሻംష ݂݅ݔ ൏  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
According to CPT, the outcomes of each option are ranked in all three domains, gains, losses and 
mixed. For gains and losses, it is always ȁݔଵȁ ൏ ȁݔଶȁ ൏ ȁݔଷȁ and thus44, the utility derived from 
choosing each option is equal to  ܸ ൌ ݎݓሺ݌ଵሻݑሺݔଵሻ ൅ ݎݓሺ݌ଶሻݑሺݔଶሻ ൅ ݎݓሺ݌ଷሻݑሺݔଷሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where the ranked probability weights are defined as follows ݎݓሺ݌ଷሻ ൌ ݓሺ݌ଷሻ,  ݎݓሺ݌ଶሻ ൌ ݓሺ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଷሻ െ ݓሺ݌ଷሻ ݎݓሺ݌ଵሻ ൌ  ? െݎݓሺ݌ଶሻ െ ݎݓሺ݌ଷሻ 
                                                          
modelling approach). Note that the necessity of the constraint ߙ ൌ ߚ  also holds for other CRRA utility functional 
forms which nest the power function like the expo-power function (Harrison and Swarthout, 2016, p.19). 
43Note that in their seminal paper on loss aversion, Köbberling and Wakker (2005) formalized an alternative 
definition for loss aversion as the ratio of the two sided derivatives at the reference point i.e. ߣ ൌ ܷᇱି ሺ ?ሻ ܷାᇱ ? ሺ ?ሻ, 
but the differentiability of such CRRA functions may not be straightforward; nonetheless, if  ߙ ൌ ߚ, this definition 
can still be meaningful. 
44 For expository purposes, we treat the right option as having three outcomes,  ݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷǤ  Recall that the right 





and ݑሺݔଵሻǡ ݑሺݔଶሻǡ ݑሺݔଷሻare the corresponding values respectively that a participant assigns to 
each of the three outcomes ݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷof each option. As for the mixed domain, the ranking takes 
place only for the two positive outcomes ݔଶǡ ݔଷǡ ሺݔଵ ൏  ? ൑ ݔଶ ൏ ݔଷሻ  and it is   ݎݓାሺ݌ଷሻ ൌ ݓାሺ݌ଷሻ, ݎݓାሺ݌ଶሻ ൌ  ? െ ݓାሺ݌ଷሻ. 
Then, the cumulative prospective utilities of the negative outcome ݔଵand of the two positive 
outcomes ݔଶǡ ݔଷ are respectively: ܸି ൌ ݓିሺ݌ଵሻݑሺݔଵሻ ܸା ൌ ݎݓାሺ݌ଶሻݑሺݔଶሻ ൅ ݎݓାሺ݌ଷሻݑሺݔଷሻ 
Adding them up and we haveܸ ൌ ܸି ൅ ܸା, so that equation ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ is satisfied.  
The other model we employ is the Dual Theory (DT) model, introduced by Yaari (1987).  More 
recently, Schmidt and Zank (2007, 2009) extended this model to incorporate reference-
dependence. This DT model retains all the basic features of CPT listed above, reference-
dependence, sign-dependence and rank-dependence and the probabilities are still weighted 
through the Prelec function. The difference with the CPT model is that the value function is piece-
wise linear: ݑሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ݔ݂݅ݔ ൒  ?െߣሺെݔሻ݂݅ݔ ൏  ?ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
As previously mentioned, the utility for choosing either option comprised of three outcomes ݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ݔଷ, is again given by ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻbut this time ݑሺݔଵሻǡ ݑሺݔଶሻǡ ݑሺݔଷሻare described by the linear 
value function of equation ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ, not equation ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ as in CPT. A potential advantage of the DT 
over the CPT model is that the former constrains the treatment effects only on the probability 
weighting and the loss aversion parameters. In that way we avoid any possible confounding 
between utility curvature and loss aversion as in CPT and we isolate the treatment effects that 
could possibly affect utility only on the loss aversion parameter. Furthermore, since DT has fewer 
parameters than CPT, it allows us to reduce any potential issues of multicollinearity, an almost 
unavoidable problem especially in computationally intensive models like ours.   
As in Chapter 3, we assume a homogeneity of risk attitudes for all participants, i.e. their 
preferences are described either by CPT or DT in Chapter 4, too. We recognize that this is 
obviously a restriction which could prohibit us from capturing the full picture of risk attitudes in 
our sample. There are two possible ways through which we could account for heterogeneity. 
First, we could adopt a finite mixture model with CPT and DT as components of this mixture 
model. This is an approach which to our knowledge has not been utilized with models which 
explicitly incorporate loss aversion. Second, we could have accounted for multiple levels of 
heterogeneity in the values of all model parameters by using simulation techniques (maximum 
simulated likelihood) in a way similar to Conte et al. (2011) and von Gaudecker et al. (2011) (see 
also Moffatt (2015)). This is an interesting approach but it is computationally demanding and 
does not address the concerns about interaction among utility, probability and loss aversion. This 





methodology. However, the above complicate our analysis and therefore are beyond the scope 
of this chapter.     
4.3.2 Econometric modelling 
The estimation procedure we follow to estimate the aforementioned model parameters is based 
on the maximum likelihood technique. Employing a random utility approach (Andersen et al., 
2008), we assume that a participant݆ א ሼ ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ܬሽ, faces a series of questions ݅ א ሼ ?ǡ ǥ ܫሽwhere a 
binary choice is made between ݇options where ݇ א ሼܣǡ ܤሽ . Then, the utility ௜ܷ௝ǡ௞ of each 
participant is  ௜ܷ௝ǡ௞ ൌ ௜ܸ௝ǡ௞ ൅ ߳௜௝ǡ௞ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where ߳௜௝ǡ௞ are independent of each other across ݅ǡ ݆ǡ ݇and represent a stochastic specification 
that is typically assume to follow the standard logistic distribution.   
Given the notation we introduced and equationሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ, the utility of an individual from choosing 
either option can be written as 
௜ܸ௝ǡ௞ ൌ ݎݓ൫݌ଵ௜௝ǡ௞൯ݑ൫ݔଵ௜௝ǡ௞൯ ൅ ݎݓሺ݌ଶ௜௝ǡ௞ሻݑ൫ݔଶ௜௝ǡ௞൯ ൅ ݎݓ൫݌ଷ௜௝ǡ௞൯ݑሺݔଷ௜௝ǡ௞ሻሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
Thus, the choice of option A over option B implies that  ௜ܷ௝ǡ஺ ൐ ௜ܷ௝ǡ஻ ฺ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஺ െ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஻ ൐ ߳௜௝ǡ஻ െ ߳௜௝ǡ஺ 
and this probability equals ሺሻ ൌ Ȧ ൬ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஺ െ ௜ܸ௝ǡ஻ߪ ൰ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where Ȧሺ ?ሻ is the cumulative logistic distribution function i.e. Ȧሺݔሻ ൌ  ? ሺ ? ൅ ݁ି ௫ሻ ?  and ߪ is its 
standard deviation45. Note that Stott (2006) has shown that the utility power function coupled 
with Prelec probability weighting function of a single parameter and the logit specification is the 
combination providing the best explanatory performance for CPT. This is the model specification 
we use in this chapter. 
To estimate the treatment effect of the higher stakes on the model parameters, we use a dummy 
variable that corresponds to the higher stakes and we condition the utility curvature, the 
probability weighting and the loss aversion parameters on this dummy variable e.g.  ߞ ൌ ߞ଴ ൅ߞଵ כ ݏݐܽ݇݁; in this simple regression, the intercept ߞ଴ indicates the baseline treatment, ߞଵ 
indicates the treatment effect and ߞ the estimated parameter after the treatment 
implementation (see Fehr-Duda et al., 2010). For the error term the interpretation has to be 
conceptually different since the impact of higher stakes in essence represents an upscaling of the 
initial standard deviation ߪ which is now equal to  ݏ ൌ ߬ כ ߪ where ߬is the scale parameter. In 
that way, ߬ represents the increased likelihood in decision making errors for the participants 
when the magnitude treatment is applied. (see von Gaudecker et al. (2011)).   
                                                          
45  This standard deviation is considered to be equal to ߨ  ? ? ? ؆ 1.814 and practically it represents the decision 





Therefore, we estimate the vector of parameters ߠᇱ ൌ ሺߙ௟ǡ ߚ௟ǡ ߣ௟ǡ ߛ௟ାǡ ߛ௟ି ǡ ߬ሻ where the subscript ݈ א ሼ ?ǡݏݐሽ denotes the baseline and the magnitude treatment respectively. Note that we will 
also later report the standard deviation of the baseline treatment (ߪ) in order to better show the 
error term volatility.  Then, the maximum likelihood function via which the estimation of vector ߠ  of each model (CPT and DT) takes place through a logit specification is: 
 ஘  ൌ ෍ ෍ሾݕ௜௝ሺሺሺܣሻሻ ȁɅሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ݕ௜௝ሻሺሺ ? െሺܣሻሻ ȁߠሻሿ௃௝ୀଵூ௜ୀଵ ሺ ?Ǥ ?ሻ 
where ݕ௜௝ ൌ  ? if option A is preferred and ݕ௜௝ ൌ  ? if option B is preferred46. 
Note that the standard errors are clustered for each participant. This is happening since it is 
plausible to assume that a within-correlation for the answers of each participant may exist, and 
thus, the standard errors are not independent and this correlation has to be corrected through 
clustering. Finally, when the identification of model parameters is over, we utilize the Likelihood 
Ratio test to examine which model, CPT or DT, fits the data best. Note that we are going to 
compare the corresponding DT and CPT models, that is, models where the treatment effects are 
applied to the same parameters so that the comparison is meaningful. The program for the 
maximum likelihood estimation has been written in Stata 15. In Appendix C of this chapter a 
sample code for the CPT model has been included.   
 
4.4 Results 
In this section we present the results of the econometric analysis. At first, we examine the 
behavior of the CPT model in our data and then we switch to the DT model. But before we discuss 
ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?ĨŝƌƐƚǁĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂďƌŝĞĨĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŵĂĚĞ ?
Table 4.2 below shows how the choices made (right and left) are disentangled per domain and 
per treatment. For the gain and loss domain, there is a switch from the left to the right option 
(the sure thing), equal to around 6%. For the mixed domain, this switch is larger and it is equal 
to almost 10%. It is this last switch which is reflected econometrically in a statistically significant 







                                                          
46 Of course, the construction of the maximum likelihood is generic and is not affected by the type of models and is 





Table 4.2  Choices per domain and treatment 
 Baseline Magnitude 
Domain Right Left Right Left 
Gains 46.99% 53.01% 53.08% 46.92% 
Losses 60.50% 39.50% 66.88% 33.12% 
Mixed 45.47% 54.43% 55.37% 44.63% 
 
4.4.1 CPT models 
By employing the CPT model, we investigate the impact of different treatment scenarios on the 
model parameters, by concentrating on loss aversion and utility curvature initially and 
subsequently on probability weighting. We summarise the models and the different application 
of treatments on utility, probability and loss aversion in Table 4.3:   
 
Table 4.3 Treatment effects application 
 Models 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Treatments application        
Utility (ߙ௦௧ ǡ ߚ௦௧)    3 3 3 3 
Probability (ߛ௦௧ା ǡ ߛ௦௧ି) 3  3 3 3   
Loss aversion (ߣ௦௧)  3 3 3  3  
 
 
4.4.1.1 Loss aversion and utility in CPT 
All the results of the CPT models we discuss are presented in Table 4.4. We start with model [1] 
to determine the impact of higher stakes on the probability parameters only. We first notice that 
the utility of the model is very close to one and statistically equal to one i.e. ߙ ൌ ߚ ൌ 1 (݌ ൌ0.111) and so it can be comfortably considered to be a straight line. The loss aversion parameter 
is ߣ ൌ1.576 and can assume values close to 2 since it is ߣ ൌ1.9 (݌ ൌ0.104). Of course, an issue 
that arises here is that this value does not necessarily reflect the impact of higher stakes and 
therefore it could well be biased. Yet, the presence of a loss averse behavior is established 
comfortably here. This model with this specific treatment implementation is useful in examining 






Table 4.4 CPT models (Standard errors in parentheses)47 























































































































(0.497) ߪ 3.253*** 3.257*** 3.219*** 2.173*** 2.173*** 2.161*** 2.153*** 
 (0.945) (0.749) (0.77) (0.378) (0.378) (0.376) (0.382) ܰ 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 ܶ 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 ݈݋݃ܮ -5068.24 -5052.4 -5051.14 -5044.94 -5007.85 -5045.63 -5013.26 
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Model [2], where treatment is confined to loss aversion only, offers an isolation of the higher 
stakes impact on loss aversion and thus, a first tangible estimation of it. The loss aversion for the 
baseline treatment is ߣ଴ ൌ1.115 and we can safely assume a loss neutral behavior (ߣ଴ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.345). Under higher stakes the treatment effect is ߣ௦௧ ൌ1.487, which leads to a substantial 
increase in loss aversion since ሺߣ௦௧ ߣ଴ ? ሻ ൌ 1.33; for the total loss aversion under higher stakes, 
after adding up the baseline coefficient and the treatment effect, we end up with a value equal 
to ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ2.6. However, from a statistical point of view, loss aversion can assume even larger 
values, above 3 (ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ3.35, ݌ ൌ0.11). Thus, after decomposing loss aversion into two 
values corresponding to the two treatments we have shown that loss neutral behavior can be 
transformed into a strongly loss averse behavior when higher stakes are in use. Another 
observation in model [2] is that utility curvature is a bit larger than one, ߙ ൌ ߚ ൌ1.14, and this 
also holds statistically (ߙ ൌ ߚ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.026). Inevitably the utility findings expose a possible 
                                                          
47 We had ܰ ൌ 119 participants who completed ܶ ൌ66 questions. As mentioned previously, three questions were 





collapse of the S-shape value function. It is unclear the source of the problem here but this issue 
is re-examined under different treatment combinations later.   
In model [3] treatment effects on the probability parameters are added on top of those of loss 
aversion. The advantage this model is that it may hint at a connection between loss aversion and 
probability weighting under higher stakes, if it exists, through the comparison with the previous 
model [2]. Loss aversion at the baseline treatment is minimal with a value at ߣ଴ ൌ1.103 (ߣ଴ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.384) which jumps by ߣ௦௧ ൌ1.668 (ߣ௦௧ ߣ଴ ൌ ? 1.511) under higher stakes. Ultimately, in the 
presence of higher stakes loss aversion is elevated at ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ2.77, and which statistically can 
be above 3.5 (ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ3.65, ݌ ൌ0.11). The bottom line is that loss aversion again increases 
substantially with values slightly larger than those of model [2]. The similarity in values between 
the two models implies a narrow probability impact for loss aversion. The utility curvature 
parameters at 1.15 are statistically larger than one (ߙ ൌ ߚ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.025) and the S-shape value 
function collapses, albeit marginally, once more. This can be seen in Fig. 4.1a below48. 
 
Fig. 4.1a Value function graph for CPT (model [3]) 
 
 
We now turn our attention to the pair of models, [4] and [5] where treatment effects are applied 
to all parameters. First in model [4], where we impose a double linear constraint on the utility 
parameters for each treatment i.e. ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴, ߙ௦௧ ൌ ߚ௦௧. This double constraint is necessary in 
order for loss aversion to be properly identified both in the baseline (ߣ଴) and in the magnitude 
treatment as well (ߣ௦௧).  The loss aversion for the baseline treatment is the same as that of 
models [2] and [3] and statistically it is ߣ଴ ൌ  ? (݌ ൌ0.239). Nonetheless, the impact of higher 
stakes on loss aversion is almost double that of the baseline treatment since according to the 
delta method it is ሺߣ௦௧ ߣ଴ ? ሻ ൌ1.91. This means that the loss aversion in the magnitude treatment 
is quite large since algebraically it is ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ3.318, assuming potentially really large values 
close to five, i.e. ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ5 (݌ ൌ0.126). This is a striking result that shows that loss aversion 
                                                          
48 Because the parameters of the CPT models are quite close to each other, for brevity of space we only present 
the graph for the value function of model [3]. Likewise, for probability weighting, we later present the graphs only 





can be very volatile. There are two caveats here: the first is the variability of the treatment effects 
since ߣ௦௧has a large standard error (see Table 4.4). The second is that this apparent spike in loss 
aversion is partly offset by a rise in the utility for gains since ߙ௦௧ ൌ 0.343, on top of a practically 
linear utility specification for the baseline treatment i.e. ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴ ൌ1 (݌ ൌ0.531). This is a 
puzzling result because conditional on the linearity of probability weighting for gains (ߛ଴ା ൅ߛ௦௧ା ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.671) it implies risk seeking behavior under higher stakes for gains. On the other 
hand, the equal treatment effect for losses, ߚ௦௧ ൌ 0.343, leads to a concave value function for 
losses and thus, offsetting the behavior in the gain domain. The large values for the treatment 
effects on utility seem non-intuitive and probably emerge because of the double linear 
constraint. Perhaps re-arranging or loosening these constraints could offer another modelling 
perspective. Note that previously we were able to talk about risk averse behavior in the gain 
domain simply because there are no treatment effects on probability and thus, utility suffices to 
describe risk preferences; if probability weighting was not linear, this claim would not have been 
valid (Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994).  
An obvious question that arises is what would happen if we had explicitly controlled for no 
treatment effects on loss aversion. This would have isolated the impact of higher stakes on utility 
and probability alone. In fact, we have tried to disentangle utility curvature from loss aversion, 
but contrary to model [3], this happens with treatments effects to have been applied on utility; 
model [5] presents this complementary approach. A single linear constraint only for the baseline 
treatment is applied i.e. ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴ along with the standard assumption that loss aversion is 
positive (ߣ ൐  ?)49. The results for the baseline treatment for all the parameters of model [5] do 
not change compared to model [4]. Furthermore, there are few changes in the loss domain 
where the utility treatment effects for losses, (ߚ௦௧ ൌ0.428) are statistically significant indicating 
again a concave value function for losses and they are also quite close in value with those of 
model [4] where ߚ௦௧ ൌ0.343; neither of the probability treatment effects are affected and remain 
statistically insignificant. Subsequently, only a small increase in utility curvature reflects the 
changes in risk preferences in the loss domain. On the other hand, in the gain domain there is a 
clear effect on utility that is negative (ߙ௦௧ ൌ-0.416) along with a probability treatment effect 
(ߛ௦௧ା ൌ0.375). However, probability is always perceived linear here since it is ߛ଴ା ൌ  ?(݌ ൌ0.326) 
and  ߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௦௧ା ൌ  ? (݌ ൌ0.124). Thus, risk behavior again is driven primarily by utility and not 
probability, signalling risk averse behavior.  
The general conclusion we derive from all the above, coupled with the results of model [4], is an 
apparent trade-off between treatment effects of loss aversion (ߣ௦௧) and the utility for gains (ߙ௦௧). 
Notably, it illustrates the prominence of loss aversion over utility curvature in the loss domain 
and the importance of disjointing these two factors in order to properly interpret the empirical 
findings of CPT. Of course, this conclusion reflects the mechanism behind the estimation of loss 
aversion as we have explained earlier where it tends to be ߙ ا ߚ and ߣ to be close to zero. Yet, 
                                                          
49 We reported previously that if the constraint ߙ ൌ ߚ is absent in the power utility function then ߣ ՜  ?. This is also 
happening here for the loss aversion under the magnitude treatmentሺߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ሻ ՜  ?. So, had we not assumed that ߣ ൐  ? we would end up with very low loss aversion for higher stakes, which given the aforementioned is a 
nonsensical result and it is not prevalent in the literature. Note that if loss aversion could assume negative values 
then the utility for losses could be non-negative (ܷሺെݔሻ ൐  ?). Obviously, irrespective of the impositionߣ ൐  ?, the 





it reveals an insensitivity in the utility for losses under higher stakes irrespective of the presence 
of loss aversion, which in turn implies that loss aversion is the factor that carries the effect of 
higher stakes in the loss domain. Note that an insensitivity in the value function for losses has 
been reported before in the literature (Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010) even 
though it was about the lack of treatment effects and additionally, loss aversion was not present 
in the modelling process.  
We draw similar conclusions from the other pair of models [6] & [7] even though in this case the 
probability treatment effects have not been applied. Again for model [6] a double linear 
constraint is imposed (ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴ and ߙ௦௧ ൌ ߚ௦௧); the utility treatment effects are sufficient enough 
(ߙ௦௧ ൌ ߚ௦௧ ൌ0.338) to lead a linearly assessed utility for the baseline treatment (ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.616) to a concave value function for losses and convex for gains. As for loss aversion, an 
initially loss neutral behavior where (ߣ଴ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.246) becomes a more definite loss averse 
behavior whereሺߣ௦௧ ߣ଴ ? ሻ ൌ1.68, ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ 3.05and which ultimately could give rise to large 
loss aversion values ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ4.3 (݌ ൌ0.12) the variability of which can also be quite large. All 
in all, these results are in line with model [4].  
For model [7] where we only apply the constraint ߙ଴ ൌ ߚ଴, the effects in utility for losses are 
significant, quite large in value (ߚ௦௧ ൌ0.445) but close to that of model [6] (i.e. ߚ௦௧ ൌ 0.338) 
resulting to a concave value function. For the gain domain, we end up the effect with a negative 
effect on utility (ߙ௦௧ ൌ-0.352) whereas probability weighting has practically no impact since it is ߛା ൌ  ? (݌ ൌ0.702). The bottom line is that a similar kind of inverse relationship between loss 
aversion and utility for gains arises. So, loss aversion again emerges as the crucial behavior-driven 
factor in CPT capturing the higher stakes effect; as for the probability factor, it does not appear 
to be particularly crucial after all. 
We have not commented yet on the error parameters of the CPT models. We report the scale 
parameter ߬ that shows the rise in error variance under the magnitude treatment. In addition, 
we also report the error term, ߪ, for the baseline treatment in order to show the complete 
picture of the error term variation. The values that ߪ assumes (up to 3.25) are relatively close to 
the standard deviation of the logistic distribution. For models [1]-[3] ߬  can assume relatively large 
values, signalling that higher stakes might lead to a substantial increase in the error variance. On 
the other hand, for models [4]-[7], we find via the delta method that ߬ is always statistically 
insignificant and equal to one50. This implies that conditioning all the CPT parameters on higher 
stakes (apart perhaps from probability, see models [6], [7]) leads to practically no change in the 
error variance and thus, no change in the error judgement in the decision making process. This 
is an important point to consider that demonstrates vividly how stochastic errors could vary 
when treatments or potentially other explanatory variables are applied. Relatively high error 
rates as those of models [1] to [3] have long been reported in the literature (Camerer, 1989) and 
beyond lab experiments (von Gaudecker et al., 2011). Other error term specifications are 
theoretically possible e.g. the employment of a tremble error or errors that are specific to each 
individual, but are not examined in this chapter.  
                                                          





4.4.1.2 Discussion of results 
A fundamental conclusion we draw from the empirical analysis of the CPT models is the sharp 
rise in loss aversion, which can more than double, when treatment effects are applied. This rise 
is independent of the presence of treatment effects on utility and probability. Such a spike in loss 
aversion may well mirror a change in preferences which is probably related to the tight budget 
constraint of most students who participated in the experiment (see Novemsky and Kahneman 
(2005) for an amplification of this argument). However, it might also convey a more emotionally-
related fear for losses which our experimental design cannot capture. Note that in this 
experiment, we only vary the scale of the magnitude of the rewards while participants are not 
subject to framing effects. The existence of such effects could force loss aversion not only to its 
increase but also to its elimination as Beauchamp et al. (2012) have shown. Moreover, this 
conclusion can be related to the volatility of loss aversion that arises due to changes in the 
framing context in riskless choices which has been documented in different areas of economics 
(e.g. Horowitz and McConnell (2002); Sayman and Öncüler (2005); Plott and Zeiler (2005)). In any 
case, it is important to stress that loss aversion can increase with more than two outcomes in the 
mixed domain and with probabilities of winning that are not necessarily fifty-fifty. This is a small 
vindication for K&T (1979) and shows the robustness of their initial insight about the stake-
dependence of loss aversion even when more elaborate experimental designs are in place.  
Another major finding about loss aversion, which is reproduced in the DT models as well, is the 
absence of loss aversion in the baseline treatment. This is in agreement with recent papers on 
structural CPT modelling which report similar numbers well below the almost sacrosanct loss 
aversion value of around  two (Harrison and Rutström, 2009; Nilsson et al., 2011; Zeisberger et 
al., 2012; Harrison and Swarthout, 2016; Murphy and ten Bricke, 2018). Unfortunately ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ
have a definite answer why this is happening, we can only speculate. One reason could bethat 
the relatively low money of the baseline treatment, up to £10, simply does not induce loss 
aversion. Another reason could be the experimental design itself, in the sense that the large 
number of questions and the existence of options with more than two outcomes fail to capture 
properly the fundamental insight of loss aversion, the preference differential between gains and 
losses for mixed options (Rieskamp, 2008). An alternative and perhaps a bit heretical 
interpretation is that there is nothing wrong with this finding: the parameter estimates of T&K 
(1992) were median estimates derived from non-linear least squares which may not be 
comparable to estimates based on maximum likelihood; this is a very difficult problem to solve 
since it reflects the contrast of different methodological approaches both in terms of design and 
parameter estimation51. 
We have also found that the usual S-shape of the value function for CPT could be violated when 
higher stakes are employed. This violation of the S-shape means that diminishing sensitivity (risk 
aversion in the gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain) which is one basic tenet of CPT 
encounters difficulties in replication. In the literature there have been reports of a concave or a 
linear utility for losses (Fennema and van Assen, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; 
                                                          
51 We want to remain agnostic about the true value of loss aversion and we hold no prior beliefs about its existence 
or not. Therefore throughout this chapter we avoid reporting one-tail t-tests for the hypothesis ߣ ൌ  ? and we stick 





Wakker et al., 2007); the empirical evidence tends to be more supportive for the concavity of 
gains literature albeit this has also been challenged (Malul et al., 2013). One explanation for this 
violation is the imposition of linear constraints for the full identification of loss aversion which 
leads to computational complexity and makes it easier for a non S-shape value function to 
follow52. This observation highlights the genuine difficulties in fully separating utility and loss 
aversion and controlling for their interactions even when a local definition of the latter is utilized. 
There may be one additional reason for the concavity for losses and the convexity for gains: 
perhaps the participants perceive the outcomes as too large, so that a miscalculation could turn 
out to be near ruinous for them (this could well be the case since the participants are students). 
In this case, the usual S-shaped value function is deemed inadequate to describe risk preferences 
(Kahneman, 2003). Put simply, the elicitation of stake dependent preferences poses a big hurdle 
for the value function shape of CPT. 
4.4.1.3 Probability weighting in CPT 
We now turn our attention to probability weighting. For gains and in the baseline treatment, 
models [1] to [6] have values very close to 0.9. So, the fact that it is ߛ଴ା ൏  ? confirms the fourfold 
pattern of T&K (1992), although for model [7] with no treatment effects on probability and loss 
aversion, the probability curvature is slightly above 1; yet, for all models, statistically it is ߛ଴ା ൌ  ? 
meaning an approximately linear probability perception in the gain domain that holds even when 
higher are present (models [1], [3], [4] and [5]) given that statistically it is ߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௦௧ା ൌ  ?, thus, the 
usual inverse S-shape dictated by the fourfold is only partly replicated. On the other hand, in the 
loss domain probability curvature is always larger than one i.e. ߛ଴ି ൐  ? resulting in an S-shape 
probability pattern, exactly the opposite of what the fourfold pattern assumes. This pattern 
remains unchanged under higher stakes. An S-shape implies a probabilistic risk seeking for low 
probability losses and probabilistic risk aversion for high probability losses respectively. In Fig. 
4.1b below, we present the probability weighting graphs for model [3].  
Although less common, S-shaped patterns for the probability weighting function have been 
reported before in the literature (Fennema and Wakker, 1997; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Harbaugh 
et al., 2010). In an extensive modeling exercise, Balcombe and Fraser (2015) even report that 
non-inverse S-shape weighting functions are more prevalent in their data than inverse S-shape 
ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƵŶƚŚŝŶŬĂďůĞƚŚĂƚĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝty exists in our data that 
could distort conventional probability weighting and ultimately gives rise to other patterns than 
the usual inverse S-shape (see also Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012)). Furthermore, most 
experimental designs rely predominantly on large and small probabilities and less on 
intermediate ones to elicit observations; yet, this practice could inadvertently lead to a better fit 
of the data through the inverse S-shape pattern, something that may help explain the dominance 
of this pattern (Stewart et al., 2015). In addition, probability parameters tend to be estimated in 
the gain and loss domains without considering mixed options where the outcomes are separately 
evaluated in each domain and then they are added up. Thus, in the context of CPT with more 
than two outcomes, probability weighting in either domain could possibly interact with loss 
aversion. Harrison and Swarthout (2016) who have attempted to estimate probability 
parameters conditional on loss aversion and by using options with three outcomes, also report 
                                                          





non-inverse S-shaped weighting functions for losses. Note that in the original version of PT, K&T 
(1979) report discontinuity at both ends of the probability scale graph which closely resembles a 
convex weighing function with a potentially high curvature parameter as in our case. So, the 
fourfold pattern should not be taken as a panacea for the probability weighting function graphs.  
 
Fig. 4.1b Probability weighting graphs for CPT per domain (model [3]) 
 
 
Regarding the probability treatment effects, they exist only for model [1] in the loss domain 
where ߛ௦௧ି ൌ 0.558 as well as for model [5] in the gain domain where ߛ௦௧ା ൌ0.375. This means that 
separability is present only when loss aversion treatment effects are non-existent (see models 
[1] and [5]). The definition of separability is given in p. 3. An explanation could be that the 
presence of treatment effects on loss aversion and utility invalidates separability because 
apparently the full force of higher stakes is not absorbed by probability weighting alone as in 
model [1]. This may also be due to our experimental design which is more dense and it does not 
focus mostly at the two ends of the probability range as happens with the designs of Fehr-Duda 
et al. (2010) and Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017) who report separability violations. For model 
[5] in particular, the arisen separability in the gain domain is part of the aforementioned impact 
on the gain domain parameters when the loss aversion treatment effect has been controlled. 
Despite its existence, separability is not substantial is not substantial in revealing any important 
role for probability weighting since the shape of the weighting function remains practically linear 
for model [5] i.e.  ߛ଴ା ൅ ߛ௦௧ା ൌ  ?(݌ ൌ0.124) while for model [1], the weighing function retains 
the clear S-shape. Finally, the rather limited presence of separability makes us doubt about any 
sizeable contribution of the probability factor towards loss aversion, at least under higher stakes 
and in the manner of Zank (2010), although we cannot offer statistical confirmation because our 
analysis is not based just on fifty-fifty options in the mixed domain. All these results leave as an 
open-ended question the existence of an underlying relationship between loss aversion and 
probability weighting. This question is reconsidered under the DT model.  
4.4.2 DT models 
Now we turn our attention to the DT model. As with CPT, we first examine loss aversion and then 
shift to probability weighting. Since there are no utility parameters under DT, we have only three 





Note that comparison is made with the corresponding models of CPT where the treatment 
applications are similar: these are the pairs of models [1]-[8], [2]-[9] and [3]-[10]. In model [8], 
where treatment effects are applied only to probability, loss aversion has a value 1.507, pretty 
close to that of 1.576 of model [1]. This implies that the role of the utility curvature may be rather 
limited in affecting loss aversion. The absence of treatment effects on loss aversion does not 
allow us to estimate the exact impact of higher stakes making the 1.507 loss aversion value 
ƵŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶĐĞŝƚ ?ƐĂĐŽŶĨŽƵŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
In model [9] now, treatment effects are applied only on loss aversion. Initially loss aversion is 
equal to 1.128 (ߣ଴ ൌ1, ݌ ൌ0.495) but after considering the higher stakes it jumps by an almost 
equal value, that is, ߣ௦௧ ൌ1.199 and ሺߣ௦௧ ߣ଴ ? ሻ ൌ1.062. In turn, higher stakes give rise to a loss 
aversion parameter equal to ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ2.328 which statistically can be larger and close to 3 
(ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ2.84, ݌ ൌ0.101). These results are again very close to these of model [2] (see Table 
4.4). The crucial difference with the CPT model is that utility is deemed linear here and the value 
function is just a dichotomous straight line. Hence, the fact that loss aversion remains 
qualitatively unaffected by the employment of the DT model means that the violation of the S-
shape value function in model [2] is not a major source of concern.  
 
Table 4.5 DT models (Standard errors in parentheses)53 





(0.089) ɀୱ୲ା  0.119 
(0.116) 
 0.228 





(0.158) ɀୱ୲ି 0.693** 
(0.32) 
 0.138 





(0.121) ɉୱ୲  1.199*** 
(0.292) 
1.267*** 





(1.783) ߪ 2.22*** 2.037*** 1.97*** 
 (0.29) (0.22) (0.199) ܰ 119 119 119 ܶ 66 66 66 ݈݋݃ܮ -5072.69 -5061.55 -5060.25 
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05*p<0.10 
 
In model [10] the picture is very similar to that of model [9] in spite of the application of 
treatment effects on the probability parameters as well: the loss aversion for the baseline 
                                                          





treatment is 1.144 (ߣ଴ ൌ 1, ݌ ൌ0.234) discloses loss neutrality converted to a loss averse 
behavior after higher stakes kick in, since ߣ௦௧ ൌ1.267 and ሺߣ௦௧ ߣ଴ ? ሻ ൌ1.107. This is translated to 
a total loss aversion value of ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ2.411 and a statistical upper limit equal to 3 (ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ௦௧ ൌ3, ݌ ൌ0.101). The closeness with model [9] reveals once again that the impact of probability 
treatments is minimal. Furthermore, the loss aversion results appear to be a bit smaller than in 
ƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐWdŵŽĚĞů ? ? ? Ž ?/ƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƐƵĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
existence of a constraint for CPT coupled with the larger number of parameters present.  
All in all, the results of DT models so far show that loss aversion does not really change compared 
to the corresponding CPT models. This is a considerable advantage of DT given its simpler value 
function form. This chapter confirms previous findings that it is not inconceivable to expect a 
linearity or near linearity of utility to emerge for relatively small stakes (Wakker, 2010; Åstebro 
et al., 2015), validating thus, the employment of a DT model. Besides, the employment of the DT 
model removes any concerns about violations of the S-shape of the value function which appears 
as a side-effect in attempting to estimate treatment effects on loss aversion. Fig. 4.2a below 
shows the value function for model [10] which has the same treatment effects implementations 
as model [3] in CPT whose graphs were reported earlier. 
As with the CPT models, higher stakes cause a considerable increase in the variance of the 
stochastic error in all three models. Note that the values of ߬ are close with the ߬ values for the 
corresponding CPT models, [1], [2], [3]. Furthermore, the error term for the baseline treatment, ߪ, is very close to the standard deviation of the logistic distribution. However, the fewer 
parameters in DT mean that the levels of noise cannot be alleviated and the error is always high 
under higher stakes. So, in terms of data fitting this could prove to be a small advantage for CPT, 
as reflected in models [4]-[7], despite the similar values that DT returns for loss aversion and 
probability weighting. We attempt later to offer a formal model comparison perspective through 
the Likelihood Ratio test.  
 







From Table 4.5, we can see that in the gain domain, the probability parameters of all the DT 
models for the baseline treatment are less than one in value, so the fourfold pattern is satisfied. 
The numbers are only slightly larger compared to those for the CPT model. This picture is not 
altered when we consider the treatment effects where for both models [8] and [10], it is ߛ଴ା ൅ߛ௦௧ା ൌ  ?, so the linearity of the probability is not affected, but the fourfold pattern, at least in 
principle, is not satisfied. In the loss domain, the probability parameters are also very close to 
those for the CPT models and since it is always ߛ଴ି ൐  ?, the probability weighting function graph 
is an S-shape exactly as under CPT, so again the fourfold pattern is violated. The above point to 
an unaffected role for probability as in CPT despite the omission of utility curvature. Fig. 4.2b 
below shows the probability weighting graphs for models [10].  
As for separability under DT, it arises only for model [8] in the loss domain where ߛ௦௧ି ൌ0.693 
(݌ ൌ0.03). Recall that the definition of separability is given in p. 3. This means that the results 
for DT are close and in accordance with the results for the corresponding CPT model, that is, 
separability exists only when the effect of higher stakes on loss aversion is controlled. Again, the 
S-shape of the weighting function in the loss domain remains unaffected under higher stakes. 
So, the general conclusion we can draw from both CPT and DT is that separability only arises 
under very specific circumstances, particularly when loss aversion treatment effects are absent. 
Thus, one should be cautious in emphasizing the existence of separability and the importance of 
probability weighting under higher stakes54. 
 
Fig. 4.2b Probability weighting graphs for DT per domain (model [10]) 
 
 
4.4.3 Models comparison 
Finally, we can also use the Likelihood Ratio test (1989) to see which of the two models, the CPT 
or the DT best describes our data. We do not compare models where treatment effects are 
applied differently because such models obviously examine the impact of higher stakes under 
different perspectives. So, we test for three different models pairs of CPT and DT: [1]-[8], [2]-[9] 
and [3]-[10]. For the models pair [1]-[8], the Likelihood Ratio test is 8.9, much larger than the 
                                                          
54Note that the divergence of the probability parameters for gains and losses in the baseline treatment for both CPT 
and DT could imply a connection between loss aversion and probability. Yet, this is a question beyond the scope of 





critical value ȱሺସሻ଴Ǥଽହଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? (or even ȱሺ଼ሻ଴Ǥଽହଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? if we take into account the presence of 
treatment effects in increasing the degrees of freedom), and reveals a preference for CPT over 
EUT. Likewise, for the models pair [2]-[9], the Likelihood Ratio test returns 18.3 and for the 
models pair [3]-[10] it returns 18.22. Thus, for all pairs of models the CPT model is comfortably 
preferred over the DT model in offering a better data fit despite the latter returning similar 
results for loss aversion and probability weighting.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have studied the effect of substantially higher payoffs on CPT, the most 
comprehensive decision theory for modelling human behavior. We have adopted an 
experimental approach where we have not taken any of the basic stipulations of CPT for granted, 
on the contrary all of them were tested. Our empirical analysis has concentrated on loss aversion. 
The main result of this study is the sizeable rise of loss aversion under higher stakes, a result 
independent of the treatment applications on other parameters. Although the exact magnitude 
of this rise can vary, potentially greater than three, and can be conditional on the treatments 
imposed, this is nonetheless evidence that loss aversion is a complex concept such that a single 
number around two is simply inadequate to represent it. The establishment of this result, 
unreported before for risky choices, strengthens the hypothesis of K&T (1979) about the loss 
aversion and the connection with stakes since it has taken place in the context of CPT and with 
options that are not simply fifty-fifty. We believe that our finding is not unrelated to the 
experimental evidence on loss aversion instability in riskless choices where valuations are 
context dependent (Kahneman et al., 1999). As such, loss aversion, and the whole of CPT in 
general, should be subject to more intense experimental investigation to further quantify loss 
aversion. 
A second conclusion about loss aversion is the non-existence of it in the baseline treatment with 
low stakes, up to £10. Obviously this is not in accord with the famous phrase "losses loom larger 
than gains", but it is not an uncommon finding when more advanced computational models of 
CPT have been deployed more extensively (see Harrison and Swarthout (2016) for a review). We 
can only surmise why this result occurs. In principle it could be that the money offered in that 
treatment were considered low or that the questions in the mixed domain were not the simple 
fifty-fifty options or even that the participants were integrating losses with the endowment so 
that losses are not felt severely by the participants. This is a difficult point that ought to be picked 
by researchers in the future.  
We also report an apparently inverse relationship between the treatment effects for loss 
aversion and the utility for gains by manipulating the constraints we impose. This result, 
identifies the role of loss aversion as a crucial factor in the mechanics of CPT, when experimental 
treatments are implemented. It further highlights the hidden dangers in utilizing global 
definitions of loss aversion where the confounding between utility and loss aversion is 
unavoidable (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). A potentially peripheral finding is the non S-shape value 
function, although it is very marginal, when treatment effects are applied on loss aversion. The 





This reflects largely computational issues regarding the interactions between loss aversion and 
utility and the presence of linear constraints. But it also hints at a local loss aversion definition 
may be insufficient in order to estimate accurate treatment effects. In this case, DT is a useful 
alternative modelling option that overcomes some of these problems. 
The evidence for the existence of separability is rather limited and in particularly they reveal that 
separability is present conditional on the absence of treatment effects on loss aversion. We are 
unsure if this is a side-effect of the computations behind the maximum likelihood estimation or 
if indeed it reveals any closer than hitherto thought connection between loss aversion and 
probability weighting. We do not allow ourselves to rush into conclusions and we strongly believe 
that this is a question that merits further research. Another interesting finding that has emerged 
is the S-shape of the probability weighting function for the loss domain. We suspect that this is 
happening due to the presence of loss aversion, hidden heterogeneity in the data or even due to 
the employment of up to three outcomes and not the usual two outcomes for an option. 
Acknowledging the lack of empirical studies on structural CPT models, we believe that the 
probability weighting patterns ought to be further examined conditional on the presence of loss 
aversion. Perhaps this shape of the weighting function is an additional empirical finding that 
challenges specific regularities of CPT (Harrison and Ross, 2017). 
Note fŝŶĂůůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞdŵŽĚĞůŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŚŝŐŚĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƉĂƌƐŝŵŽŶǇƐŝŶĐĞŝƚ ?ƐĂƐŝŵƉůĞƌŵŽĚĞůƚŚĂŶ
CPT. This can proven to be a very useful feature especially outside the lab: when a plethora of 
individual characteristics are elicited, then a potentially very large number of parameters would 
need to be identified. DT as a simpler model could possibly increase the computational easiness 
without sacrificing the estimation accuracy. This could stand as an opportunity in the decision 
theory literature to reconsider this often overlooked model. 
It remains an open question how one ought to handle the reference dependence feature of CPT. 
The previously mentioned theoretical developments on the reference point formulation are not 
easy to be translated into an empirical model specification and as a result, the questions about 
the existence of a degree of asset integration are not easily answerable. Thus, this remains a 
moot point in the literature. Nonetheless, the implementation of appropriate implemented 
treatments in an experimental design which could test for a possible shift in reference point 
when higher stakes are utilized seems to be feasible in the same spirit as the techniques of this 
chapter. But still, even if such a shift is observable, the mechanism behind the development of 
reference points seems to be a black box.  
Another undecided matter is the complicated nature of loss aversion. Camerer (2005) claimed 
that loss aversion may not only be a preference manifestation but also an emotional reaction or 
even a judgment mistake.  The role of emotions and feelings in particular is a factor that merits 
further investigation implying a hedonic-related experience which could better reveal loss 
aversion and its variability mechanisms. The literature offers answers which are largely context-
dependent and show that loss aversion is present as long as gains and losses are expressed in 
the same context (McGraw et al., 2010), it may be present only under higher stakes after 
employing experienced utility based techniques (Carter and McBride, 2013) as well as when 
feelings are extrapolated on decision choices (Charpentier et al., 2016) or it may not exist at all 





In any case, matching the loss aversion parameter from detailed-descriptive choice questions to 
the derived feelings from these choices, or the reverse process of it, and all these in the light of 
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ Ă ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ĂŶĚ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ Ă ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
question to be tackled econometrically since we are unaware of an approach that accounts for 
emotional reactions and has been put in the context of a structural model requiring simultaneous 
parameter estimation.  
It would also be interesting to investigate how higher stakes may interact with other explanatory 
variables (e.g. age, gender, educational level, income, cultural characteristics etc.) and impact 
loss aversion and the other CPT parameters in the context of a field experiment. In that way we 
could account for observed heterogeneity which has been absent in our analysis since the sample 
of the students is quite homogeneous. Besides, it may be also interesting to try to model loss 
aversion at the individual level, too, since aggregation could mask different individual-based 
trends for the model parameters. This is a promising approach but it also raises issues of 
computational complexity and is likely to require the employment of powerful algorithms 
(hierarchical bayesian modelling) in order to be fruitful. These are definitely challenging 
computational tasks. All the aforementioned constitute some challenges researchers could 





















Appendix A: The questions 
 
Table 4.6  Gain domain options-Second block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
0 2.5 10 0 0.8 0.2 0 3.5 0 0 1 0 
0 1.5 9.5 0.15 0.2 0.65 0 6 0 0 1 0 
0 8 9 0.75 0.05 0.2 0 1.5 0 0 1 0 
0 1.5 10 0 0.5 0.5 0 5 0 0 1 0 
0 8.5 9.5 0.1 0.15 0.75 0 8 0 0 1 0 
5 0 10 0.7 0 0.3 0 6.5 0 0 1 0 
0 5.5 10 0.1 0.55 0.35 0 6 0 0 1 0 
0 5.5 10 0.05 0.5 0.45 0 7 0 0 1 0 
0 1.5 10 0.1 0.3 0.6 0 6.5 0 0 1 0 
0 3 9 0.3 0.1 0.6 0 5 0 0 1 0 
0 1 10 0.25 0.6 0.15 0 1.5 0 0 1 0 
0 3 9.5 0.15 0.3 0.55 0 4.5 0 0 1 0 
 
 
Table 4.7  Gain domain options-Third block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
0 0 10 0.6 0 0.4 0 2.5 0 0 1 0 
0 1 10 0.2 0.35 0.45 0 3.5 0 0 1 0 
0 0 9.5 0.35 0 0.65 0 6 0 0 1 0 
0.5 8.5 10 0.1 0.55 0.35 0 8 0 0 1 0 
0.5 6.5 9.5 0.6 0.15 0.25 0 2.5 0 0 1 0 
0 0.5 10 0.1 0.05 0.85 0 7.5 0 0 1 0 
0 0.5 10 0 0.75 0.25 0 2 0 0 1 0 
1.5 5 9.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0 5 0 0 1 0 
0.5 0 9.5 0.3 0 0.7 0 5.5 0 0 1 0 
0 2.5 9.5 0 0.15 0.85 0 8.5 0 0 1 0 
0 5.5 10 0.05 0.5 0.45 0 6.5 0 0 1 0 













Table 4.8  Loss domain options-First block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
-9.5 0 0 0.55 0 0.45 0 -5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -1 0 0.5 0.45 0.05 0 -5.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -5.5 0 0.6 0.35 0.05 0 -7.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 0 0 0.25 0 0.75 0 -2 0 0 1 0 
-8.5 -0.5 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 -1.5 0 0 1 0 
-9 -3 0 0.35 0.65 0 0 -4.5 0 0 1 0 
-8.5 0 0 0.75 0 0.25 0 -6.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -5 -1.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0 -5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -4 0 0.35 0.65 0 0 -5.5 0 0 1 0 
-9 0 0 0.45 0 0.55 0 -4 0 0 1 0 
-8.5 0 -2.5 0.25 0 0.75 0 -3.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -1.5 0 0.6 0.05 0.35 0 -6.5 0 0 1 0 
 
Table 4.9  Loss domain options-Second block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
-10 -4 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 -7.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -6.5 -0.5 0.6 0.15 0.25 0 -7 0 0 1 0 
-10 -3.5 0 0.65 0.35 0 0 -8 0 0 1 0 
0 -9 -2 0 0.45 0.55 0 -5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -7.5 0 0.45 0.05 0.5 0 -4 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -5.5 -2 0.1 0.05 0.85 0 -3 0 0 1 0 
-8 -7.5 -0.5 0.65 0.1 0.25 0 -6 0 0 1 0 
-9 -7 0 0.45 0.4 0.15 0 -6.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -3.5 0 0.25 0.75 0 0 -4.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -5 -1.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0 -4.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -9 -2.5 0.25 0.3 0.45 0 -6.5 0 0 1 0 
-9 -1.5 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 -3.5 0 0 1 0 
 
Table 4.10  Loss domain options-Third block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
-9.5 -1.5 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 -7.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -2.5 0 0.55 0.45 0 0 -6 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 0 -0.5 0.1 0 0.9 0 -1.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -3 0 0.35 0.05 0.6 0 -3 0 0 1 0 
-8.5 -3.5 0 0.65 0.05 0.3 0 -6 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -1 0 0.65 0.35 0 0 -7 0 0 1 0 
0 -9 -1.5 0 0.35 0.65 0 -4 0 0 1 0 
-9 -3.5 0 0.65 0.05 0.3 0 -5.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 0 0 0.6 0 0.4 0 -4.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 -3.5 0 0.65 0.35 0 0 -7.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 -3.5 0 0.25 0.6 0.15 0 -4.5 0 0 1 0 






Table 4.11  Mixed domain options-First block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
-10 0 8.5 0.75 0.1 0.15 0 -7 0 0 1 0 
-8 2 5.5 0.05 0.5 0.45 0 2.5 0 0 1 0 
-0.5 0 5.5 0.25 0.2 0.55 0 2.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 0 0 0.65 0.35 0 0 -6.5 0 0 1 0 
-7.5 0.5 0 0.35 0.65 0 0 -1.5 0 0 1 0 
-9 0 6.5 0.25 0.65 0.1 0 -2.5 0 0 1 0 
-4.5 0 10 0.3 0 0.7 0 2 0 0 1 0 
-0.5 0 9 0.05 0.4 0.55 0 3 0 0 1 0 
-10 0 6.5 0.35 0.6 0.05 0 -1 0 0 1 0 
 
 
Table 4.12  Mixed domain options-Second block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
-8.5 0 8 0.15 0.05 0.8 0 2 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 0 9 0.25 0.6 0.15 0 -1 0 0 1 0 
-8.5 0 4.5 0.8 0.05 0.15 0 -5.5 0 0 1 0 
-10 0 3 0.1 0 0.9 0 1 0 0 1 0 
-0.5 0 7.5 0.45 0 0.55 0 1.5 0 0 1 0 
-7 0 9 0.05 0.55 0.4 0 2.5 0 0 1 0 
-9 0 8.5 0.05 0.8 0.15 0 0 0 0 1 0 
-10 0 0 0.15 0 0.85 0 -1.5 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 0 4 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 -4.5 0 0 1 0 
 
 
Table 4.13   Mixed domain options-Third block 
x11 x12 x13 p11 p12 p13 x21 x22 x23 p21 p22 p23 
-9 3 0 0.45 0.55 0 0 -3 0 0 1 0 
-7 0 8.5 0.5 0.05 0.45 0 -1.5 0 0 1 0 
-7.5 0 9 0.05 0.35 0.6 0 4.5 0 0 1 0 
-8 0 8 0.65 0.3 0.05 0 -5 0 0 1 0 
-9 0 1 0.6 0 0.4 0 -5.5 0 0 1 0 
-1.5 0 9 0.7 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
-9.5 0 7.5 0.5 0.45 0.05 0 -4 0 0 1 0 
-8.5 0 8.5 0.05 0.25 0.7 0 2 0 0 1 0 









Appendix B: Experimental instructions 
Welcome! You are going to participate in an economic experiment on decision making under 
uncertainty. Please put in silent mode your mobile phones. All your decisions will be anonymous 
and the data generated will be treated strictly confidentially.  
The experiment is consisted of 6 parts and in each part you will be asked to answer a series of 
questions, where you will have to choose between different two different options. The pair of 
options consist of a Left and a Right Option. You are asked to indicate which of the two options, 
Left or Right, you prefer to buy. Below you can see an example of how the questions you will face 
in a while will look like: 
 
                         Left Option                                                           Right Option 
 
Both options are presented in the form of pie charts. The rewards are presented as separate 
regions and the size of each region is proportional to the chance of winning of the reward. Next 
to each region you can see labels which specify the exact reward and its corresponding chance 
of winning. So, the Left Option consists of the rewards £8 and £1 with 30% and50% chance of 
winning them respectively and the negative reward (loss) -£3 (grey area) with 20% chance of 
winning. On the other hand, the Right Option consists of a single and certain reward of £2.  
To indicate your choice, you circle either Left or Right in the last column next to the options. You 
circle only one option, either Left or Right. 
For most questions you will have a cash endowment (written next to the options). In this example 
it is £3, so the potential losses would be deducted from the endowment. This means that you 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚƉĂǇĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨǇŽƵƌƉŽĐŬĞƚ. The endowment could change from question to question, 
but it will always be equal to the larger possible loss you may face. Note that the endowment is 
applicable only to losses, not gains. 
The Right Option will always be a single and certain reward but that reward could change from 
question to question. Note also that losses will always be depicted as grey areas. 
Apart from the above mixed Left Option, you will also face questions where the rewards are only 
gains or only losses, too. When the rewards are only losses, again all potential losses will be 
0 
  
















deducted from the question-specific endowment. The rewards and the corresponding chance of 
winning could change from question to question and you will also face questions where the 
rewards will be much larger, up to £60. Furthermore, you may also face questions where the Left 
Option has two rewards but not options with more than three rewards. 
 
Payment process:    
Assume that the above decision question has been randomly selected for payment at the end of 
the experiment and you have chosen the Left Option. A random number between 1 and 100 will 
be drawn by using a 10-sided dice. If the number drawn is between, and including, 1 and 20 (20% 
chance of winning) you lose £3 out of your endowment, that is your earnings would be £3-£3=£0; 
if the number is between 21 and 70 (50% chance of winning), you receive £1. Finally, if the 
number is between 71 and 100 (30% chance of winning), you will receive £8.  Of course, if you 
choose the Right Option, you will receive £2. 
The payment process for options with only gains or only losses will be of similar nature. 
At the end of the session each one of you will receive £5 as a participation fee. In addition, 1 in 
5 of you will be randomly chosen by picking a number out of a hat and will be given the 
opportunity to receive rewards up to £60, based on their answers in a randomly selected decision 
question. All rewards are in cash and are in addition to the £5 show-up fee. 
For statistical needs, please answer all the questions. There are no correct or wrong answers. 




Appendix C: Sample code for the CPT model 
capture program drop CPT_prelec1_log_rev 
program define CPT_prelec1_log_rev 
args lnf alpha beta gamma_plus gamma_minus lambda noise 
tempvar prob1l prob2l prob3l prob1r prob2r prob3r m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 dw_prob1l_ga  dw_prob2l_ga   
tempvar dw_prob3l_ga  dw_prob1r_ga  dw_prob2r_ga  dw_prob3r_ga  
tempvar dw_prob1l_lo  dw_prob2l_lo  dw_prob3l_lo  dw_prob1r_lo  dw_prob2r_lo  dw_prob3r_lo  
tempvar dw_prob2l_mix dw_prob3l_mix dw_prob2r_mix dw_prob3r_mix we_min_le_mx we_min_ri_mx  
tempvar y1left y2left y3left y1right y2right y3right euL euR euDiff  
 quietly { 
generate double `prob1l'=$ML_y2 





generate double `prob3l'=$ML_y4 
generate double `prob1r'=$ML_y5 
generate double `prob2r'=$ML_y6 
generate double `prob3r'=$ML_y7 
generate double `m1' = $ML_y8 
generate double `m2' = $ML_y9 
generate double `m3' = $ML_y10 
generate double `m4' = $ML_y11 
generate double `m5' = $ML_y12 
generate double `m6' = $ML_y13 
*Left lottery first 
*Gains 
generate double `dw_prob1l_ga'=. 
generate double `dw_prob2l_ga'=. 
generate double `dw_prob3l_ga'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob3l_ga'=exp(-(-ln(`prob3l'))^ `gamma_plus')                                               if  sign2==1 
replace         `dw_prob3l_ga'=0                                                                                 if  `prob3l'==0 & sign2==1 
replace         `dw_prob2l_ga'=exp(-(-ln(`prob2l' + `prob3l'))^ `gamma_plus') - `dw_prob3l_ga'                   if  sign2==1  
replace         `dw_prob2l_ga'=0                                                                                 if  `prob2l'==0 & `prob3l'==0 & sign2==1 
replace         `dw_prob1l_ga'=1 - `dw_prob3l_ga' - `dw_prob2l_ga'                                               if  sign2==1  
replace         `dw_prob1l_ga'=0                                                                                 if  `prob1l'==0 & sign2==1 
*Left lottery 
*Losses 
generate double `dw_prob1l_lo'=. 
generate double `dw_prob2l_lo'=. 
generate double `dw_prob3l_lo'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob1l_lo'=exp(-(-ln(`prob1l'))^ `gamma_minus')                                              if  sign2==2 
replace         `dw_prob1l_lo'=0                                                                                 if `prob1l'==0 & sign2==2 
replace         `dw_prob2l_lo'=exp(-(-ln(`prob2l' + `prob1l'))^ `gamma_minus') - `dw_prob1l_lo'                  if  sign2==2  
replace         `dw_prob2l_lo'=0                                                                                 if  `prob2l'==0 & `prob1l'==0 & sign2==2 





replace         `dw_prob3l_lo'=0                                                                                 if `prob3l'==0 & sign2==2   
*Right lottery now 
*Gains 
generate double `dw_prob1r_ga'=. 
generate double `dw_prob2r_ga'=. 
generate double `dw_prob3r_ga'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob3r_ga'=exp(-(-ln(`prob3r'))^ `gamma_plus')                                               if  sign2==1 
replace         `dw_prob3r_ga'=0                                                                                 if `prob3r'==0 & sign2==1 
replace         `dw_prob2r_ga'=exp(-(-ln(`prob2r' + `prob3r'))^ `gamma_plus') - `dw_prob3r_ga'                   if  sign2==1  
replace         `dw_prob2r_ga'=0                                                                                 if  `prob2r'==0 & `prob3r'==0 & sign2==1 
replace         `dw_prob1r_ga'=1 - `dw_prob3r_ga' - `dw_prob2r_ga'                                               if  sign2==1  
replace         `dw_prob1r_ga'=0                                                                                 if `prob1r'==0 & sign2==1   
*Right lottery 
*Losses 
generate double `dw_prob1r_lo'=. 
generate double `dw_prob2r_lo'=. 
generate double `dw_prob3r_lo'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob1r_lo'=exp(-(-ln(`prob1r'))^ `gamma_minus')                                              if  sign2==2 
replace         `dw_prob1r_lo'=0                                                                                 if  `prob1r'==0 & sign2==2 
replace         `dw_prob2r_lo'=exp(-(-ln(`prob2r' + `prob1r'))^ `gamma_minus') - `dw_prob1r_lo'                  if  sign2==2  
replace         `dw_prob2r_lo'=0                                                                                 if   `prob2r'==0 & `prob1r'==0 & sign2==2 
replace         `dw_prob3r_lo'=1 - `dw_prob1r_lo' - `dw_prob2r_lo'                                               if  sign2==2  
replace         `dw_prob3r_lo'=0                                                                                 if  `prob3r'==0 & sign2==2 
*Mixed gambles now 
*Left lottery 
generate double  `we_min_le_mx'=. 
replace          `we_min_le_mx'= exp(-(-ln(`prob1l'))^ `gamma_minus')         if  sign2==3  
replace          `we_min_le_mx'=0                                             if  `prob1l'==0 & sign2==3 
 
generate double `dw_prob2l_mix'=.   






replace         `dw_prob3l_mix'= exp(-(-ln(`prob3l'))^`gamma_plus')                if  sign2==3 
replace         `dw_prob3l_mix'= 0                                                 if  `prob3l'==0 & sign2==3 
replace         `dw_prob2l_mix'= 1 - `dw_prob3l_mix' - `we_min_le_mx'              if  sign2==3 
replace         `dw_prob2l_mix'= 0                                                 if  `prob2l'==0 & sign2==3 
*Right lottery 
generate double  `we_min_ri_mx'=. 
replace          `we_min_ri_mx'= exp(-(-ln(`prob1r'))^ `gamma_minus')        if sign2==3   
replace          `we_min_ri_mx'= 0                                           if `prob1r'==0 & sign2==3 
 
generate double `dw_prob2r_mix'=.   
generate double `dw_prob3r_mix'=. 
 
replace         `dw_prob3r_mix'= exp(-(-ln(`prob3r'))^`gamma_plus')                if  sign2==3 
replace         `dw_prob3r_mix'= 0                                                 if  `prob3r'==0 & sign2==3 
replace         `dw_prob2r_mix'= 1 - `dw_prob3r_mix' - `we_min_ri_mx'              if  sign2==3 
replace         `dw_prob2r_mix'= 0                                                 if  `prob2r'==0 & sign2==3 
*Evaluating the utility function 
*Left lottery first 
generate double `y1left' = . 
replace `y1left' = ( `m1')^(`alpha')            if sign2==1 | (sign2==3 & `m1'>=0) 
replace `y1left' = -`lambda'*(-`m1')^(`beta')   if sign2==2 | (sign2==3 & `m1'<0) 
 
generate double `y2left' = . 
replace `y2left' = ( `m2')^(`alpha')            if sign2==1 | (sign2==3 & `m2'>=0) 
replace `y2left' = -`lambda'*(-`m2')^(`beta')   if sign2==2 | (sign2==3 & `m2'<0) 
 
generate double `y3left' = . 
replace `y3left' = ( `m3')^(`alpha')            if sign2==1 | (sign2==3 & `m3'>=0) 
replace `y3left' = -`lambda'*(-`m3')^(`beta')   if sign2==2 | (sign2==3 & `m3'<0) 
 
*Right lottery now 





replace `y1right' = ( `m4')^(`alpha')           if sign2==1 | (sign2==3 & `m4'>=0) 
replace `y1right' = -`lambda'*(-`m4')^(`beta')  if sign2==2 | (sign2==3 & `m4'<0) 
 
generate double `y2right' = . 
replace `y2right' = ( `m5')^(`alpha')           if sign2==1 | (sign2==3 & `m5'>=0) 
replace `y2right' = -`lambda'*(-`m5')^(`beta')  if sign2==2 | (sign2==3 & `m5'<0) 
 
generate double `y3right' = . 
replace `y3right' = ( `m6')^(`alpha')           if sign2==1 | (sign2==3 & `m6'>=0) 
replace `y3right' = -`lambda'*(-`m6')^(`beta')  if sign2==2 | (sign2==3 & `m6'<0) 
*The utility of each lottery 
generate double `euL'=. 
replace         `euL'= (`dw_prob1l_ga'*`y1left')+(`dw_prob2l_ga'*`y2left')+(`dw_prob3l_ga'*`y3left')               if sign2==1 
replace         `euL'= (`dw_prob1l_lo'*`y1left')+(`dw_prob2l_lo'*`y2left')+(`dw_prob3l_lo'*`y3left')               if sign2==2 
replace         ` euL'= (`we_min_le_mx'*`y1left')+(`dw_prob2l_mix'*`y2left')+(`dw_prob3l_mix'*`y3left')           if sign2==3 
 
generate double `euR'=. 
replace       `euR'= (`dw_prob1r_ga'*`y1right')+(`dw_prob2r_ga'*`y2right')+(`dw_prob3r_ga'*`y3right')      if sign2==1 
replace      `euR'= (`dw_prob1r_lo'*`y1right')+(`dw_prob2r_lo'*`y2right')+(`dw_prob3r_lo'*`y3right')         if sign2==2 
replace     `euR'= (`we_min_ri_mx'*`y1right')+(`dw_prob2r_mix'*`y2right')+(`dw_prob3r_mix'*`y3right')   if sign2==3 
generate double `euDiff' = (`euR' - `euL')/`noise' 
replace `lnf' = ln(invlogit( `euDiff')) if $ML_y1==1 
replace `lnf' = ln(invlogit(-`euDiff')) if $ML_y1==0 
} 
end 
ml model lf CPT_prelec1_log_rev (alpha: option p1left p2left p3left p1right p2right p3right prize1 prize2 prize3 















In this dissertation, we have investigated experimentally in three different lab experiments, the 
decision making process under risk conditional on the presence of higher stakes and time delay. 
To obtain a picture of risk preferences which is as complete as possible and to examine their 
variation when payoffs are higher or delayed, our econometric analysis utilizes the two most 
well-known decision theory models, EUT and CPT, as well as the lesser known DT model. Our 
analysis is extended in three chapters and even though it is initially confined in the gain domain 
only (Chapter 2), then it is expanded to include losses (Chapter 3) and finally mixed options 
(Chapter 4), the latter necessary for the estimation of loss aversion.  
In Chapter 2 we conducted an experiment where we tried to establish if any link between the 
risk and time parameters exists and in addition to determine how their relationship is affected 
when payments are delayed. The results show a shift towards rising risk tolerance as time passes. 
Yet, we have not succeeded in showing a clear relationship between patience and risk 
preferences because attitudes with respect to time change only marginally. So, our overall 
conclusions are limited to risk preferences only. Apparently, it seems that our experimental 
design was not dense enough in terms of the range of time delays, and thus, it failed to capture 
changes in time attitudes. There is also evidence about a stabilization of preferences for both 
risk and time dimensions. Construal Level Theory (CLT) offers theoretical foundation that could 
possibly explain such an outcome (Sagristano et al., 2002), but this is a finding that should also 
be tested under different experimental designs as well. We have also made use of the Eckel-
Grossman (2008) (EG) method, which is a method based on the choice participants make among 
different options rather than the initial matching process. This method confirms much more 
emphatically the switch towards a risk tolerant behavior since almost half of the participants 
report change in risk attitudes after four months. It is likely that these more emphatic results are 
attributable to the nature of the EG method which returns interval estimates of risk parameters, 
making thus more discernable the changes in risk preferences. 
All in all, in Chapter 2 we have shown that risk attitudes are susceptible to change when time 
delay is an explicit factor in decision making process. Our failure to show any relationship 
between patience and risk preferences demonstrates the necessity of using other types of 
experimental designs, too. The use of iterative bidding processes or Multiple Price Lists like the 
one advocated by Holt and Laury (2002) for risk elicitation and Coller and Williams (1999) for 
time elicitation could be useful for such a task. Moreover, multiple time delays are necessary in 
order to manifest clearly the tendency towards stabilization for risk and time preferences. In any 
case, the question about the relationship between risk and time has not been fully addressed by 
the economics literature (Coble and Lusk (2010) is an exception) and we believe that it is an 





Chapter 3 also studied risk behavior under time delay, but in contrast to Chapter 2 we also 
examined risk behavior for the loss domain as well as the potential impact of higher stakes in 
both domains. The popular Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) method was employed for the elicitation 
of risk preferences, which were modelled after Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT). Under higher stakes and employing the sign-dependent EUT model, we 
ĐĂŶ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ŽĨ DĂƌŬŽǁŝƚǌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ-based fourfold pattern, which causes 
changes in utility curvature. These changes are also present in the CPT model where we found 
that higher stakes weaken reflection effect leading to the rejection of this hypothesis, implying 
different behavioural responses per domain in terms of utility curvature. In addition, a second 
layer of differential responses is found in probability weighting where treatment effects exist 
only in the loss domain; the outcome is risk averse behaviour for both gains and losses, an 
outcome that is due to the elevation parameter of the probability weighting functions. When the 
lotteries were delayed, the validity of the reflection effect was unaffected since the time delay 
impact on utility is minimal. Treatment effects are detectable only on probability weighting in 
the gain domain and they show a rise in risk tolerance, in line with the results of Chapter 2 which 
were obtained under different statistical methodology. In addition, the non-existence of 
treatment effects in the loss domain reveals an asymmetry between risk preferences for 
temporal gains and losses. This is in agreement with the sign effect in delay discounting 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), but it is centred on temporal risk preferences, not time 
preferences.  
The above results show the inherent difficulties that EUT and CPT face in handling higher stakes 
and furthermore, they show the importance of probability weighting in the modelling process, 
both for atemporal and temporal risk preferences as well. Another factor that ought to be taken 
into account here is the influence of emotions on decision making (Lo et al., 2005; Chapurat et 
al., 2013). This constitutes an important parameter not considered in this dissertation that is 
likely to be responsible for the existence of probability treatment effects. More elaborate 
econometric techniques, like a finite mixture model approach that would allow the combination 
of both EUT and CPT so that to account for unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences is a 
potentially appealing path to follow, even though the HL design may not be appropriate for such 
a modelling exercise since it has been shown to bias probability weighting and subsequently CPT 
over EUT (Drichoutis and Lusk, 2016). A potential drawback in the outlined analysis of Chapter 3 
is the non-elicitation of time discount rates. Although this is a straightforward process for the 
gain domain based on the approach by Coller and Williams (1999), we are unaware of any 
implementation of their approach in the loss domain and under an analytic economic approach 
as that of Chapter 3. This is an issue that researchers could consider for the future.  
In Chapter 4 we adopted an experimental design that accounted for the two main deficiencies 
of the HL design: first, the few outcomes that might not be enough to capture accurately utility 
curvature and second, the absence of mixed options containing both gains and losses in order 
the loss aversion parameter to be properly identifiable. We used options with up to three 
outcomes and we tested how the CPT model parameters react when higher stakes are employed 
and especially how loss aversion is affected. The main conclusion that follows from Chapter 4 is 
the volatility of loss aversion since this parameter assumes larger values, potentially more than 





various treatment effects implementations or to the modelling process of loss aversion after CPT 
or DT. However, for lower stakes we failed to confirm experimentally the presence of loss 
aversion since this parameter is always considered to equal one and loss neutral behavior follows 
naturally. After having controlled for no treatment effects on loss aversion, we found slight 
change on the utility curvature for losses, but much larger for utility in the gain domain. This 
demonstrates the importance of loss aversion over utility, and on the other hand, it shows that 
loss aversion along with the utility for gains are the main drivers of the change in preferences 
under higher stakes. We found weak evidence for the existence of probability treatment effects 
under higher stakes; nonetheless, they do appear when treatment effects on loss aversion are 
not implemented. The relationship between probability weighting and loss aversion is a difficult 
issue that has not been considered empirically and deserves future research (Fehr-Duda and 
Epper, 2012).Finally, we have found that the DT model is almost equally suitable in describing 
our data as the CPT model without compromising the accuracy of probability weighting 
parameters and loss aversion. This could be a useful finding for applied researchers who want to 
measure risk preferences in the field, where controlling for demographic variables leads to a rise 
in the dimensionality of the estimated parameters vector and thus, numerical estimation 
becomes more difficult. Such a situation necessitates the employment of a simpler model like 
DT.  
The above results show that loss aversion is a concept the value of which cannot easily be 
quantified. The abrupt increase in its value may conceal elements of an emotional shift in the 
light of higher losses (Camerer, 2005); then, risk preferences alone may be insufficient to justify 
this increase. This could well imply that tracking the emotional reactions of the participants is 
necessary in order firm conclusions to be drawn. We are also unsure about how to explain the 
loss neutral behavior for lower stakes; perhaps, the magnitude of the outcomes has played a role 
here, but this is a point that could be further examined using multiple ranges of outcomes as 
experimental treatments. It is also possible that these findings hide heterogeneity at the 
individual level; this is a difficult issue to handle that in order to be modelled requires advanced 
econometric techniques and powerful algorithms. Furthermore, loss aversion could be 
potentially affected by non-experimental factors like culture, religion (Wang et al., 2017). All 
these are factors not examined in this dissertation but a fresh look on them as loss aversion 
explanatories could be worthwhile.  
This dissertation has studied preferences for decisions under risk and has shown that risk 
attitudes formed according to popular decision theory models like EUT and CPT, are context 
dependent when higher stakes are on offer or when the payments are available in future dates. 
The role of probability weighting and the volatility of loss aversion has been highlighted in 
Chapters 3 and 4. These are factors that future researchers could have a fresh look upon. 
Nonetheless, we recognize that our econometric approach in Chapters 3 and 4 has a potential 
limitation in the fact that it fails to account for the existence of heterogeneity. We have already 
hinted at Chapters 3 and 4 at two different types of heterogeneity which could be appropriate 
for our lab experiments: the unobserved heterogeneity which could be tackled by using finite 
mixture models where more than one decision theory models can account for risk attitudes, and 
the continuous heterogeneity with respect to the model parameters where the latter are better 





2015). These are interesting econometric avenues for future analysis since they have not been 
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